residuary clause in Illinois

1957Rather, it points out the wisdom of including a broad residuary clause (Belleville Savings Bank v. Aneshaensel, 298 Ill. 292 ; Dunn v. Kearney, 288 Ill. 49 ,) and indicates that the testator wanted such property to fall into the trust residuum should he survive his wife.

1930It is a general rule to so construe a residuary clause as to prevent the intestacy of any part of the testator's estate unless there is an apparent intention to the contrary. ( Dunn v. Kearney , 288 Ill. 49 .) There is ample reason for such construction here.

1948(Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523 .) If a specific devise includes only a partial or a contingent interest, or if an estate in fee is devised specifically but is to take effect only on the happening of some contingent event, the reversion will pass by a residuary clause in the same will although the devisee of the partial or contingent interest is also the residuary devisee.

1942(Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523 ; Booth v. Krug, 368 id. 487.) The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause.

1975Clearly, the residuary clause should not be interpreted so as to cover property not intended to be included therein by the testator, and such clause should be interpreted in connection with the rest of the will (Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442 , 2 N.E.2d 699 ; 36 I.L.P.

1975Clearly, the residuary clause should not be interpreted so as to cover property not intended to be included therein by the testator, and such clause should be interpreted in connection with the rest of the will (Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442 , 2 N.E.2d 699 ; 36 I.L.P.

2003Greer, 326 Ill.

2003Greer, 326 Ill.

1986(In re Estate of Cancik (1985) 106 Ill. 2d 11, 17 , 476 N.E.2d 738 ; Rosenthal v. First National Bank (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 266 , 239 N.E.2d 826 .) Further, the law presumes, particularly where a residuary clause is involved, that a testator intended to dispose of his entire estate by will rather than to die intestate (Marshall v. Northern Trust Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 391 , 176 N.E.2d 807 ; Gridley v. Gridley (1948), 399 Ill. 215 , 77 N.E.2d 146 ), and unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, courts will endeavor to adopt any reasonable construction to this end (Marshall v. Northern Trust C

1986(In re Estate of Cancik (1985) 106 Ill. 2d 11, 17 , 476 N.E.2d 738 ; Rosenthal v. First National Bank (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 266 , 239 N.E.2d 826 .) Further, the law presumes, particularly where a residuary clause is involved, that a testator intended to dispose of his entire estate by will rather than to die intestate (Marshall v. Northern Trust Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 391 , 176 N.E.2d 807 ; Gridley v. Gridley (1948), 399 Ill. 215 , 77 N.E.2d 146 ), and unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, courts will endeavor to adopt any reasonable construction to this end (Marshall v. Northern Trust C

1963Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45 ; Fisher v. Easton, 299 id. 293; Friedman v. Friedman, 283 id. 383; 1 Jarman on Wills, (5th ed.) 650.” Flartwick v. Fleberling, 364 Ill. 523, 534 .

1948(Williams v. Ivie, 371 Ill. 355 ; Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523 ; Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45 ; Fisher v. Easton, 299 Ill. 293 ; Friedman v. Friedman, 283 Ill. 383 .) The reason for the rule is that the testator intends the residuary clause to include that portion of his estate which is not absolutely devised specifically.

1949App. 342 ; Moore v. Smith, supra.) Defendants rely on the case of Simonsen v. Hutchinson, 231 Ill. 508 , in support of their argument that, inasmuch as there were insufficient assets after the sale of the property to pay the specific legacies to which they personally were entitled, therefore the residuary clause creating the trust was a nullity, and the rents were part of the assets of the estate of Sara H.

1935Counsel cite Simonsen v. Hutchinson, 231 Ill. 508 , in support of the proposition that there being no specific devise of this particular land it became subject to sale to pay charges and legacies.

1907Ency. of Law,—2d ed.—1354; Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 ; Williams v. Williams, 189 id. 500 .) In the case last above cited the language of the residuary clause was as follows: “I give and devise all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, after my debts and funeral expenses are paid, to my sons and daughters, to share and share alike.” This court, in deciding that the residuary clause above quoted created a charge upon the real estate for the payment of legacies, quoted the following language from Reid v. Corrigan, supra: “By holding that the expression ‘rest, residue and remainder’ w

1907Ency. of Law,—2d ed.—1354; Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 ; Williams v. Williams, 189 id. 500 .) In the case last above cited the language of the residuary clause was as follows: “I give and devise all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, after my debts and funeral expenses are paid, to my sons and daughters, to share and share alike.” This court, in deciding that the residuary clause above quoted created a charge upon the real estate for the payment of legacies, quoted the following language from Reid v. Corrigan, supra: “By holding that the expression ‘rest, residue and remainder’ w

2011The Laas court noted that "the existence of a residuary clause does not necessarily indicate an intent to make a present gift to the charities, but may have been considered necessary to prevent a bequest from lapsing in the event that a preresiduary beneficiary predeceased the decedent." Laas, 134 Ill.App.3d at 511 , 89 Ill.Dec. 440 , 480 N.E.2d 1183 .

