45 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1935–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Murphygreen2 sentences2014See Murphy, 340 So.2d at 109 (Testator could not be said to have intentions as to after-acquired property except as indicated in a residuary clause). 2006See Estate of Murphy, 340 So.2d 107 (Fla.1976) (finding that a specific devise of homestead property is preferred, but the general language of a residuary clause is a sufficiently precise indicator of testamentary intent). | 3 | 13 |
De Pass v. the Kansas Masonic Home Corp.green2 sentences1953So much reliance, however, is placed upon Sec. 731.05 (2) that for clarity we refer appellants to the history of that section as outlined in DePass v. Kansas Masonic Home Corp., 132 Fla. 455, 461-463 , 181 So. 410, 412-413 , where we adopted an opinion by Mr. Justice Sebring (then Circuit Judge) in which he pointed out that prior to June 13, 1892, in Florida, after-acquired property did not pass by will at all, Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307 , 20 So. 245 , whereas the Revised Statutes of 1892, Sec. 1794, based in part upon the English Wills Act of 1837, specifically provided that the every will 1953So much reliance, however, is placed upon Sec. 731.05 (2) that for clarity we refer appellants to the history of that section as outlined in DePass v. Kansas Masonic Home Corp., 132 Fla. 455, 461-463 , 181 So. 410, 412-413 , where we adopted an opinion by Mr. Justice Sebring (then Circuit Judge) in which he pointed out that prior to June 13, 1892, in Florida, after-acquired property did not pass by will at all, Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307 , 20 So. 245 , whereas the Revised Statutes of 1892, Sec. 1794, based in part upon the English Wills Act of 1837, specifically provided that the every will | 2 | 3 |
Husson v. Benselgreen2 sentences1982See Luxmoore v. Wallace, 145 Fla. 325, 336-37 , 199 So. 492, 496 (Fla.1941); Husson v. Bensel, 124 Fla. 304, 307 , 168 So. 395, 396 (Fla.1936). 1982See Luxmoore v. Wallace, 145 Fla. 325, 336-37 , 199 So. 492, 496 (Fla.1941); Husson v. Bensel, 124 Fla. 304, 307 , 168 So. 395, 396 (Fla.1936). | 2 | 2 |
Luxmoore v. Wallacegreen2 sentences1982See Luxmoore v. Wallace, 145 Fla. 325, 336-37 , 199 So. 492, 496 (Fla.1941); Husson v. Bensel, 124 Fla. 304, 307 , 168 So. 395, 396 (Fla.1936). 1982See Luxmoore v. Wallace, 145 Fla. 325, 336-37 , 199 So. 492, 496 (Fla.1941); Husson v. Bensel, 124 Fla. 304, 307 , 168 So. 395, 396 (Fla.1936). | 2 | 2 |
Marti v. Martigreen2 sentences1967See, also, In re Marti’s Estate, 311 Ill.App. 237 , 35 N.E.2d 696 . 1967See, also, In re Marti’s Estate, 311 Ill.App. 237 , 35 N.E.2d 696 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Barkergreen2 sentences2014A similar issue was addressed by the First District in In re Barker, 448 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), where a personal representative sought to have a residuary clause from a prior will admitted into the probate action, claiming that the clause was inadvertently omitted from the later probated will. 1986This is not a case like In re Estate of Barker, 448 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), in which the will contained nothing whatsoever that could be construed to be a residuary clause. | 1 | 5 |
Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Henry's Estategreen2 sentences2011See also In re Estate of Gilbert, 585 So.2d 970, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (a specific bequest or devise "`is a gift of a particular thing or of a specified part of the testator's estate so described as to be capable of distinguishment from all others of the same kind.'" (quoting Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Henry's Estate, 106 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958))). 1967The County Judge held that "the language employed in the residuary clause of the Will" from which the above quoted excerpts are taken, "indicates a testamentary intent that all real and personal property not needed in the administering of the Will should descend to the devisees and legatees in kind." In arriving at such finding, the County Judge was giving approbation to what the Supreme Court said in Brickell v. DiPietro, 1940, 145 Fla. 23 , 198 So. 806 , as follows: "[i]n the construction of a will, the court should be guided by the intention of the testator, and the court must give effect t | 1 | 2 |
McKean v. Warburtongreen2 sentences2008These and a whole host of other Florida cases hold that, in a contest between the application of Article X, section 4(b) and a will directiveas was the circumstance in the two cases cited by the majorityprotected homestead becomes an estate asset if and only if "the will specifically orders that the [homestead] property be sold." Estate of Hamel, 821 So.2d at 1279 ; see also McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d 341, 347 (Fla.2006) (quoting Knadle ); Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (stating that unless a trust specifically directs homestead to be sold, rights of 2005Weekly S613 , ___ So.2d ___, 2005 WL 2155180 (Fla. Sept. 8, 2005), the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision and held that where homestead property is not specifically bequeathed but passes through a residuary clause to an heir or heirs of the decedent, the property, in the absence of a specific testamentary directive otherwise, is not subject to forced sale and cannot be used to satisfy a general bequest of cash. | 1 | 2 |
City Nat. Bank of Florida v. Teschergreen2 sentences2005In re Estate of Mahaney, 903 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Clifton v. Clifton, 553 So.2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); City Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Tescher, 557 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 1990See also City National Bank of Florida v. Tascher, 557 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). | 1 | 2 |
