residuary clause (Massachusetts) · Go Syfert
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residuary clause in Massachusetts

55 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1827–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (28)

CaseFollowedCited
Frye v. Loringgreen
mass · 1953 · cited in 3 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1962–1985
2 sentences

1985See Frye v. Loring, 330 Mass. at 396 .

1985See Welch v. Morse, 323 Mass. 233 (1948); Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553 (1951); Frye v. Loring, 330 Mass. 389 (1953); Loring v. Morse, 332 Mass. 57 (1954). [4] The parties have stipulated that at the relevant time the Harvard Medical School admitted women to instruction on an equal footing with men. [5] We are concerned here only with "property possessed" by the testatrix at her death and not property over which she had "a power of disposition under the will of [her] father." That property was given outright to his widow under the residuary clause of the will of Ca

33
Stone v. Forbesgreen
· 1905 · cited in 5 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1907–1975
2 sentences

1975In Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 169 (1905), we said: “If it were necessary to determine the question we should hesitate to follow the . . . [distinction drawn in the English cases between the exercise of general and special powers by a residuary clause].

1975In Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 169 (1905), we said: "If it were necessary to determine the question we should hesitate to follow the ... [distinction drawn in the *328 English cases between the exercise of general and special powers by a residuary clause].

25
Fitts v. Powellgreen
mass · 1940 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1950–2023
2 sentences

2023"The fundamental rule for the construction of wills 'is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids.'" Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 84 (2008), quoting Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940).

1950See Nickerson v. Bowly, 8 Met. 424 , 431; Bailey v. Bailey, 236 Mass. 244, 247 ; Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 .

12
Harlow v. Chingreen
mass · 1989 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2018
2 sentences

2018"Although technically a limitation on liability, the charitable cap set forth in § 85K has been treated as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded under Mass.R.Civ.P. 8 (c), 365 Mass. 749 (1974) (listing specific affirmative defenses, and concluding with the residuary clause 'any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense')." Ibid ., citing Harlow v. Chin , 405 Mass. 697 , 715, 545 N.E.2d 602 (1989).

2018"Although technically a limitation on liability, the charitable cap set forth in § 85K has been treated as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded under Mass.R.Civ.P. 8 (c), 365 Mass. 749 (1974) (listing specific affirmative defenses, and concluding with the residuary clause 'any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense')." Ibid ., citing Harlow v. Chin , 405 Mass. 697 , 715, 545 N.E.2d 602 (1989).

12
Worcester Trust Co. v. Turnergreen
· 1911 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1929–2011
2 sentences

2011Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 121 (1911).

1929Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115 , and cases cited.

12
Pitman v. Pitmangreen
mass · 1943 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1962–1976
2 sentences

1976The court also distinguished a situation in which a donor required a specific reference and the donee simply referred to any power of appointment he might have. 9 Also instructive is Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465 (1943), where a special power of appointment was held exercised by a residuary clause in the donee’s will devising and bequeathing his own property and that over which he might have a power of appointment at the time of his death.

1962See Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465,474, 475 (where the testator’s will “contained a residuary clause devising and bequeathing his own property and that over which he had a power of appointment”); Restatement: Property, § 341.

12
Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepningreen
mass · 2008 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023"The fundamental rule for the construction of wills 'is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids.'" Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 84 (2008), quoting Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940).

11
Meyerovitz v. Jacobovitzgreen
mass · 1928 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017A typical residuary clause uses language such as, "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate," Matteson v. Walsh, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 402 , 408 n.7 (2011), or "[a]ll the rest and residue of my estate real, personal or mixed, wherever it may be found," Meyerowitz v. Jacobovitz, 263 Mass. 47, 49 (1928).6 To support their claim that Evelyn intended "monies" to 5 "I urge that the property that I share with my brother, Philip, on Sheep Pond in Brewster, be bequeathed to Henry and Yayoi Rosenkrantz, with the proviso that they will not assume ownership during his life

2017For its primary definition of "money," the same source states, "In usual and ordinary acceptation it means gold, silver, or paper money used as circulating medium of exchange, and does not embrace notes, bonds, evidences of debt, or other personal or real estate." Ibid.

11
Fishman v. Fishmangreen
massappct · 1974 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Christ's Home, supra ("It has been said repeatedly, the [c]ourt's main concern is not so much what the testator meant to say as it is to determine what [she] meant by what [she] did say").9 8 The clause "appears in an odd position," Fishman v. Fishman, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 349 (1974), only if it is meant to operate as a general residuary clause.

