reasoned rule in Texas

2015Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (noting that “[a] judgment is void ... when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act”) (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.2005)). 7 But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, “the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than void”);

2015Co. v. Estate of 7 Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 121 , 121–22 (Tex.1991) (per But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 , 178 curiam)(stating that procedural rules should be “liberally (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy construed so that the decisions of the courts of appeals Act, “the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken turn on substance rather than procedural technicality”). in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than void”); see also Chisholm v. Chisholm, No. 04–06– 9 See, e.g., Isuani v. Manske–Sheffield Radiology Grp., 00504–CV, 2007 WL 148157

2021See Cook, 591 S.W.3d at 683 (concluding that Hamburger and subsequent federal cases provide “the better reasoned analysis” (citing Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992) (“Texas should borrow from well- reasoned and persuasive federal procedural and substantive precedent when this is deemed helpful . . . .”))).

2019See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992) (noting Texas courts “should borrow from well-reasoned and persuasive federal procedural and substantive precedent when this is deemed helpful”).

2015P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.1991) (holding that LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May final judgment mooted interlocutory appeal of order 23, 2007, no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and granting or denying temporary injunction); Providian Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d Bancorp Servs. v. Hernandez, No. 08–04–00186–CV, 119, 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) 2005 WL 82197 , at *1, 2005 Tex.App.

2015P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.1991) (holding that LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May final judgment mooted interlocutory appeal of order 23, 2007, no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and granting or denying temporary injunction); Providian Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d Bancorp Servs. v. Hernandez, No. 08–04–00186–CV, 119, 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) 2005 WL 82197 , at *1, 2005 Tex.App.

2015LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007 , no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119 , 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). 8 See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ( “[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2011LEXIS 3936, at *6-7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007, no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119, 120-21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). [8] See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ("[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2015Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (noting that “[a] judgment is void ... when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act”) (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.2005)). 7 But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, “the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than void”);

2011Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (noting that "[a] judgment is void . . . when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act") (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.2005)). [7] But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, "the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than voi

2015Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (noting that “[a] judgment is void ... when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act”) (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.2005)). 7 But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, “the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than void”);

2011Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (noting that "[a] judgment is void . . . when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act") (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.2005)). [7] But see Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, "the better reasoned rule characterizes acts taken in violation of the automatic stay as voidable rather than voi

2015LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007 , no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119 , 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). 8 See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ( “[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2011LEXIS 3936, at *6-7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007, no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119, 120-21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). [8] See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ("[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2015Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir.2005) ("[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner” and " 'must supply a reasoned analysis’ for any departure from other agency decisions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). .

2015Ed. 2d 863 (2014); Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 234 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 730 (2013); Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tax Court must “spell out its reasoning” and that “[a] reasoned decision as to what is reasonable in this context must bring together the disparate elements and give some account of how the judge has reached his conclusion.”). 32 Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its

2005See Caballero, 53 S.W.3d at 396 (“The better reasoned rule is that once the Department has established a parent’s knowing criminal conduct resulting in their incarceration for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence as to how the parent would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during that period.

2004See Caballero , 53 S.W.3d at 396 (“The better reasoned rule is that once the Department has established a parent's knowing criminal conduct resulting in their incarceration for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence as to how the parent would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during that period.

2000See id.

2000See id.

2015Ed. 2d 863 (2014); Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 234 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 730 (2013); Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tax Court must “spell out its reasoning” and that “[a] reasoned decision as to what is reasonable in this context must bring together the disparate elements and give some account of how the judge has reached his conclusion.”). 32 Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its

2015Ed. 2d 863 (2014); Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 234 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 730 (2013); Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tax Court must “spell out its reasoning” and that “[a] reasoned decision as to what is reasonable in this context must bring together the disparate elements and give some account of how the judge has reached his conclusion.”). 32 Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its

2015LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007 , no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119 , 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). 8 See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ( “[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2011LEXIS 3936, at *6-7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007, no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119, 120-21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). [8] See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ("[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2023See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112-15 (1943) (concluding that business’s accident reports did not qualify under exception for reports prepared in regular course of business); Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 810-13 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112-15 (1943) (concluding that business’s accident reports did not qualify under exception for reports prepared in regular course of business); Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 810-13 (Tex. Crim.

2021The court reasoned that a violation of the hotel’s policies would subject guests to “immediate eviction.” Id. at 551.

2021Thus, as soon as hotel staff authorized the police to enter the room to effectuate the eviction, the defendant’s “hotel tenancy—and accompanying expectation of privacy—was extinguished.” Id.

2015Ed. 2d 863 (2014); Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 234 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 730 (2013); Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tax Court must “spell out its reasoning” and that “[a] reasoned decision as to what is reasonable in this context must bring together the disparate elements and give some account of how the judge has reached his conclusion.”). 32 Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its

2015LEXIS 3936, at *6–7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 23, 2007 , no pet.) (noting conflict between Sikes and Continental Casing ); In re De La Garza, 159 S.W.3d 119 , 120–21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (same); Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 , 131 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.)(same); Chunn v. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (same). 8 See, e.g., Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex.2006) ( “[W]e have repeatedly stressed that procedural rules should be construed and applied so that the right of appeal is not unnecessarily lost to technicalitie

2015Ed. 2d 863 (2014); Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 234 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 730 (2013); Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tax Court must “spell out its reasoning” and that “[a] reasoned decision as to what is reasonable in this context must bring together the disparate elements and give some account of how the judge has reached his conclusion.”). 32 Jupiter Energy Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its

2003In my opinion, the better reasoned analysis with regard to a prosecutor’s duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury is contained in State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 , 676 A.2d 533 (1996).

2003In my opinion, the better reasoned analysis with regard to a prosecutor’s duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury is contained in State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 , 676 A.2d 533 (1996).