residuary clause in Kentucky

1983Id. 6 S.W.2d at 711 .

1983Id. 6 S.W.2d at 711 .

1972Sigmon v. Moore’s Adm’r, 297 Ky. 525 , 180 S.W.2d 420 (1944) and Lester’s Adm’r v. Jones, 300 Ky. 534 , 189 S.W.2d 728 (1945).

1972If no remainderman is designated, however, the future interest remains outstanding and undisposed of and is therefore a part of the testator’s estate to which the residuary clause of his will is applicable under the reasoning of Sigmon v. Moore’s Adm’r, supra, and Lester’s Adm’r v. Jones, supra. Secondly, a life estate is a separate and distinct interest in property and if the devise of a life estate is incapable of taking effect by reason of the death of the life tenant before the death of the testator the devise of the life estate would lapse under KRS 394.500 but it does not follow that any

2011Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky.App.2000).

2011The testator executed a will that contained a residuary clause devising the residue of the estate to “my first cousins living at the time of my death.” Id. at 814 .

1985We find further support for our decision in Conley v. Brewer, Ky.App., 666 S.W.2d 751 (1983), wherein this court held that the revoked portions of the will in that ease, including a portion of the residuary clause, passed to the remaining residuary devisees and not to the heirs at law of the testatrix.

1972Sigmon v. Moore’s Adm’r, 297 Ky. 525 , 180 S.W.2d 420 (1944) and Lester’s Adm’r v. Jones, 300 Ky. 534 , 189 S.W.2d 728 (1945).

1972Sigmon v. Moore’s Adm’r, 297 Ky. 525 , 180 S.W.2d 420 (1944) and Lester’s Adm’r v. Jones, 300 Ky. 534 , 189 S.W.2d 728 (1945).

1972The future interest in such a case is accelerated according to the rule of Timmons v. Graham, supra. Thus if there is a provision in the will applicable to the disposition of the future interest it comes into effect at the death of the life tenant.

1964See McKee v. Hedges, Ky., 297 S.W.2d 45 ; Whitehead v. Donnelly, Ky., 368 S.W.2d 337 .

1955In Howe v. Howe’s Ex’x, 287 Ky. 756 , 155 S.W.2d 196 , it was held that “all personal property * * * ” was specific rather than residuary because when read with the rest of the will it showed that the testatrix intended to leave a specified part of her estate to the named beneficiaries.

1955In Howe v. Howe’s Ex’x, 287 Ky. 756 , 155 S.W.2d 196 , it was held that “all personal property * * * ” was specific rather than residuary because when read with the rest of the will it showed that the testatrix intended to leave a specified part of her estate to the named beneficiaries.

1951Appellants rely upon Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 1 Cir., 1921, 275 F. 513 , 24 A.L.R. 156 , certiorari denied 257 U.S. 661 , 42-S.Ct. 270, 66 L.Ed. 422 ; and the cases from several jurisdictions that have followed the Atwood case.

1951Appellants rely upon Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 1 Cir., 1921, 275 F. 513 , 24 A.L.R. 156 , certiorari denied 257 U.S. 661 , 42-S.Ct. 270, 66 L.Ed. 422 ; and the cases from several jurisdictions that have followed the Atwood case.

1951In the case of Cunningham’s Devisees v. Cunningham’s Heirs, 57 Ky. 19 , 18 B.Mon. 19, 68 Am.Dec. 718, we had occasion to discuss the legal effect of the words “not otherwise disposed of in this will,” employed in a residuary clause.

1948We stated 225 Ky. 699 , at page 710, 9 S. W. 2d 1020 , 1025: “Therefore, until the contingency happened which would turn thé contingent remainder created by the will of David Irvine we have been discussing into a vested one, there was a reversion in David Irvine which either descended to his heirs, if he died intestate as to it, or passed to his residuary devisees, if the residuary clause of his will covered it.” We concluded that the reversion passed to the testator’s children either by descent or under the residuary clause in the will.

1948We stated 225 Ky. 699 , at page 710, 9 S. W. 2d 1020 , 1025: “Therefore, until the contingency happened which would turn thé contingent remainder created by the will of David Irvine we have been discussing into a vested one, there was a reversion in David Irvine which either descended to his heirs, if he died intestate as to it, or passed to his residuary devisees, if the residuary clause of his will covered it.” We concluded that the reversion passed to the testator’s children either by descent or under the residuary clause in the will.