Hanson v. Dencklagreen1 sentence2026See id. at 239-43 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Parker's Estategreen1 sentence2011The Comment to this section states the purpose is "to assure that, for example, a residuary clause in a will not only passes property owned at death that is not otherwise devised, even though the property was acquired by the testator after the will was executed, but also passes property acquired by a testator's estate after his or her death." Id. [3] Section 732.6005(1), Florida Statutes (2009) is based on and virtually identical to section 2-603 of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code. [4] "A specific legacy is a gift by will of property which is particularly designated and which is to be satisfied | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. Society of the New York Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence2011See also In re Estate of Gilbert, 585 So.2d 970, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (a specific bequest or devise "`is a gift of a particular thing or of a specified part of the testator's estate so described as to be capable of distinguishment from all others of the same kind.'" (quoting Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Henry's Estate, 106 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958))). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Vail's Estategreen2 sentences2011The supreme court explained in In re Vail’s Estate, 67 So.2d 665, 670 (Fla.1953), that the primary purpose of this section “was to permit transmissal of after-acquired property by will rather than by intestacy.” In 1974, the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code. 2011The supreme court explained in In re Vail's Estate, 67 So.2d 665, 670 (Fla.1953), that the primary purpose of this section "was to permit transmissal of after-acquired property by will rather than by intestacy." In 1974, the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code. | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Udellgreen1 sentence2011The Comment to this section states the purpose is "to assure that, for example, a residuary clause in a will not only passes property owned at death that is not otherwise devised, even though the property was acquired by the testator after the will was executed, but also passes property acquired by a testator's estate after his or her death." Id. [3] Section 732.6005(1), Florida Statutes (2009) is based on and virtually identical to section 2-603 of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code. [4] "A specific legacy is a gift by will of property which is particularly designated and which is to be satisfied | 1 | 1 |
Engelke v. Estate of Engelkegreen1 sentence2008These and a whole host of other Florida cases hold that, in a contest between the application of Article X, section 4(b) and a will directiveas was the circumstance in the two cases cited by the majorityprotected homestead becomes an estate asset if and only if "the will specifically orders that the [homestead] property be sold." Estate of Hamel, 821 So.2d at 1279 ; see also McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d 341, 347 (Fla.2006) (quoting Knadle ); Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (stating that unless a trust specifically directs homestead to be sold, rights of | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Horne v. Dishonggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamilton v. Needhamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. State
neutral
2 sentences1990Estate of Murphy, 340 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1976), In re: Estate of Lois Mueller, 419 So.2d 784 (2d DCA 1982), Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v Trammel, 508 So.2d 422 (1st DCA 1987). 1989Estate of Murphy, 340 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1976); Estate of Mueller, 419 So.2d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). | 3 | 1989–1990 |
Corey v. State
green
2 sentences2016We noted that we could not determine whether the doctrine’s presumption applied based on the record then before us and that “the decision as to whether the residuary clause in one of Mrs. Murphy’s prior wills is enforceable, necessarily requires factual determinations in this case.” Rocke, 18 So.3d at 1267 . 2015We noted that we could not determine whether the doctrine's presumption applied based on the record then before us and that "the decision as to whether the residuary clause in one of Mrs. Murphy's prior wills is enforceable necessarily requires factual determinations in this case." Rocke, 18 So. 3d at 1267 . | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Hausman v. First Baptist Church
green
2 sentences2008In both Estate of Price v. West Florida Hospital, Inc., 513 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), the testators expressly directed their homestead properties be sold upon their respective deaths and the proceeds distributed either equally to their surviving adult children in Estate of Price or under the residuary clause of the will in Knadle . 2005The court added that the will gave the personal representative the authority to sell the property and that the parties could seek further relief for a *751 determination of whether the terms of the sale of the homestead property comports with Florida law, particularly the cases of In re Granger, 318 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and Estate of Price v. West Florida Hospital, Inc., 513 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). | 2 | 2005–2008 |
Snyder v. Davis
green
2 sentences2006This result is consistent with Snyder v. Davis, 699 So.2d 999 (Fla.1997). 2004The Appellees rely on Snyder v. Davis, 699 So.2d 999 (Fla.1997), for this proposition. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
In Re Levy's Estate
green
2 sentences1982In re Levy’s Estate, 196 So.2d 225 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). 1982In re Levy's Estate, 196 So.2d 225 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). | 2 | 1982–1982 |
King v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank of Atlanta, Ga.