2011The Laas court noted that "the existence of a residuary clause does not necessarily indicate an intent to make a present gift to the charities, but may have been considered necessary to prevent a bequest from lapsing in the event that a preresiduary beneficiary predeceased the decedent." Laas, 134 Ill.App.3d at 511 , 89 Ill.Dec. 440 , 480 N.E.2d 1183 .

2002The court stated, “In sum, the facts of the present case did not amount to a violent crime ***.” Freeman, 167 Ill.

2002The court stated, "In sum, the facts of the present case did not amount to a violent crime ***." Freeman , 167 Ill.

2002In People v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 101 (1986), in comparing the residuary clause of the statutory definition of forcible felony to a similar definition that appears in the California Penal Code, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that the residuary clause has been interpreted broadly to include nonviolent felonies which might require force to perpetrate.

2002In People v. Guest , 115 Ill. 2d 72, 101 (1986), in comparing the residuary clause of the statutory definition of forcible felony to a similar definition that appears in the California Penal Code, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that the residuary clause has been interpreted broadly to include nonviolent felonies which might require force to perpetrate.

2002The fourth division of the First District considered the residuary clause in the definition of forcible felony (720 ILCS 5/2 — 8 (West 2000)) and discussed the holding in People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398 , 207 N.E.2d 68 .

2002The fourth division of the First District considered the residuary clause in the definition of forcible felony (720 ILCS 5/2 — 8 (West 2000)) and discussed the holding in People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398 , 207 N.E.2d 68 .

2000Zelenka, 294 Ill.

2000Zelenka , 294 Ill.

1992Hallinan, Homer Probate Practice & Estates §2115 (4th ed. 1982).) Cancik and Sehroeder v. Benz (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 589 , 138 N.E.2d 496 , the case cited in Caneik, both involved wills with a residuary clause.

1992Hallinan, Homer Probate Practice & Estates §2115 (4th ed. 1982).) Cancik and Sehroeder v. Benz (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 589 , 138 N.E.2d 496 , the case cited in Caneik, both involved wills with a residuary clause.

1992App. 3d 847 , 538 N.E.2d 643 , wherein the preamble of the will limited the distribution to Florida property only, but the will also included a residuary clause referring to the residue of the estate.

1992An example of an ambiguity on the face of the will is presented in the case of In re Estate of Shaw (1989), 182 Ill.App.3d 847 , 131 Ill.Dec. 268 , 538 N.E.2d 643 , wherein the preamble of the will limited the distribution to Florida property only, but the will also included a residuary clause referring to the residue of the estate.

1986These rules have consistently been applied to situations such as the instant one, where a testator has, by specific devise, made an incomplete, contingent or conditional disposition of the property (Williams v. Ivie (1939), 371 Ill. 355 , 20 N.E.2d 796 ), and courts have found lapsed or void gifts of personal property to fall into a general residuary bequest rather than treating such property as intestate estate descending to the heirs at law (see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. City of Waukegan (1929), 333 Ill. 577, 581-82 , 165 N.E.2d 348 ).

1986These rules have consistently been applied to situations such as the instant one, where a testator has, by specific devise, made an incomplete, contingent or conditional disposition of the property (Williams v. Ivie (1939), 371 Ill. 355 , 20 N.E.2d 796 ), and courts have found lapsed or void gifts of personal property to fall into a general residuary bequest rather than treating such property as intestate estate descending to the heirs at law (see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. City of Waukegan (1929), 333 Ill. 577, 581-82 , 165 N.E.2d 348 ).

1984App. 2d 24 , 260 N.E.2d 766 ); rather, any property not specifically devised or bequeathed will pass under the residuary clause, but where there is no residuary provision or that clause itself has failed for some reason, the undisposed portion of the estate becomes intestate property and vests in the heirs of the testator according to their proportionate statutory shares (Griffin v. Griffin (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 354 , 194 N.E.2d 641 ; Glaser v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1946), 393 Ill. 447 , 66 N.E.2d 410 ).