1944The appellees rely on Wintuska v. Peart et al., 237 Ky. 666 , 36 S. W. (2d) 50 , and similar cases, in which it was held that property devised to a life tenant, with power of disposition which was not exercised, passes as 'undevised estate when there is no devise over.

1944The appellees rely on Wintuska v. Peart et al., 237 Ky. 666 , 36 S. W. (2d) 50 , and similar cases, in which it was held that property devised to a life tenant, with power of disposition which was not exercised, passes as 'undevised estate when there is no devise over.

1942This position also receives support from the presumption against intestacy which is particularly strong where the residuary is disposed of, the rule being that “a residuary clause will be construed so as to avoid partial intestacy unless a contrary intent is apparent.” Shaver v. Weddington et al., 247 Ky. 248 , 56 S. W. (2d) 980, 984 .

1942This position also receives support from the presumption against intestacy which is particularly strong where the residuary is disposed of, the rule being that “a residuary clause will be construed so as to avoid partial intestacy unless a contrary intent is apparent.” Shaver v. Weddington et al., 247 Ky. 248 , 56 S. W. (2d) 980, 984 .

1938The court was therefore in error in adjudging that Betty York had only a defeasible fee in her one-half interest in the real estate. (2) The judgment of the court in this particular is correct under the rule laid down in Deckard v. Deckard, 241 Ky. 329 , 43 S. W. (2d) 1006 . (3) The judgment of the court is erroneous in this particular.

1938The court was therefore in error in adjudging that Betty York had only a defeasible fee in her one-half interest in the real estate. (2) The judgment of the court in this particular is correct under the rule laid down in Deckard v. Deckard, 241 Ky. 329 , 43 S. W. (2d) 1006 . (3) The judgment of the court is erroneous in this particular.

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1935The rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2031 ; Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658 , 201 S. W. 13 , but inadmissible to show the testator’s intention wher-e there is no ambiguity in it, Violett’s Adm’r v. Violett, 217 Ky. 59 , 288 S. W. 1016 ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Harkleroad, 224 Ky. 5 , 5 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1932The presumption is particularly strong where the residuary is disposed of by will, and an intention to exclude residuary bequests must appear from appropriate language evidencing that intention or by clear implication; and “a residuary clause will be construed so as to avoid partial intestacy unless a contrary intent is apparent.” Sections 57, Id.

1930This court is, therefore, harmonious on the question so far as its own opinions are concerned, and is in harmony with the rules found in the opinions of a majority of the courts and standard text-writers. ' But it is argued by counsel for appellees that the opinion in the case of Crawford v. Hisle, 214 Ky. 536 , *563 283 S. W. 1019 , adheres to the principles announced in Bohon v. Bohon which is the lone exception to the general rule adhered to in the opinions of this court.

1930This court is, therefore, harmonious on the question so far as its own opinions are concerned, and is in harmony with the rules found in the opinions of a majority of the courts and standard text-writers. ' But it is argued by counsel for appellees that the opinion in the case of Crawford v. Hisle, 214 Ky. 536 , *563 283 S. W. 1019 , adheres to the principles announced in Bohon v. Bohon which is the lone exception to the general rule adhered to in the opinions of this court.

1929In Ruff v. Baumbach, 114 Ky. 339 , 70 S. W. 828 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1167 , the provision of the will to be construed by the court was a residuary clause by which property was devised for life to a widow, and, at her death, to be divided equally between his children then living.

1925This court without noticing the reply or the demurrer to it, and considering only the wills in controversy, held that the land passed to William Irvine Greenway under the residuary clause of Mrs. Irvine’s will, and reversed the judgment below with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with the opinion, Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745 .

1916As was said in Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566 , such a controversy “must be one about which well informed lawyers and judges may easily differ, and about which parties themselves differ.” No well informed lawyer and no judge could have any doubt as to the validity of the residuary clause of W.

1904Wooldridge, during her father’s life; that, by the direction of the sacredi trust to put the whole in trust for the four grandchildren at Charles F. Johnson’s death, they are given an estate in remainder, and that this estate in remainder of the infants is not an estate in possession; therefore the court, under the decision in Dineen v. Hall, 65 S. W., 445 , 66 S. W., 392 , 23 Ky. Law Rep., 1615 , has no jurisdiction to sell the property under the section of the Code, supra. Our construction of the will is that, exclusive of the specific bequests to Mrs. Wooldridge in her own right, it devises