residuary clause in Kansas

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1921In Delaney v. City of Salina, 34 Kan. 532 , 9 Pac. 271 , after holding that a bequest to a city of property, real and personal, for the purpose of prospecting for and developing a coal mine in or near the city was valid, it was said in the opinion: “If neither the executor nor the city of Salina has the power to execute some particular portion of the trust attempted to be reposed in either, the court could easily find and appoint some suitable person to execute such trust.

1920(Delaney v. City of Salina, 34 Kan. 532 , syl. ¶ 4, 9 Pac. 271 ; Curtis v. Board of Education, 43 Kan. 138, 143 , 23 Pac. 98 .) Appellant next contends that the compromise itself is void, (1) because one of the coheirs, Charley Schnack, who is also named as an executor, joined with the plaintiffs as a participant in the compromise, and (2) that the city has no power to compromise or surrender any of its rights under the will.

2000App. 2d 955, 961 , 636 P.2d 236 (1981) rev. denied 230 Kan. 818 (1982), the Court of Appeals discussed what happens when a gift lapses, stating: “(5) Where a bequest lapses because of the death of the beneficiary prior to that of the testator, the lapsed devise falls into the residuum and will be disposed of by the residuary clause, if one has been provided for in the will. [Citations omitted.] “(6) Where a bequest lapses because of the death of the beneficiary prior to that of the testator, and there is no residuary clause in the will, the property subject to the lapsed bequest passes under t

2000In In re Estate of Stroble, 6 Kan.

2000In re Estate of Hannah, 215 Kan. 892, 897 , 529 P.2d 154 (1974).

2000In re Estate of Hannah, 215 Kan. 892, 897 , 529 P.2d 154 (1974).

1991Ass’n v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 506 , 592 P.2d 438 (1979).

1991Ass’n v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 506 , 592 P.2d 438 (1979).

1991Coleman construed a residuary clause in the will of the testator leaving the residue: (1) two-fifths to the American Cancer Society, (2) *399 twoTifths “to the College of Emporia, a Presbyterian educational institution located at Emporia, Kansas,” and (3) one-fifth to the Presbyterian Manor, a Presbyterian home for the aged. 2 Kan.

1985In re Estate of Barclay, 215 Kan. 129 , 523 P.2d 376 (1974). “13.

1985In re Estate of Barclay, 215 Kan. 129 , 523 P.2d 376 (1974). “13.

1983Appellants rely on Weiss v. Grant, 87 Colo. 144 , 286 Pac. 114 (1930), in which the court construed the following phrase contained in the residuary clause: “After paying all court costs, taxes and administrators fees, I hereby give . . . .” The Colorado Supreme Court held: “The expression ‘all taxes’ means just what it says and must necessarily include inheritance taxes.

1983Appellants rely on Weiss v. Grant, 87 Colo. 144 , 286 Pac. 114 (1930), in which the court construed the following phrase contained in the residuary clause: “After paying all court costs, taxes and administrators fees, I hereby give . . . .” The Colorado Supreme Court held: “The expression ‘all taxes’ means just what it says and must necessarily include inheritance taxes.

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1979Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 214 ; Gibbs v. Turner, 140 Kan. 53 , 34 P.2d 564 (1934); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314 , 211 Pac. 146 (1922); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645 , 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).

1965In the absence of such clause we are forced to conclude that should the trust fail on the death of both Margaret and Nancy, because either leaves issue, the corpus of the trust passes to the heirs of the testator by intestate succession. ( Lasnier v. Martin, 102 Kan. 551 , 171 Pac. 645 .) The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary and not inconsistent with this opinion.

1965In the absence of such clause we are forced to conclude that should the trust fail on the death of both Margaret and Nancy, because either leaves issue, the corpus of the trust passes to the heirs of the testator by intestate succession. ( Lasnier v. Martin, 102 Kan. 551 , 171 Pac. 645 .) The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary and not inconsistent with this opinion.

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1964In this connection reliance is had upon statements found in a number of decisions of this court, among them being Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262 , 124 P. 2d 438 ; Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734 , 129 P. 2d 242 , and In re Estate of Pallister, 159 Kan. 7 , 152 P. 2d 61 .

1953It is an application of the axiom that equity regards that as done which ought to be done.” (p. 737.) The widow, on the other hand, contends for the familiar rule that a will speaks as of the death of the testator; that as the buildings were destroyed in Albert’s lifetime the insurance money was owing to him when he died and thus was “personalty” which would pass *258 to her under the residuary clause; that the insurance policy was a personal contract with the insured and not a contract running with the land; that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application for the reason the “conv

1953It is an application of the axiom that equity regards that as done which ought to be done.” (p. 737.) The widow, on the other hand, contends for the familiar rule that a will speaks as of the death of the testator; that as the buildings were destroyed in Albert’s lifetime the insurance money was owing to him when he died and thus was “personalty” which would pass *258 to her under the residuary clause; that the insurance policy was a personal contract with the insured and not a contract running with the land; that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application for the reason the “conv

1953It is an application of the axiom that equity regards that as done which ought to be done.” (p. 737.) The widow, on the other hand, contends for the familiar rule that a will speaks as of the death of the testator; that as the buildings were destroyed in Albert’s lifetime the insurance money was owing to him when he died and thus was “personalty” which would pass *258 to her under the residuary clause; that the insurance policy was a personal contract with the insured and not a contract running with the land; that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application for the reason the “conv

1953It is an application of the axiom that equity regards that as done which ought to be done.” (p. 737.) The widow, on the other hand, contends for the familiar rule that a will speaks as of the death of the testator; that as the buildings were destroyed in Albert’s lifetime the insurance money was owing to him when he died and thus was “personalty” which would pass *258 to her under the residuary clause; that the insurance policy was a personal contract with the insured and not a contract running with the land; that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application for the reason the “conv

1945Trusts for the promotion of education include trusts ... to establish scholarships or otherwise to assist students in acquiring education. . . .” In Washburn College v. O’Hara, 75 Kan. 700 , 90 Pac. 234 , it was held: “In the residuary clause of a will the testator bequeathed all of the remainder of his estate, in trust, to the trustees of an incorporated educational institution, to be held by them as a perpetual fund for the higher education of young men to be selected by such trustees for the Christian ministry.