11
Christ's Home v. Mattsongreen
nj · 1947 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Christ's Home, supra ("It has been said repeatedly, the [c]ourt's main concern is not so much what the testator meant to say as it is to determine what [she] meant by what [she] did say").9 8 The clause "appears in an odd position," Fishman v. Fishman, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 349 (1974), only if it is meant to operate as a general residuary clause.

11
Flower v. Dortgreen
texapp · 1953 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017However, this plain-English form will also work"). 7 See Flower v. Dort, 260 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Ct. Civ.

11
Salter v. Saltergreen
mass · 1959 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017In Salter v. Salter, 338 Mass. 391, 393 (1959), construing the term "funds," the court noted, "Although in certain circumstances the term has been construed to include real estate, . . . ordinarily it is used to describe an accumulation of money or collection of securities set apart and held for a definite purpose." Accordingly, the court held that a residuary clause disposing of "[a]ny funds remaining after the settlement of my estate" did not dispose of real estate not mentioned in the will.

2017Id. at 393-394 . 8 In our view, the rule of thumb in these circumstances is that "money" should be construed as commonly understood, unless "a reading of the whole will produces a conviction that the testator must necessarily have intended" the broader meaning.

11
Flannery v. McNamaragreen
mass · 2000 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Cf. Flannery v. McNamara, 432 Mass. 665, 669 (2000) (“Neither the fact that [the object of bounty] predeceased the decedent [and thus the gift failed], nor the absence of a residuary clause or a contingent beneficiary provision, makes [a] will ambiguous”).

11
Ferguson v. Massachusetts Audubon Societygreen
mass · 1944 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005See Ferguson v. Massachusetts Audubon Soc., 316 Mass. 436, 445 (1944).

11
Chase v. Dickeygreen
· 1912 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997We begin by stating what may seem entirely obvious: the Church is a public charity, established by Eddy under a series of charitable trusts. 8 The 1892 instrument executed by Eddy conveyed land in trust for the purpose of building a “suitable and convenient church edifice,” in which to “maintain public worship in accordance with the doctrines of Christian Science in said church.” Her second deed, executed in 1898, granted property in trust to the Publishing Society for “promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science.” In addition to these two trusts, in the residuary clause of her w

1997See Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 557 (1912).

11
Krauthoff v. Attorney Generalgreen
· 1921 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997We begin by stating what may seem entirely obvious: the Church is a public charity, established by Eddy under a series of charitable trusts. 8 The 1892 instrument executed by Eddy conveyed land in trust for the purpose of building a “suitable and convenient church edifice,” in which to “maintain public worship in accordance with the doctrines of Christian Science in said church.” Her second deed, executed in 1898, granted property in trust to the Publishing Society for “promoting and extending the religion of Christian Science.” In addition to these two trusts, in the residuary clause of her w

11
Welch v. Morsegreen
mass · 1948 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
1 sentence

1985See Welch v. Morse, 323 Mass. 233 (1948); Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553 (1951); Frye v. Loring, 330 Mass. 389 (1953); Loring v. Morse, 332 Mass. 57 (1954). [4] The parties have stipulated that at the relevant time the Harvard Medical School admitted women to instruction on an equal footing with men. [5] We are concerned here only with "property possessed" by the testatrix at her death and not property over which she had "a power of disposition under the will of [her] father." That property was given outright to his widow under the residuary clause of the will of Ca

11
Selectmen of the Town of Nahant v. United Statesgreen
mad · 1968 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983See Selectmen of Nahant v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1076, 1078 (D.

11
Beals v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.green
mass · 1975 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
1 sentence

1976Bank & Trust Co., 367 Mass. 318, 322-324 (1975). 7 In the Fiduciary Trust case a special power was held not exercised by a residuary clause making no mention of powers of appointment. 8 The court in the Shine case distinguished National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 (1944), in which particularized formal requirements (a seal, acknowledgment, and deposit with trustee) were laid down by the donor for exercise of a general power of appointment, and the donee failed to comply.

11
Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Yale University Alumni Fundgreen
mass · 1959 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
2 sentences

1975Alumni Fund, 338 Mass. 520, 524 (1959), which has been a part of the case law of this Commonwealth at least since our decision in Amory v. Meredith, 7 Allen 397 (1863), applies equally to the execution of a special power of appointment, provided, of course, that (a) the residuary clause includes any beneficiary within the scope of the special power of appointment, (b) the instrument creating the special power does not prohibit its exercise by a general residuary clause, and (c) the residuary clause includes no disclaimer of intent to exercise the special power.

