residuary clause in Arkansas

2018Appellees cite Cook v. Estate of Seeman , 314 Ark. 1 , 858 S.W.2d 114 (1993), for the proposition that, if at all possible, courts must broaden or enlarge a residuary clause to avoid intestacy.

2018Appellees cite Cook v. Estate of Seeman , 314 Ark. 1 , 858 S.W.2d 114 (1993), for the proposition that, if at all possible, courts must broaden or enlarge a residuary clause to avoid intestacy.

1997In Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558 , 151 S.W. 1014 , we stated: The presumption against intended intestacy leads to a liberal, rather than to a restrictive, construction of the residuary clause, in the will, in order to prevent partial intestacy. . . .

1997In Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558 , 151 S.W. 1014 , we stated: The presumption against intended intestacy leads to a liberal, rather than to a restrictive, construction of the residuary clause, in the will, in order to prevent partial intestacy. . . .

1980Appellant argues that the bequest here is not a specific legacy under the following definition set out in Holcomb v. Mullin, 167 Ark. 622 , 268 S.W. 32 , viz: “A specific legacy or devise is a gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator’s estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other parts of the same kind, and which may be satisfied only by delivery of the particular thing.” It would be difficult to find a clause more nearly like the one in question here than that held to be a specific legacy in Holcomb.

1980Appellant argues that the bequest here is not a specific legacy under the following definition set out in Holcomb v. Mullin, 167 Ark. 622 , 268 S.W. 32 , viz: “A specific legacy or devise is a gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator’s estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other parts of the same kind, and which may be satisfied only by delivery of the particular thing.” It would be difficult to find a clause more nearly like the one in question here than that held to be a specific legacy in Holcomb.

2005A bequest of all of a man’s property is residuary and not a specific legacy, since its import is the same as expressed by the words, ‘rest and residue.’ ” 202 Ark. at 1022 , 154 S.W.2d at 822 .

2005A bequest of all of a man’s property is residuary and not a specific legacy, since its import is the same as expressed by the words, ‘rest and residue.’ ” 202 Ark. at 1022 , 154 S.W.2d at 822 .

1997Id. at 502 , 230 S.W.2d at 934 .

1997Id. at 502 , 230 S.W.2d at 934 .

1994The next case of significance which discusses ademption is Williamson v. Merritt, 257 Ark. 489 , 519 S.W.2d 767 (1975).

1994The next case of significance which discusses ademption is Williamson v. Merritt, 257 Ark. 489 , 519 S.W.2d 767 (1975).

1994The Court of Appeals next discussed the ademption question in Jennings v. National Bank of Commerce, 270 Ark. 735 , 606 S.W.2d 130 (1980).

1994The Court of Appeals next discussed the ademption question in Jennings v. National Bank of Commerce, 270 Ark. 735 , 606 S.W.2d 130 (1980).

1994In the Matter of the Estate of Lindsey, 309 Ark. 596 , 832 S.W.2d 808 (1992).

1994In the Matter of the Estate of Lindsey, 309 Ark. 596 , 832 S.W.2d 808 (1992).

1993Kidd v. Sparks, 276 Ark. 85 , 633 S.W.2d 13 (1982).

1993Kidd v. Sparks, 276 Ark. 85 , 633 S.W.2d 13 (1982).

1993Traditionally, the cardinal principle of will interpretation is that the testator’s intent governs and that intention is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument, Gifford v. Gifford, 305 Ark. 46 , 805 S.W.2d 71 (1991), and if at all possible, we will broaden or enlarge a residuary clause to avoid intestacy.

1993Traditionally, the cardinal principle of will interpretation is that the testator’s intent governs and that intention is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument, Gifford v. Gifford, 305 Ark. 46 , 805 S.W.2d 71 (1991), and if at all possible, we will broaden or enlarge a residuary clause to avoid intestacy.

