residuary clause in Tennessee

2005A residuary clause only "strengthens the presumption that the testator intended his entire estate to pass by his will." In re Frolich's Estate, 295 A.2d at 452 .

2005A residuary clause only “strengthens the presumption that the testator intended his entire estate to pass by his will.” In re Frolich’s Estate, 295 A.2d at 452 .

2025Appellant argues that the coin collection is money, i.e., intangible personal property, that should pass to him under the residuary clause of the Will, supra. Appellee contends that the trial court correctly determined that the coin collection is tangible personal property that passes to her under the Disposition of Personal and Household Effects provision of the Will, supra. The trial court relied on In re Estate of Darken, No. M2016-00711-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 7378806 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016), for the proposition that a coin collection is tangible personal property.

2025Appellant argues that the coin collection is money, i.e., intangible personal property, that should pass to him under the residuary clause of the Will, supra. Appellee contends that the trial court correctly determined that the coin collection is tangible personal property that passes to her under the Disposition of Personal and Household Effects provision of the Will, supra. The trial court relied on In re Estate of Darken, No. M2016-00711-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 7378806 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016), for the proposition that a coin collection is tangible personal property.

2005“Every word used by a testator in a will is presumed to have some meaning.” In re Estate of Jackson, 793 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) (citing Third Nat’l Bank v. Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988)).

1996In Bradshaw v. Cruise, 51 Tenn. 260 (1871), in an action challenging the terms of the sale of the decedent’s personal estate, this Court stated that it was the administrator’s “duty to sell the property, and so to sell as to secure the best price for the benefit of the creditors and distributees.

1976Ingham’s Estate, 315 Pa. 293 , 172 A. 662 , 93 A.L.R. 510 ; Verchot’s Estate, 4 Wash.2d 574 , 104 P.2d 490 .” In Fehringer v. Fehringer, 222 Tenn. 585 , 439 S.W.2d 258 (1969), language identical to that used in the instant residuary clause was construed.

1976Ingham’s Estate, 315 Pa. 293 , 172 A. 662 , 93 A.L.R. 510 ; Verchot’s Estate, 4 Wash.2d 574 , 104 P.2d 490 .” In Fehringer v. Fehringer, 222 Tenn. 585 , 439 S.W.2d 258 (1969), language identical to that used in the instant residuary clause was construed.

1976Ingham’s Estate, 315 Pa. 293 , 172 A. 662 , 93 A.L.R. 510 ; Verchot’s Estate, 4 Wash.2d 574 , 104 P.2d 490 .” In Fehringer v. Fehringer, 222 Tenn. 585 , 439 S.W.2d 258 (1969), language identical to that used in the instant residuary clause was construed.

1976Ingham’s Estate, 315 Pa. 293 , 172 A. 662 , 93 A.L.R. 510 ; Verchot’s Estate, 4 Wash.2d 574 , 104 P.2d 490 .” In Fehringer v. Fehringer, 222 Tenn. 585 , 439 S.W.2d 258 (1969), language identical to that used in the instant residuary clause was construed.

1970So, the rule does not apply if the intention of the testator is manifested to the contrary, as where an intestacy would otherwise be created, or when such general expression occurs in a residuary clause, or in a. general bequest of the testator’s estate, or in a will that does not contain a residuary disposition.” In Arnold v. Groobey, 195 Va. 214 , 77 S.E.2d 382 (1953) a prominent attorney concluded his will with the words “any other property — my interest in the Home Estate at Waverly — is given to my brother * * which were held to dispose of all of the residue of the estate.

1970So, the rule does not apply if the intention of the testator is manifested to the contrary, as where an intestacy would otherwise be created, or when such general expression occurs in a residuary clause, or in a. general bequest of the testator’s estate, or in a will that does not contain a residuary disposition.” In Arnold v. Groobey, 195 Va. 214 , 77 S.E.2d 382 (1953) a prominent attorney concluded his will with the words “any other property — my interest in the Home Estate at Waverly — is given to my brother * * which were held to dispose of all of the residue of the estate.

1970Complainant cites Fox v. Fox, 102 Tenn. 77 , 50 S.W. 765 (1899), wherein the issue was whether the residuary clause provided distribution to the heir absolutely or to a trustee for the benefit of the same heir.

1970Complainant cites Fox v. Fox, 102 Tenn. 77 , 50 S.W. 765 (1899), wherein the issue was whether the residuary clause provided distribution to the heir absolutely or to a trustee for the benefit of the same heir.

1969In Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187 , 30 S.W.2d 227 , the devise was of a half interest to each of two life tenants with remainders “to the heirs of his body.” And Justice Swiggart, who was not given to loose reasoning or writing, said that, since “the will contains no residuary clause, nor any provision disposing of the reversion, in the event of death of either of the life tenants * * * without leaving heirs of his body”, the reversion passed as intestate property to the heirs at law of the testatrix. *595 Tlie conclusion here reached is that which is compelled by

1969In Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187 , 30 S.W.2d 227 , the devise was of a half interest to each of two life tenants with remainders “to the heirs of his body.” And Justice Swiggart, who was not given to loose reasoning or writing, said that, since “the will contains no residuary clause, nor any provision disposing of the reversion, in the event of death of either of the life tenants * * * without leaving heirs of his body”, the reversion passed as intestate property to the heirs at law of the testatrix. *595 Tlie conclusion here reached is that which is compelled by

1969In Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187 , 30 S.W.2d 227 , the devise was of a half interest to each of two life tenants with remainders “to the heirs of his body.” And Justice Swiggart, who was not given to loose reasoning or writing, said that, since “the will contains no residuary clause, nor any provision disposing of the reversion, in the event of death of either of the life tenants * * * without leaving heirs of his body”, the reversion passed as intestate property to the heirs at law of the testatrix. *595 Tlie conclusion here reached is that which is compelled by

1954In connection with the contention of appellants they have referred to the case of McDonald v. Ledford, 140 Tenn. 471 , 205 S. W. 312 , 314, by which they seek comfort from the statement in that case to the effect that, ‘ ‘ The rale of construction that an heir is not to be disinherited except by express words or necessary ■implication prevails, in case of conflict, over the rule that testator is presumed to have intended not to die partially intestate. ’ ’ The Court was speaking, however, of one who disregards “one’s own offspring” in the words used in illustrating the relative strength of the

1949In re Link’s Estate, 182 Misc. 966 , 47 N. Y.

1928While under Ford v. Cottrell, 141 Tenn., 169 , the sale of the farm accomplished an ademption of the alter *507 native devise to the heirs as well as the primary devise to G-reeneville College contained in item three, item three can still be looked to as evincing the purpose of testator to withdraw the farm and, in onr opinion, its proceeds as well from the residuary clause, and such proceeds must accordingly pass as intestate property.

1928Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn., 602 ; Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn., 313 ; Reeves v. Reeves, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea), 644.

1915That this is true is recognized in a ease contrary to those above cited — Estate of Vance, 141 Pa., 201 , 21 Atl., 643 , 12 L.

1915That this is true is recognized in a ease contrary to those above cited — Estate of Vance, 141 Pa., 201 , 21 Atl., 643 , 12 L.