reasoned rule in North Carolina

2022In addition, “while the trial court is entitled to consider the children’s wishes in determining whether termination of their parents’ parental rights would be appropriate, their preferences are not controlling given that the children’s best interests constitute ‘the polar star’ of the North Carolina Juvenile Code.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865 , 879, 844 S.E.2d 916 , 926–27 (2020) (quoting In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 450 , 665 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008)). ¶ 36 Here, the trial court’s findings demonstrate that it considered the dispositional factors set forth in N.C.G.S. section 7B-1110(a) and “performe

2022In addition, “while the trial court is entitled to consider the children’s wishes in determining whether termination of their parents’ parental rights would be appropriate, their preferences are not controlling given that the children’s best interests constitute ‘the polar star’ of the North Carolina Juvenile Code.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865 , 879, 844 S.E.2d 916 , 926–27 (2020) (quoting In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 450 , 665 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008)). ¶ 36 Here, the trial court’s findings demonstrate that it considered the dispositional factors set forth in N.C.G.S. section 7B-1110(a) and “performe

2022Id. at 259 , 623 S.E.2d at 606 . ¶ 24 Defendant’s reading of Hanton is overbroad.

2022Id. at 259 , 623 S.E.2d at 606 . ¶ 24 Defendant’s reading of Hanton is overbroad.

2015Id.

2010As support for this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Booker quoted the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Hickey, 103 Mich.App. 350, 353 , 303 N.W.2d 19 (1981), in which the Court stated that "polling the jury on the various possible verdicts submitted to it would constitute an unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury," since, "as a practical matter," "jury votes on included offenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in an effort to reach unanimity" and since "[a] jury should not be precluded from reconsidering a previous vote on any issue, a

2010As support for this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Booker quoted the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Hickey, 103 Mich.App. 350, 353 , 303 N.W.2d 19 (1981), in which the Court stated that "polling the jury on the various possible verdicts submitted to it would constitute an unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury," since, "as a practical matter," "jury votes on included offenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in an effort to reach unanimity" and since "[a] jury should not be precluded from reconsidering a previous vote on any issue, a

2010The Supreme Court "reject[ed] this request" because it was "of the opinion that the better reasoned rule is the majority rule which requires a final verdict before there can be an implied acquittal." Id. (emphasis original).

2010In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Supreme Court pointed out that "the better reasoned rule is the majority rule which requires a final verdict before there can be an implied acquittal." Id., 306 N.C. at 305 , 293 S.E.2d at 80 .

2009The Court reasoned that a claim under this statute “involve[d] intentional conduct.” Id.

2007Ellis-Don repudiated the idea that the economic loss doctrine prohibits recovery for any and all economic loss in tort; rather, the court reasoned that the doctrine has not “expanded to preclude all claims in tort for economic damages in the absence of a contract, or, more narrowly, outside the products liability context.” Id.

2007The court further reasoned that “[t]he economic loss rule ... in no way undermines or overturns the twenty-five years of case law recognizing [a tort claim for negligence from the breach of the duty of care].” Id.

1982State v. Cousin, 292 N.C. 461 , 233 S.E. 2d 554 (1977).

1982State v. Cousin, 292 N.C. 461 , 233 S.E. 2d 554 (1977).

1979Hinkle v. Minneapolis, Anoka & Cuyuna Range Railway, 162 Minn. 112 , 202 N.W. 340 (1925); see also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1379 (1926) and cases cited therein. *539 In cases where defendant is guilty of simple negligence, this Court has held that under certain circumstances it becomes the duty of the gratuitous passenger in the exercise of due care for his own safety to protest, remonstrate the driver and, if his warning is disregarded, to request that the automobile be stopped and he be permitted to leave the car.

1979Hinkle v. Minneapolis, Anoka & Cuyuna Range Railway, 162 Minn. 112 , 202 N.W. 340 (1925); see also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1379 (1926) and cases cited therein. *539 In cases where defendant is guilty of simple negligence, this Court has held that under certain circumstances it becomes the duty of the gratuitous passenger in the exercise of due care for his own safety to protest, remonstrate the driver and, if his warning is disregarded, to request that the automobile be stopped and he be permitted to leave the car.