18 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Custody of C.C.R.S.green2 sentences1995Moreover, because I believe the better reasoned analysis and result is that set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Taubman, In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337, 1345-55 (Colo. App.1993) (Taubman, J., dissenting), I respectfully dissent. 1995Moreover, because I believe the better reasoned analysis and result is that set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Taubman, In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337, 1345-55 (Colo.App.1993) (Taubman, J., dissenting), I respectfully dissent. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hickeygreen2 sentences2008P. 28(a)(8); see also Hickey, 303 N.W.2d at 21 ("[The weight of final adjudication should not be given to any jury action that is not returned in a final verdict."); Booker, 298 S.E.2d at 80 ("[The better reasoned rule is the majority rule which requires a final verdict ...."). 2008Indeed, it is very possible that jurors could believe that a defendant is guilty of a greater charge, but focus on lesser offenses "in a spirit of compromise to reach a verdict." Hall, 324 N.E.2d at 52 ; see also Hickey, 303 N.W.2d at 21 ("[Als a practical matter ... jury votes on included offenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in an effort to reach unanimity."). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc.green1 sentence2008P. 28(a)(8); see also Hickey, 303 N.W.2d at 21 ("[The weight of final adjudication should not be given to any jury action that is not returned in a final verdict."); Booker, 298 S.E.2d at 80 ("[The better reasoned rule is the majority rule which requires a final verdict ...."). | 1 | 1 |
Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adamsgreen1 sentence1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1 |
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Hayutingreen1 sentence1984See also Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Hayutin, 40 Colo.App. 559 , 583 P.2d 296 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher R. Williams v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences1976See Williams v. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1971); Bullock v. Mississippi, 404 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. 1976See Williams v. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1971); Bullock v. Mississippi, 404 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hudsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Almeida v. Correa
green
2 sentences1973Recognizing that there is a split in authority among other jurisdictions which lend credence to the reasoning by the Court of Appeals, we are persuaded that the better reasoned doctrine is as announced by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Almeida v. Correa, 51 Haw. 594 , 465 P.2d 564 (1970). 1973Recognizing that there is a split in authority among other jurisdictions which lend credence to the reasoning by the Court of Appeals, we are persuaded that the better reasoned doctrine is as announced by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Almeida v. Correa, 51 Haw. 594 , 465 P.2d 564 (1970). | 3 | 1973–1973 |
Hans v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2002Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-12 , 10 S.Ct. 504 . 2002Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-12 , 10 S.Ct. 504 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Paul
green
2 sentences1993Cf. Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Paul, 90 Colo. 94 , 6 P.2d 462 (1931) (lease terminates upon foreclosure sale). 1993Cf. Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Paul, 90 Colo. 94 , 6 P.2d 462 (1931) (lease terminates upon foreclosure sale). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
220 West 42 Associates v. Ronbet Newmark Co.
green
2 sentences1993The court reasoned that this rule of law “comports with basic notions of priorities and notice.” Accord 220 West 4.2 Associates v. Ronbet Newmark Co., 53 A.D.2d 829 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1976) (lease subordinate to existing and future mortgages and thus extinguished by foreclosure sale). 1993The court reasoned that this rule of law “comports with basic notions of priorities and notice.” Accord 220 West 4.2 Associates v. Ronbet Newmark Co., 53 A.D.2d 829 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1976) (lease subordinate to existing and future mortgages and thus extinguished by foreclosure sale). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Fenton v. SAIF Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Font v. New York City Board of Education
green
2 sentences1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. 1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Preway, Inc. v. Davis
green
2 sentences1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. 1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Taylor v. Centex Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. 1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McElroy's Case
green
2 sentences1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. 1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Laines v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. 1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Moore v. 1600 Downing Street, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1993And, applying Moore v. 1600 Doming Street, Ltd., 668 P.2d 16 (Colo.App.1983), the court reasoned that the rule of the law of the case is a discretionary rule of practice based on the policy that once an issue is decided that should be the end of the matter, but that it was inapplicable here since there was new evidence before the court. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Little Caesar's Pizza v. Ingersoll
green
1 sentence1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark.App. 132 , 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987); Laines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 48 Cal.App.3d 872 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130 , 379 P.2d 217 (1963); Case of McElroy, 397 Mass. 743 , 494 N.E.2d 1 (1986); Font v. New York City Board of Education, 170 A.D.2d 928 , 566 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1991); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 87 Or. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Donald M. Wingate v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida
green
1 sentence1983Otherwise a person could never remove himself from the blight and suspicious aura which surround an accusation that he is guilty of a specific crime.” We conclude that the better reasoned rule is that of Wingate v. Wainwright, supra, and therefore adopt it. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gilligan, Will & Co., a Partnership, and James Gilligan and William Will v. Securities and Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sidney Tager v. Securities and Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corporation and Willard R. Custer
green
1 sentence1977We believe the better reasoned rule to be that enunciated in United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., supra . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,455 Robert W. Nees v. Securities and Exchange Commission, William Reigel v. Securities and Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Leatherhide Industries, Inc. v. Lieberman
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Gilligan v. Securities & Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
General Houses, Inc. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
green
1 sentence1977There the court held that in a direct criminal prosecution or in a proceeding for injunctive relief, it is "sufficient to show that the act of selling unregistered stock was willful and intentional, without the necessity of showing evil purpose or bad motive with specific intent to violate the law . . .." See also Nees v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Tager v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 , 80 S.Ct. 200 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Thomas J. Bullock, III v. State of Mississippi, Joe Patterson, Attorney General, State Board of Parole, United States of America
green
2 sentences1976See Williams v. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1971); Bullock v. Mississippi, 404 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. 1976See Williams v. Dept. of Corrections, 438 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1971); Bullock v. Mississippi, 404 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Publicker v. Shallcross
green
1 sentence1975Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 , 12 S.Ct. 62 , 35 L.Ed. 870 ; Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 624 , 60 S.Ct. 379 , 84 L.Ed. 521 . [1] Nevertheless, Colorado apparently does not permit the setting aside of a fraudulently obtained judgment after the expiration of rights under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), if the same was the result of intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Marshall v. Holmes green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Anglo California National Bank v. Lazard
green
1 sentence1975Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 , 12 S.Ct. 62 , 35 L.Ed. 870 ; Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 624 , 60 S.Ct. 379 , 84 L.Ed. 521 . [1] Nevertheless, Colorado apparently does not permit the setting aside of a fraudulently obtained judgment after the expiration of rights under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), if the same was the result of intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Publicker v. Shallcross
green
1 sentence1975Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 , 12 S.Ct. 62 , 35 L.Ed. 870 ; Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 624 , 60 S.Ct. 379 , 84 L.Ed. 521 . [1] Nevertheless, Colorado apparently does not permit the setting aside of a fraudulently obtained judgment after the expiration of rights under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), if the same was the result of intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Osborn v. LAKE WN. SCH. DIST. neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| cluster 237303 green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Ryan v. International Harvester Co. of America green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Peterson v. Hansen-Niederhauser, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Gillette Motor Transport, Inc. v. Kirby neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Harriman v. Pullman Palace-Car Co. neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| City of Junction City v. Blades neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| City of Salina v. Wait neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| López Santos v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Rude v. People neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.