1975Alumni Fund, 338 Mass. 520, 524 (1959), which has been a part of the case law of this Commonwealth at least since our decision in Amory v. Meredith, 7 Allen 397 (1863), applies equally to the execution of a special power of appointment, provided, of course, that (a) the residuary clause includes any beneficiary within the scope of the special power of appointment, (b) the instrument creating the special power does not prohibit its exercise by a general residuary clause, and (c) the residuary clause includes no disclaimer of intent to exercise the special power.

11
Johnson v. Shrivergreen
colo · 1950 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1962–1962
11
Loring v. Clappgreen
mass · 1958 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1962–1962
11
Pepper's Exr. v. Pepper's Admr.green
kyctapp · 1903 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1950–1950
11
Bigelow v. Gillottgreen
· 1877 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1940–1940
11
City of Louisville v. Commonwealthgreen
kyctapp · 1862 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1937–1937
11
Williams v. Punchardgreen
mass · 1914 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1936–1936
11
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Reedgreen
mass · 1918 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1936–1936
11
Loring v. Dextergreen
mass · 1926 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1936–1936
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (44)

CaseCitedYears
Dresel v. King green
mass · 1908
2 sentences

1937Though clause 220 is a true residuary clause which, without the first paragraph of clause 219, would dispose of the sums in question if they were not needed to supply deficiencies in previous gifts (see Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546, 547 ), this paragraph serves to make certain that the testator intended such sums, if not needed for this purpose, to pass as a “part of the residue” rather than as intestate property.

1910Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546 .

31909–1937
Welch v. Hill green
· 1914
2 sentences

1950Welch v. Hill, 218 Mass. 327, 331-332 .

1933Cases like Welch v. Hill, 218 Mass. 327 , and Mayberry v. Carey, 268 Mass. 255 , where the wills under consideration contained no such provision, are not here applicable. .

21933–1950
White v. Ditson green
mass · 1885
2 sentences

1932It was said by Chief Justice Shaw in Quincy v. Rogers, 9 Cush. 291 , 297: "... in common parlance, as well as in a more precise use of language, a 'legacy’ is distinguishable from the gift of a residue, or share in a residue.” This statement was quoted with approval and given application in White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 359 , and Sias v. Chase, 207 Mass. 372, 377 .

1888White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 353 .

21888–1932
Matteson v. Walsh green
massappct · 2011
1 sentence

2017A typical residuary clause uses language such as, "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate," Matteson v. Walsh, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 402 , 408 n.7 (2011), or "[a]ll the rest and residue of my estate real, personal or mixed, wherever it may be found," Meyerowitz v. Jacobovitz, 263 Mass. 47, 49 (1928).6 To support their claim that Evelyn intended "monies" to 5 "I urge that the property that I share with my brother, Philip, on Sheep Pond in Brewster, be bequeathed to Henry and Yayoi Rosenkrantz, with the proviso that they will not assume ownership during his life

12017–2017
Clymer v. Mayo green
mass · 1985
1 sentence

2009Victor cites to Clymer v. Mayo, 393 Mass. 754 (1985), and argues the Donor created a valid pour-over trust funded by his will.

12009–2009
Buys v. Buys green
tex · 1996
1 sentence

2002Id. at 372-373 .

12002–2002
Loring v. Morse green
mass · 1954
1 sentence

1985See Welch v. Morse, 323 Mass. 233 (1948); Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553 (1951); Frye v. Loring, 330 Mass. 389 (1953); Loring v. Morse, 332 Mass. 57 (1954). [4] The parties have stipulated that at the relevant time the Harvard Medical School admitted women to instruction on an equal footing with men. [5] We are concerned here only with "property possessed" by the testatrix at her death and not property over which she had "a power of disposition under the will of [her] father." That property was given outright to his widow under the residuary clause of the will of Ca

11985–1985
Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring green
mass · 1951
1 sentence