1945Trusts for the promotion of education include trusts ... to establish scholarships or otherwise to assist students in acquiring education. . . .” In Washburn College v. O’Hara, 75 Kan. 700 , 90 Pac. 234 , it was held: “In the residuary clause of a will the testator bequeathed all of the remainder of his estate, in trust, to the trustees of an incorporated educational institution, to be held by them as a perpetual fund for the higher education of young men to be selected by such trustees for the Christian ministry.

1945(Morse v. Henlon, 97 Kan. 399, 402 , 155 Pac. 800 ; 2 Bogert Trusts and Trustees, § 418, pp. 1276-1277, § 468, pp. 1443-1445.) But herd we have a residuary clause and title to the lapsed trust property passes thereunder to the residuary devisee in the same manner as if the trust were void.

1945(Morse v. Henlon, 97 Kan. 399, 402 , 155 Pac. 800 ; 2 Bogert Trusts and Trustees, § 418, pp. 1276-1277, § 468, pp. 1443-1445.) But herd we have a residuary clause and title to the lapsed trust property passes thereunder to the residuary devisee in the same manner as if the trust were void.

1945Held, that such bequest created an educational trust, which is a public charity.” (Syl.) In Lehnherr v. Feldman, 110 Kan. 115, 117 , 202 Pac. 624 , it was said: “It is the settled rule that courts will look with favor upon all attempted charitable donations, and will endeavor to carry them into effect, if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.” We think the trust may be not stricken down as not being a charitable trust.- Under definitions relied on by appellant, the trust is not a private one.

1945Held, that such bequest created an educational trust, which is a public charity.” (Syl.) In Lehnherr v. Feldman, 110 Kan. 115, 117 , 202 Pac. 624 , it was said: “It is the settled rule that courts will look with favor upon all attempted charitable donations, and will endeavor to carry them into effect, if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.” We think the trust may be not stricken down as not being a charitable trust.- Under definitions relied on by appellant, the trust is not a private one.

1945(Clingman v. Hill, 113 Kan. 632, 634 , 215 Pac. 1013 .) Having stated earlier herein that Carl Staab died testate it may be well to also say that his last will dated July 24,' 1931, made no devise of any specific real estate, but contained only a residuary clause under which all of his property not needed for the payment of debts and funeral expenses and not disposed of by specific money bequests was devised to John and Alex in equal parts.

1945(Clingman v. Hill, 113 Kan. 632, 634 , 215 Pac. 1013 .) Having stated earlier herein that Carl Staab died testate it may be well to also say that his last will dated July 24,' 1931, made no devise of any specific real estate, but contained only a residuary clause under which all of his property not needed for the payment of debts and funeral expenses and not disposed of by specific money bequests was devised to John and Alex in equal parts.

1935The argument in support of the contention is based on the decision in the case of Holt v. Wilson, 82 Kan. 268 , 108 Pac. 87 .

1935The argument in support of the contention is based on the decision in the case of Holt v. Wilson, 82 Kan. 268 , 108 Pac. 87 .

1926Various authorities are cited in support of this contention. (1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 661, 674, 675; 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 75, 76, 751, 752, 753, 755, 766; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 120 ; Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. [N. Y.] 229; Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75 ; Jameson, Appellant, etc., 1 Mich. 99 ; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536 , 542; Zimmerman v. Briner, 50 Pa. St. 535; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 .) We think a more reasonable construction can be applied to the will.

1926Various authorities are cited in support of this contention. (1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 661, 674, 675; 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 75, 76, 751, 752, 753, 755, 766; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 120 ; Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. [N. Y.] 229; Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75 ; Jameson, Appellant, etc., 1 Mich. 99 ; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536 , 542; Zimmerman v. Briner, 50 Pa. St. 535; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 .) We think a more reasonable construction can be applied to the will.

1926Various authorities are cited in support of this contention. (1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 661, 674, 675; 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 75, 76, 751, 752, 753, 755, 766; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 120 ; Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. [N. Y.] 229; Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75 ; Jameson, Appellant, etc., 1 Mich. 99 ; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536 , 542; Zimmerman v. Briner, 50 Pa. St. 535; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 .) We think a more reasonable construction can be applied to the will.

1926Various authorities are cited in support of this contention. (1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 661, 674, 675; 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 75, 76, 751, 752, 753, 755, 766; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 120 ; Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. [N. Y.] 229; Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75 ; Jameson, Appellant, etc., 1 Mich. 99 ; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536 , 542; Zimmerman v. Briner, 50 Pa. St. 535; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 .) We think a more reasonable construction can be applied to the will.

1925(Albany Hospital v. Albany Guardian Society, 214 N. Y. 435 .) Here, if the renunciation had been effective, the resulting intestate estate of C.

1924In Horton, Adrn’r, v. Upham et al., 72 Conn. 29 , the residuary clause of a will provided: “I give and devise unto my grandson, Arthur H.