1976Wilson v. Pharris, supra. Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152 , 458 S.W. 2d 414 ; Hutchison v. Sheppard, supra; Davis v. Davis, supra; Nuckolls v. Mantooth, 234 Ark. 64 , 350 S.W. 2d 512 ; Core, Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 Ark.

1976Wilson v. Pharris, supra. Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152 , 458 S.W. 2d 414 ; Hutchison v. Sheppard, supra; Davis v. Davis, supra; Nuckolls v. Mantooth, 234 Ark. 64 , 350 S.W. 2d 512 ; Core, Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 Ark.

1976Wilson v. Pharris, supra. Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152 , 458 S.W. 2d 414 ; Hutchison v. Sheppard, supra; Davis v. Davis, supra; Nuckolls v. Mantooth, 234 Ark. 64 , 350 S.W. 2d 512 ; Core, Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 Ark.

1976Wilson v. Pharris, supra. Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152 , 458 S.W. 2d 414 ; Hutchison v. Sheppard, supra; Davis v. Davis, supra; Nuckolls v. Mantooth, 234 Ark. 64 , 350 S.W. 2d 512 ; Core, Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 Ark.

1941A bequest of all of a man’s property is residuary and not a specific legacy, since its import is the same as expressed by the ■words, ‘ rest and residue ’. ’ ’ As indicated the testator in the will before us used the language, “all of my personal property,” which made the bequest a residuary and not a specific legacy, the import of the words being the same as if he had used In Orr v. Griffith, et al., 188 Ark. 428 , 65 S. W. 2d 556 , this court said: “It is conceded by appellant that the construction as to the fifth paragraph of the wdll is correct, that the bequest there made is a specific on

1941A bequest of all of a man’s property is residuary and not a specific legacy, since its import is the same as expressed by the ■words, ‘ rest and residue ’. ’ ’ As indicated the testator in the will before us used the language, “all of my personal property,” which made the bequest a residuary and not a specific legacy, the import of the words being the same as if he had used In Orr v. Griffith, et al., 188 Ark. 428 , 65 S. W. 2d 556 , this court said: “It is conceded by appellant that the construction as to the fifth paragraph of the wdll is correct, that the bequest there made is a specific on

1940In Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark. 184 , 171 S. W. 90 , it was said: “By the terms of the will he had already by specific devises, and by the general devise in the residuary clause to certain of them, made provision for all of his relatives whom he expected to share in the distribution of his estate or to succeed to any part thereof, and this evident purpose of the testator cannot be defeated by any rules of construction, which are only effective to arrive at the true intent of the maker of the will.” In article third, he placed the residuum in trust with his executor, directed him to sell same, and

1940In Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark. 184 , 171 S. W. 90 , it was said: “By the terms of the will he had already by specific devises, and by the general devise in the residuary clause to certain of them, made provision for all of his relatives whom he expected to share in the distribution of his estate or to succeed to any part thereof, and this evident purpose of the testator cannot be defeated by any rules of construction, which are only effective to arrive at the true intent of the maker of the will.” In article third, he placed the residuum in trust with his executor, directed him to sell same, and

1931Considering these circumstances and that the intention to dispose of the entire estate will be presumed unless the language of the will shows to the contrary, and remembering that the testator did not insert a residuary clause, her intention becomes obvious, and, as is said in Hayward v. Rowe, (Mass. 1905), 76 N. E. 286 , cited by appellee: “There being no residuary clause, an inference cannot be safety drawn that the (testator’s) intention was otherwise than to make a full testamentary disposition of her property.” It will next be observed that nowhere in the will is there any language indica

1931In the case of Snedeker v. Congdon, 58 N. Y.

1912In the case of Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18 , it was urged that the use of the words, “and assigns forever,” enlarged the estate, which otherwise would have been restricted by the use of thé words, “bodily heirs.” But this court held, following other decisions cited in the opinion, that the word “assigns,” was to be construed in a technical sense, and that it only imported “that the estate may be transferred, and can not operate to enlarge the grant or defeat its express limitations.” Our conclusion, therefore, is that the devise to Mrs. Darby in the will lapsed, and that the