1985See Welch v. Morse, 323 Mass. 233 (1948); Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553 (1951); Frye v. Loring, 330 Mass. 389 (1953); Loring v. Morse, 332 Mass. 57 (1954). [4] The parties have stipulated that at the relevant time the Harvard Medical School admitted women to instruction on an equal footing with men. [5] We are concerned here only with "property possessed" by the testatrix at her death and not property over which she had "a power of disposition under the will of [her] father." That property was given outright to his widow under the residuary clause of the will of Ca

11985–1985
National Shawmut Bank v. Joy green
mass · 1944
1 sentence

1976Bank & Trust Co., 367 Mass. 318, 322-324 (1975). 7 In the Fiduciary Trust case a special power was held not exercised by a residuary clause making no mention of powers of appointment. 8 The court in the Shine case distinguished National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 (1944), in which particularized formal requirements (a seal, acknowledgment, and deposit with trustee) were laid down by the donor for exercise of a general power of appointment, and the donee failed to comply.

11976–1976
Cooney v. Montana green
mass · 1964
1 sentence

1971Cooney v. Montana, 347 Mass. 29, 35 .

11971–1971
Frederick v. Frederick green
mass · 1969
11971–1971
Beals v. Magenis green
mass · 1940
11962–1962
Brown v. Addison Gilbert Hospital green
mass · 1892
11957–1957
Bailey v. Bailey green
mass · 1920
11950–1950
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou green
mass · 1947
11949–1949
Cumston v. Bartlett green
mass · 1889
11948–1948
Tudor v. Vail green
mass · 1907
11948–1948
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle green
mass · 1935
11948–1948
Pollock v. Farnham neutral
mass · 1892
11940–1940
Worcester Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellis green
mass · 1935
11940–1940
Smith v. Livermore green
mass · 1937
11938–1938
Hassam v. Hazen neutral
mass · 1892
11936–1936
Blinn v. Pillsbury neutral
mass · 1925
11934–1934
Mayberry v. Carey green
mass · 1929
11933–1933
Brown v. Wright green
mass · 1897
11932–1932
Sias v. Chase neutral
mass · 1911
11932–1932
Bates v. Kingsley neutral
mass · 1913
11931–1931
Van Winkle v. Catholic Missionary Union neutral
nc · 1926
11931–1931
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith neutral
mass · 1929
11930–1930
Sewall v. Wilmer green
mass · 1882
11926–1926
Cummings v. Stearns neutral
mass · 1894
11922–1922
Tomlinson v. Bury green
mass · 1887
11919–1919
Endicott v. Rector & Board of Visitors of University of Virginia green
mass · 1902
11909–1909
Suter v. Hilliard neutral
mass · 1882
11908–1908
Bowen v. Hoxie green
mass · 1884
11908–1908
Hooper v. Shaw green
mass · 1900
11908–1908
Cushman v. Albee neutral
mass · 1903
11904–1904
Trustees of Unitarian Society v. Tufts green
· 1890
11902–1902
Steele v. Price green
· 1844
11900–1900
State v. Courtemarch green
wash · 1895
11894–1894

Where else courts name it

NY 382 (1838–2017) PA 153 (1863–2026) TX 120 (1912–2025) IL 102 (1889–2025) CA 79 (1885–2024) MA 55 (1827–2023) MD 48 (1862–2025) NC 47 (1870–2022) FL 45 (1935–2026) VA 37 (1802–2024) NJ 36 (1891–1995) OH 35 (1900–2025) MO 29 (1883–2005) IA 28 (1894–2026) KS 26 (1907–2008) KY 24 (1904–2011) GA 22 (1920–2013) IN 21 (1855–2019) AL 21 (1859–1990) MI 21 (1912–2004) WI 21 (1907–2022) CO 19 (1927–2026) TN 19 (1915–2026) CT 19 (1896–2023) UT 18 (1982–2024) RI 17 (1878–2015) WA 17 (1940–2015) DE 17 (1916–2018) SC 16 (1931–2022) AR 15 (1912–2018) OK 15 (1931–2014) NE 13 (1910–2021) WV 13 (1931–2021) MS 11 (1866–2024) OR 11 (1917–2001) MN 8 (1925–2018) ME 8 (1906–1988) VT 7 (1903–2024) NM 6 (1951–1990) SD 6 (1921–2010) NH 5 (1972–2024) DC 5 (1977–2011) MT 5 (1924–2015) AZ 5 (1966–1997) ID 4 (1911–2011) WY 4 (1953–2017) HI 4 (1918–1927) LA 3 (1936–1995) NV 3 (2022–2025) ND 2 (1993–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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