1984App. 2d 24 , 260 N.E.2d 766 ); rather, any property not specifically devised or bequeathed will pass under the residuary clause, but where there is no residuary provision or that clause itself has failed for some reason, the undisposed portion of the estate becomes intestate property and vests in the heirs of the testator according to their proportionate statutory shares (Griffin v. Griffin (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 354 , 194 N.E.2d 641 ; Glaser v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1946), 393 Ill. 447 , 66 N.E.2d 410 ).

1982The cardinal rule of will construction, to which all other rules yield, is the ascertainment of a testator's intention from the will itself. ( Vollmer v. McGowan (1951), 409 Ill. 306 , 99 N.E.2d 337 .) That intention must be drawn from the will language where it has a settled legal meaning; in the absence of an ambiguity or uncertainty, surrounding circumstances may not be considered so as to impart a meaning other than that expressed in the will. ( Mitchell v. Snyder (1949), 402 Ill. 279 , 83 N.E.2d 680 .) The intention of the testator is determined by ascertaining the actual meaning of the w

1961(Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Ill.2d 197 ; Vollmer v. McGowan, 409 Ill. 306 ; Knisely v. Simpson, 397 Ill. 605 .) The law presumes, particularly where a residuary clause is involved, that a testator intended to dispose of his entire estate by will rather than to die intestate, (Erwin v. Kruse, 17 Ill.2d 364 ; Gridley v. Gridley, 399 Ill. 215 ,) and unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions and adopt any reasonable construction to this end.

1976In Cahil v. Michael (1942), 381 Ill. 395, 405 , 45 N.E.2d 657 , the court stated: ” ° The court will prefer any construction of a will to avoid intestacy. [Citations.] The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause. [Citations.] 0 0 0 The courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions rather than to ignore or declare both of them void. [Citations.] ° ° More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wise v. First National Bank (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 623, 627-28 , 141 N.E.2d 1 , stated: “The cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascert

1976In Cahil v. Michael (1942), 381 Ill. 395, 405 , 45 N.E.2d 657 , the court stated: ” ° The court will prefer any construction of a will to avoid intestacy. [Citations.] The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause. [Citations.] 0 0 0 The courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions rather than to ignore or declare both of them void. [Citations.] ° ° More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wise v. First National Bank (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 623, 627-28 , 141 N.E.2d 1 , stated: “The cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascert

1976In Cahil v. Michael (1942), 381 Ill. 395, 405 , 45 N.E.2d 657 , the court stated: ” ° The court will prefer any construction of a will to avoid intestacy. [Citations.] The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause. [Citations.] 0 0 0 The courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions rather than to ignore or declare both of them void. [Citations.] ° ° More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wise v. First National Bank (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 623, 627-28 , 141 N.E.2d 1 , stated: “The cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascert

1976In Cahil v. Michael (1942), 381 Ill. 395, 405 , 45 N.E.2d 657 , the court stated: ” ° The court will prefer any construction of a will to avoid intestacy. [Citations.] The presumption against intestacy is strong where there is a residuary clause. [Citations.] 0 0 0 The courts will endeavor to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions rather than to ignore or declare both of them void. [Citations.] ° ° More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wise v. First National Bank (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 623, 627-28 , 141 N.E.2d 1 , stated: “The cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to ascert

1971He leaves to his brother * * * `all of my personal property not herein otherwise disposed of.' This clearly discloses an intention to create a residuary estate." • 7 The cases of Retzinger v. Retzinger, 239 Ill.

1956Defendants say that the phrase “rest, residue and remainder” means that part of the estate remaining after payment of the administration expenses and the surviving spouse’s award and cite Retzinger v. Retzinger, 239 Ill.

1965(Evans v. Price, 118 Ill. 593 .) Following this reasoning, it would seem that the use of the word `bequeath' instead of `devise' would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the property which the testatrix thereby intended to dispose of was personalty; but be that as it may, the word `bequeath' in this residuary clause is coupled with the word `give,' which is of the largest possible signification, and is applicable as well to real as personal estate." In Weigel v. Green, 218 Ill. 227 , at page 239, 75 NE 913 , the court said: "although, `legatee,' is generally the word applied in wills

1904(Evans v. Price, 118 Ill. 593 .) Following this reasoning, it would seem that the use of the word “bequeath” instead of “devise” would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the property which the testatrix thereby intended to dispose of was personalty; but be that as it may, the word “bequeath” in this residuary clause is coupled with the word “give,” which is of the largest possible signification, and is applicable as well to real as personal estate.