reasoned analysis in Idaho

2026Based on this record, the district court’s reasoned analysis shows that the court possessed “a high degree of certainty—certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released.” Windom, 150 Idaho at 878 , 253 P.3d at 315 .

2026Based on this record, the district court’s reasoned analysis shows that the court possessed “a high degree of certainty—certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released.” Windom, 150 Idaho at 878 , 253 P.3d at 315 .

2026The district court’s concern with public safety also reflects a sentence that was not the product of arbitrariness or a lack of clarity. “[I]t is clear, as a matter of policy in Idaho, that the primary consideration is ‘the good order and protection of society.’ All other factors must be subservient to that end.” State v. Dobbs, 166 Idaho 202, 204 , 457 P.3d 854, 856 (2020) (quoting Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568 , 650 P.2d at 710 ).

2026The district court’s concern with public safety also reflects a sentence that was not the product of arbitrariness or a lack of clarity. “[I]t is clear, as a matter of policy in Idaho, that the primary consideration is ‘the good order and protection of society.’ All other factors must be subservient to that end.” State v. Dobbs, 166 Idaho 202, 204 , 457 P.3d 854, 856 (2020) (quoting Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568 , 650 P.2d at 710 ).

2021Indigency Application of C.H., 164 Idaho 801 , 435 P.3d 1121 (2019). 1 this Court, and we held that the Board’s findings did not provide a reasoned analysis, as required by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA).

2021Indigency Application of C.H., 164 Idaho 801 , 435 P.3d 1121 (2019). 1 this Court, and we held that the Board’s findings did not provide a reasoned analysis, as required by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA).

2019The court reasoned that a standard requiring the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim made a prior false accusation “strikes the right balance, placing an initial burden on the defendant to justify the use of such evidence while not setting an exceedingly high threshold for its admission.” Id.

2013Truman, 150 Idaho at 722 , 249 P.3d at 1177 .

2013Truman, 150 Idaho at 722 , 249 P.3d at 1177 .

2001Id. at 801-03 , 109 S.Ct. at 2205-06 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 873-75 . .

2001Id. at 801-03 , 109 S.Ct. at 2205-06 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 873-75 . .

1983Attention should then center on the nature of these justifications in the light of the problems of financing and administering these massive plans under changing conditions.’ (citations and footnotes omitted.)” Dullea, supra, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass, at 861-862, 303 N.E.2d 320 . *806 In Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514 , 446 P.2d 634 (1968), this court placed Idaho squarely in line with Massachusetts and other jurisdictions which reject both the gratuity and the strict contract theory, holding further that reasonable modification can be made to keep the plan f

1983Attention should then center on the nature of these justifications in the light of the problems of financing and administering these massive plans under changing conditions.’ (citations and footnotes omitted.)” Dullea, supra, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass, at 861-862, 303 N.E.2d 320 . *806 In Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514 , 446 P.2d 634 (1968), this court placed Idaho squarely in line with Massachusetts and other jurisdictions which reject both the gratuity and the strict contract theory, holding further that reasonable modification can be made to keep the plan f

1983Attention should then center on the nature of these justifications in the light of the problems of financing and administering these massive plans under changing conditions.’ (citations and footnotes omitted.)” Dullea, supra, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass, at 861-862, 303 N.E.2d 320 . *806 In Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514 , 446 P.2d 634 (1968), this court placed Idaho squarely in line with Massachusetts and other jurisdictions which reject both the gratuity and the strict contract theory, holding further that reasonable modification can be made to keep the plan f

1983Instead it must be considered compensatory in nature.” In Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 693 , 448 P.2d 977 , (1969), we held that the legislature could not by later act take away vested retirement rights of a Coeur d’Alene policeman, stating, “Thus, if respondent had acquired pension rights under I.C. § 50 — 2116(i), those existing rights could not be taken from him by a later act of the legislature.

1983Instead it must be considered compensatory in nature.” In Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 693 , 448 P.2d 977 , (1969), we held that the legislature could not by later act take away vested retirement rights of a Coeur d’Alene policeman, stating, “Thus, if respondent had acquired pension rights under I.C. § 50 — 2116(i), those existing rights could not be taken from him by a later act of the legislature.

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1968Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695 , 296 P.2d 536 (1956); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511 , 332 P.2d 324 (Cal. 4th DCA 1958).

1941Thus respondent was not a bona fide purchaser (Zohos v. Marefolos, 48 Ida. 291, 294 , 281 Pac. 1114 ; Kite v. Eckley, 48 Ida. 454, 460 , 282 Pac. 868 ) and not protected against secret liens.

1941Thus respondent was not a bona fide purchaser (Zohos v. Marefolos, 48 Ida. 291, 294 , 281 Pac. 1114 ; Kite v. Eckley, 48 Ida. 454, 460 , 282 Pac. 868 ) and not protected against secret liens.

1941Thus respondent was not a bona fide purchaser (Zohos v. Marefolos, 48 Ida. 291, 294 , 281 Pac. 1114 ; Kite v. Eckley, 48 Ida. 454, 460 , 282 Pac. 868 ) and not protected against secret liens.

1941Thus respondent was not a bona fide purchaser (Zohos v. Marefolos, 48 Ida. 291, 294 , 281 Pac. 1114 ; Kite v. Eckley, 48 Ida. 454, 460 , 282 Pac. 868 ) and not protected against secret liens.

1937The better reasoned rule is well stated in McIntosh v. Munson Road Machinery Co., 167 Miss. 546 , 145 So. 731, at 733 , under a situation almost identical to the one herein: “On appeal, this court has uniformly held that judgments by default, rendered when there is a plea on file, which plea is not a nullity, are erroneous, and many eases have been reversed for that reason.

1937The better reasoned rule is well stated in McIntosh v. Munson Road Machinery Co., 167 Miss. 546 , 145 So. 731, at 733 , under a situation almost identical to the one herein: “On appeal, this court has uniformly held that judgments by default, rendered when there is a plea on file, which plea is not a nullity, are erroneous, and many eases have been reversed for that reason.

1937Beginning with the case of Dean v. McKinstry, 2 Smedes & M. 213, and ending with the case of Dalton et al. v. Rhodes Motor Co., 153 Miss. 51 , 120 So. 821 , this court has announced the rule that a judgment by default, rendered at a time when a plea is on file, even though it was defective, is an erroneous judgment, and, for that reason, the case would be reversed. ‘ ‘ There seems to be no exception to this rule in the various appellate courts throughout the country.

1937Beginning with the case of Dean v. McKinstry, 2 Smedes & M. 213, and ending with the case of Dalton et al. v. Rhodes Motor Co., 153 Miss. 51 , 120 So. 821 , this court has announced the rule that a judgment by default, rendered at a time when a plea is on file, even though it was defective, is an erroneous judgment, and, for that reason, the case would be reversed. ‘ ‘ There seems to be no exception to this rule in the various appellate courts throughout the country.

1936While the limited authorities above mentioned do support appellant with regard to this particular question, the better reasoned rule supported by authority is to the effect that the engineer of the locomotive involved in the alleged accident, that is the actor, the individual charged with negligence may testify as to whether he knew of anything else he could have done to stop quicker, such testimony being admissible on the ground that it calls for a statement of fact from the operator thereof with regard to the use of an instrumentality calling for skilled knowledge and is not a matter of gene