residuary clause in Maryland

2015In order to do so, she stated that all bequests were conditional on survivorship by a period of time, and if the person did not meet the condition the effect would be that the bequest was inoperative and would pass through the residuary clause to her own legatees.” We are confined, however, to the language of the Will, as the “intention to be sought for is not that which existed in the mind of the testator, but that which is expressed by the language of the will.” Curtis v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 178 Md. 360, 365-66 , 13 A.2d 546, 548 (1940) (internal quotation marks and citation o

2015In order to do so, she stated that all bequests were conditional on survivorship by a period of time, and if the person did not meet the condition the effect would be that the bequest was inoperative and would pass through the residuary clause to her own legatees.” We are confined, however, to the language of the Will, as the “intention to be sought for is not that which existed in the mind of the testator, but that which is expressed by the language of the will.” Curtis v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 178 Md. 360, 365-66 , 13 A.2d 546, 548 (1940) (internal quotation marks and citation o

2025Besche v. Murphy In Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 541, 552 , 59 A.2d 499, 500, 505 (1948), where a residuary clause in a decedent’s will provided that the remainder of the estate would go to “those persons who under the laws of the State of Maryland would take in case of intestacy[,]” this Court held that the claimant, who lost her parents at a young age and had been cared for by the decedent, could not inherit the residuary estate under the will as an - 18 - equitably adopted child because the decedent did not die intestate.

2025Besche v. Murphy In Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 541, 552 , 59 A.2d 499, 500, 505 (1948), where a residuary clause in a decedent’s will provided that the remainder of the estate would go to “those persons who under the laws of the State of Maryland would take in case of intestacy[,]” this Court held that the claimant, who lost her parents at a young age and had been cared for by the decedent, could not inherit the residuary estate under the will as an - 18 - equitably adopted child because the decedent did not die intestate.

1962Miller, op. cit. supra, sec. 158; Barnum v. Barnum, supra, 42 Md. at 311 ; Holmes v. Mackenzie, supra, 118 Md. at 216 . (10) No particular form of expression is required to constitute a residuary clause, it being sufficient if the intent to dispose of the residue appears.

1962Miller, op. cit. supra, sec. 158; Barnum v. Barnum, supra, 42 Md. at 311 ; Holmes v. Mackenzie, supra, 118 Md. at 216 . (10) No particular form of expression is required to constitute a residuary clause, it being sufficient if the intent to dispose of the residue appears.

1984See Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 555 , 111 A. 81 (1920), where the Court of Appeals said, “... every intendment is to be made against holding a man to be intestate who sits down to dispose of the rest and residue of his property.” Accepting Señor San Pio’s interpretation, the Spanish will had a residuary clause as to the Spanish assets of the decedent, and the American will also had a residuary clause which disposed of the American assets.

1984See Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 555 , 111 A. 81 (1920), where the Court of Appeals said, “... every intendment is to be made against holding a man to be intestate who sits down to dispose of the rest and residue of his property.” Accepting Señor San Pio’s interpretation, the Spanish will had a residuary clause as to the Spanish assets of the decedent, and the American will also had a residuary clause which disposed of the American assets.

1962Miller, op. cit. supra, sec. 158; Barnum v. Barnum, supra, 42 Md. at 311 ; Holmes v. Mackenzie, supra, 118 Md. at 216 . (10) No particular form of expression is required to constitute a residuary clause, it being sufficient if the intent to dispose of the residue appears.

1962Miller, op. cit. supra, sec. 158; Barnum v. Barnum, supra, 42 Md. at 311 ; Holmes v. Mackenzie, supra, 118 Md. at 216 . (10) No particular form of expression is required to constitute a residuary clause, it being sufficient if the intent to dispose of the residue appears.

2015See State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 296 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (explaining that a court must consider six conditions before admitting evidence under the residual exception).

2015See State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 296 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (explaining that a court must consider six conditions before admitting evidence under the residual exception).

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1998Mary’s Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb. 728 , 325 N.W.2d 164,165 (1982) (holding that attorney who drafted will owed no duty to alleged beneficiaries of the will’s residuary clause, and thus, alleged beneficiaries could not maintain negligence action); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (1986) (holding that alleged intended beneficiaries had no cause of action against testator’s attorney for negligently drafting will so that alleged beneficiaries inherited nothing); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (holding that, absent fraud, col

1994See Appelton, 2 P.2d 71 (Wash.1931), where the court declared that the testatrix’s attempt to alter the residuary clause in such a manner as to increase the share of one taking under the residuary clause from one-half of the residuary estate to all of it was invalid because such alteration altered the testamentary disposition of the will.

1991The language here is very different from that in Frick v. Frick, 82 Md. 218, 220 , 33 A. 462, 463 (1895), upon which the Children rely. 3 There the testator: (1) bequeathed successive life estates in the home property to his wife and their daughter, Lillian, (2) left Lillian all of his personal property, (3) expressly stated that his wife and Lillian were not to share in the “balance of my estate” and (4) directed that the “balance” of his estate be divided among his other eight children.

1991The language here is very different from that in Frick v. Frick, 82 Md. 218, 220 , 33 A. 462, 463 (1895), upon which the Children rely. 3 There the testator: (1) bequeathed successive life estates in the home property to his wife and their daughter, Lillian, (2) left Lillian all of his personal property, (3) expressly stated that his wife and Lillian were not to share in the “balance of my estate” and (4) directed that the “balance” of his estate be divided among his other eight children.

1988On the other hand the appellate court stated that the proof had obviously established “that testatrix executed the revocatory clause in her new will with the full intent that it not be effective until the new devise became effective.” Id. at 360.

1987Although Ms. Besche had never been formally adopted, she claimed under the residuary provision as an equitable adoptee, relying on dictum in Clayton v. Heptasophs, 130 Md. 31, 36-37 , 99 A. 949, 951-952 (1917): “the authorities very generally establish the proposition, that a parol obligation by a person to adopt the child of another as his own, accompanied by the virtual though not statutory adoption, and acted upon by both parties during the obligor’s life, may be enforced upon the death of the obligor, who dies without disposing of the property by his will____” Chief Judge Marbury, writing

1987Although Ms. Besche had never been formally adopted, she claimed under the residuary provision as an equitable adoptee, relying on dictum in Clayton v. Heptasophs, 130 Md. 31, 36-37 , 99 A. 949, 951-952 (1917): “the authorities very generally establish the proposition, that a parol obligation by a person to adopt the child of another as his own, accompanied by the virtual though not statutory adoption, and acted upon by both parties during the obligor’s life, may be enforced upon the death of the obligor, who dies without disposing of the property by his will____” Chief Judge Marbury, writing

1978There, the testatrix’s will provided: “FIRST: I direct the payment of all my just debts, taxes, funeral expenses and expense of administration of my estate.” 406 P. 2d at 657 (Emphasis supplied.) Then followed certain specific bequests and a residuary clause.