green
2 sentences1965The petitioner takes under the will, through the residuary clause (Article VI), and in the absence of any other controlling factors her share, when the calculation is confined to the facts above recited, would be as follows: Probate Estate $123,528.14 Debts and Expenses of Administration 24,619.51 $ 98,908.63 One-half to the widow $ 49,454.31 Unlike the will in King v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, Fla.App., 103 So.2d 689 , the testator did not provide that the bequest should be calculated on a basis of fifty (50%) per cent of his adjusted gross estate as defined for f 1965The petitioner takes under the will, through the residuary clause (Article VI), and in the absence of any other controlling factors her share, when the calculation is confined to the facts above recited, would be as follows: Probate Estate $123,528.14 Debts and Expenses of Administration 24,619.51 ___________ $ 98,908.63 One-half to the widow $ 49,454.31 *173 Unlike the will in King v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, Fla.App., 103 So.2d 689 , the testator did not provide that the bequest should be calculated on a basis of fifty (50%) per cent of his adjusted gross estate | 2 | 1965–1965 |
Basile v. Aldrich
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Estate of Hamel
green
1 sentence2008These and a whole host of other Florida cases hold that, in a contest between the application of Article X, section 4(b) and a will directiveas was the circumstance in the two cases cited by the majorityprotected homestead becomes an estate asset if and only if "the will specifically orders that the [homestead] property be sold." Estate of Hamel, 821 So.2d at 1279 ; see also McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d 341, 347 (Fla.2006) (quoting Knadle ); Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (stating that unless a trust specifically directs homestead to be sold, rights of | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Knadle v. Estate of Knadle
green
1 sentence2008In both Estate of Price v. West Florida Hospital, Inc., 513 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), the testators expressly directed their homestead properties be sold upon their respective deaths and the proceeds distributed either equally to their surviving adult children in Estate of Price or under the residuary clause of the will in Knadle . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Flinn v. Van Devere
green
2 sentences2007We conclude that this case is more analogous to Flinn v. Van Devere, 502 So.2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein the Third District concluded that realty owned by the decedent was not validly transferred to a trust she established during her lifetime and thus remained an estate asset and the property passed under the residuary clause of her will rather than the trust. 2007Id. at 454 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
McEnderfer v. Keefe
green
1 sentence2005In re Estate of Mahaney, 903 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Clifton v. Clifton, 553 So.2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); City Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Tescher, 557 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Clifton v. Clifton
green
1 sentence2005In re Estate of Mahaney, 903 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Clifton v. Clifton, 553 So.2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); City Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Tescher, 557 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Warburton v. McKean
green
1 sentence2005The record contains no basis for disturbing this factual determination. [3] *753 Mention must be made at this point of the fact that the trial court additionally based its ruling in favor of the personal representative on the fact that the devise of the homestead property is by way of the residuary clause of the will with the court relying on Warburton v. McKean, 877 So.2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In re Granger
green
1 sentence2005The court added that the will gave the personal representative the authority to sell the property and that the parties could seek further relief for a *751 determination of whether the terms of the sale of the homestead property comports with Florida law, particularly the cases of In re Granger, 318 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and Estate of Price v. West Florida Hospital, Inc., 513 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Romaniello v. Romaniello
neutral
1 sentence2004The court relied on Romaniello v. Roaniello, 760 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), in concluding that neither Jureski nor Callahan was entitled to all of the estate property, real and personal, because the will did not contemplate a failure to fund the residuary beneficiaries. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Estate of Hill green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State, Dept. of Health v. Trammell green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Perkins v. O'Donald green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Jones v. Jones green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ogle v. Fuiten green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Ruppert v. Estate of Hastings green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Reid v. Whitfield green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Estate of Finch green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| In Re Estate of Wood green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Talcott v. Holl green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In re the Estate of Moritz green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Gessner v. Powell green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Spitzer v. Branning, Et Ux. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| In Re Noble's Estate green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Baker v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Raulerson v. Peebles green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Dana v. Drumright neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Schuck Estate green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Drafts v. Drafts green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Brickell v. DiPietro Ex Rel. DiPietro green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| In Re Williams'estate green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Meszaros v. Holsberry green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Butts v. Jammes neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Lawyer v. Munro neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| In re the Estate of Stiemes green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.