residuary clause in Rhode Island

2015Accordingly, Dauray has not suffered an injury in fact and there no longer remains “a justiciable question as to [her] right to share in the deceased’s estate.” Apollonio, 101 R.I. at 587 , 225 A.2d at 788 .

2015Accordingly, Dauray has not suffered an injury in fact and there no longer remains “a justiciable question as to [her] right to share in the deceased’s estate.” Apollonio, 101 R.I. at 587 , 225 A.2d at 788 .

2006Pertinent to the case at bar, a defining characteristic of the residuary clause is that "where there are other definite and important bequests, [the residuary clause] cannot be taken as the primary and principal factor determinative of testamentary intent; it is a catch-all." Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Votolato, 102 R.I. 467 , 483 , 231 A.2d 491 , 499-500 (1967) (quoting State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 130 A. 483 , 490 (1925)).

2006Pertinent to the case at bar, a defining characteristic of the residuary clause is that "where there are other definite and important bequests, [the residuary clause] cannot be taken as the primary and principal factor determinative of testamentary intent; it is a catch-all." Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Votolato, 102 R.I. 467 , 483 , 231 A.2d 491 , 499-500 (1967) (quoting State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 130 A. 483 , 490 (1925)).

2005Id.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1976Any reference herein to the testator’s children shall exclude Andrew and apply only to the five children named in the residuary trust. 3 For examples of cases involving this doctrine see Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009 , 83 S.W.2d 369 (1930) ; Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 55 , 242 N.E.2d 848 (1968) ; Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96 , 190 S.W.2d 1015 (1945): Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34 , 65 S.E.2d 317 (1951); cf. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.

1974DiCristofaro stresses that in Haslam v. de Alvarez, supra, *319 a gift of “* * * all real estate owned by me or in which I may have an interest” was held to be specific.

1970I. 370, 252 A.2d 335 ; First Baptist Church v. Soban, 77 R.

1969I give, devise and bequeath, absolutely and in fee simple, as follows: * * * "One-Third (1/3) thereof to the Newport Hospital Nurses Alumni Association to be used to provide scholarships for persons who desire to make nursing their vocation and who have the intention and purpose to become good bedside nurses." [3] The complainant is designated in the title of this case as Alumnae Association of the Newport Hospital School of Nursing; in the pertinent part of the residuary clause set out in n. 2, supra, it is described as "Newport Hospital Nurses Alumni Association." The difference between the

1967In State Bank & Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 328 , 130 Atl. 483 , 490, the court held: ’ ■ “In most cases a residuary clause, where there are other definite and important bequests, cannot-be taken as the primary and principal factor determinative of testa- . mentary intent; it is a catch-all, a refuse,group; a provision which operates after the operation of the other provisions of a given will; its logical position is the same as its local position,'at the end of the testamentary process, not at the beginning.” What is said about the location of a residuary clause is equally applicable t

1967I. 314, 132 Atl. 888 , that the words “rest and residue” in the absence of language showing a contrary intention mean the estate remaining after satisfying all previous ■ gifts.

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1962There is a general presumption against a testator's intending partial intestacy and that is greatly strengthened when we are dealing, as here, with the residuary clause." See also Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 427 ; Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193 ; Edwards v. Martin, 54 R.I. 64, 67 , 169 A. 756 ; Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262 .

1952Carpenter v. Smith, 77 R.I. 358 , 75 A.2d 413 .

1952Carpenter v. Smith, 77 R.I. 358 , 75 A.2d 413 .

1925Hospital Trust Company et als., 275 Fed. 513 , in which case the court held that' the residuary clause of Mr. Davis’ will was void.

1914We are, therefore, of opinion that, as the residuary clause of the will blends real and personal estate and gives it to the heirs-at-law of the testator, the persons answering that description should enjoy the whole, there being nothing to indicate a contrary intention on the part of the testator.” In Mason v. Baily, 6 Del.

1912S. 737.) “It was held by this court in Hutton v. Benkard ( 92 N. Y. 295 ), that the rule laid down in Section 126 (supra), touching the execution by will of a power as to real estate, should be applied to personal estate also, and it follows, therefore, that it is the law of this state that by the residuary clause, by which Mrs. Mildeberger gave to her husband all the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, she executed the power of appointment given to her by her grandmother’s will, unless it appears expressly, or by necessary implication from the language of the will, that it was not her

1891Thus in Hoppock et al. v. Tucker, 59 N. Y. 202 , it was held to be the testator’s intent that certain children named in a residuary clause should take as a class, and it was accordingly so construed.

1878Ch. 614 ; Gridley v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 1 ; but it is well supported on authority, especially when, as in the case at bar, the residuary clause is not preceded by any devise of real estate, or when, as in the case at bar, the residue of the entire estate “ not hereinbefore disposed of ” is given, and the executor is himself residuary devisee.