98 California opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2026 26 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Boardgreen2 sentences2019(See Shapell , supra , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 235 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 .) As far as residential development, the District "engaged in a reasoned analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created." ( Ibid . ) The argument that the District lacked evidentiary support and failed to demonstrate a rational connection between the Level 2 fee and the project turns on the unique designation of the project as adults -only employee housing. 2019(See Shapell , supra , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 235 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 .) As far as residential development, the District "engaged in a reasoned analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created." ( Ibid . ) The argument that the District lacked evidentiary support and failed to demonstrate a rational connection between the Level 2 fee and the project turns on the unique designation of the project as adults -only employee housing. | 2 | 6 |
San Francisco Ecology Center v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2022(San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 584, 596 ; Concerned Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-842.) While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis. 2007What is required is evidence that the additional costs or lost profitability are sufficiently severe as to render it impractical to proceed with the project.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1181 , italics added.) While an EIR need not analyze “ ‘ “ ‘every imaginable alternative or mitigation measure,’ ” ’ ” “it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 , italics omitted; see San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 4 | 2 | 3 |
People v. Sydegreen2 sentences2021(See People v. Syde (1951) 37 Cal.2d 765, 768 [“The Corporate Securities Law does not contain an all-inclusive formula by which to test the facts in every case. 2021(See People v. Syde (1951) 37 Cal.2d 765, 768 [“The Corporate Securities Law does not contain an all-inclusive formula by which to test the facts in every case. | 2 | 2 |
Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protectiongreen2 sentences2020(Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 487, fn. 9 .) 2. 2020(Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 487, fn. 9 .) 2. | 2 | 2 |
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordovagreen2 sentences2026An EIR evaluating a planned land use project must assume that all phases of the project will eventually be built and will need water, and must analyze, to the extent reasonably possible, the impacts of providing water to the entire proposed project.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431 .) “Third,” the Vineyard court continued, “the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project mus 2026An EIR evaluating a planned land use project must assume that all phases of the project will eventually be built and will need water, and must analyze, to the extent reasonably possible, the impacts of providing water to the entire proposed project.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431 .) “Third,” the Vineyard court continued, “the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project mus | 1 | 8 |
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2019(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 15088, subd. (c).) The EIR “must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible. [Citations.] While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1029 .) Finally, an agency need not “adopt every nickel and dime mitigation scheme brought to its attention or proposed in the project EIR,” but it must incorporate “feasible mitigation measures” “when such 2009“In keeping with the statute and guidelines, an adequate EIR must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1029 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 367 ].) “While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Ibid.) That was done here. | 1 | 4 |
California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa Claritagreen2 sentences2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f 2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f | 1 | 3 |
Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f 2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f | 1 | 2 |
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislausgreen2 sentences2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f 2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f | 1 | 2 |
Pierotti v. Toriangreen2 sentences2026(See Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 32-33 [“[A]n opening brief is not an appropriate vehicle for an attorney to ‘vent his spleen’. . . .”].) “Ad hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve. 2026When counsel resort to name-calling and to unsupported claims of misconduct, they risk obscuring any meritorious arguments they may have.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) They also impose “a real cost to the opposing party and the state” (Pierotti v. Torian, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32-33), as both opposing counsel and the court must “spend additional resources filtering out the hyperbole.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) Counsel can zealously dispute the facts of a case or the merits of a rulin | 1 | 1 |
Davenport v. Davenportgreen1 sentence2026Norrenberg and Demchak’s “[a]d hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 652 , 667; see In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537 [“Zeal and vigor in the representation of clients are commendable. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Oatesgreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 (Oates) [declining to address an assertion where the appellant failed to expand on it with argument or citation to relevant authority]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 (Hardy) [same]; People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 333, fn. 11 (Verdugo) [“Issues not adequately developed in an appellate brief are generally deemed forfeited.”].) Moreover, the assertion lacks merit. | 1 | 1 |
HOME BUILDERS ASSN. OF TULARE/KINGS COUNTIES, INC. v. City of Lemooregreen1 sentence2025However, if the [government’s] evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” (City of Lemoore, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 562 [“a plaintiff challenging an impact fee has to show that the record before the [government] cl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hardygreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 (Oates) [declining to address an assertion where the appellant failed to expand on it with argument or citation to relevant authority]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 (Hardy) [same]; People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 333, fn. 11 (Verdugo) [“Issues not adequately developed in an appellate brief are generally deemed forfeited.”].) Moreover, the assertion lacks merit. | 1 | 1 |
Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alamedagreen2 sentences2025However, if the [government’s] evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” (City of Lemoore, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 562 [“a plaintiff challenging an impact fee has to show that the record before the [government] cl 2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an | 1 | 1 |
Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.green1 sentence2024Perhaps the DMV’s theory is based on Code of Civil Procedures section 1094.5, subdivision (a), which refers to a writ “issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision.” (Italics added; see Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055 [writ of administrative mandamus may be issued to review an administrative decision only if it is final].) These principles regarding administrative mandamus do not apply to Bonaudi’s challenge to the failure to rule on his request for a continuance, which is made in a petition for | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. City of Sacramentogreen1 sentence2024(Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants”].) Instead, they argue in a summary fashion that the only specific allegations referencing them are protected activities and therefore this “necessarily means that Plaintiffs’ causes of action against [them] arise from those protected activities and shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to prove a probability of success on the merits . . . .” The officer defendants cite no authority for this conclusory argument, and we find it is contrary to Park | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Santa Clara v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cabell v. John H.green | 1 | 1 |
| State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Zichwicgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Castillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| John Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Incgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Maderagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Traub v. Board of Retirementgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stull v. Sparrowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Transit Ads, Inc. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Merfeldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Woodheadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Velasquez
green
2 sentences2022(Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 .) The court reasoned that the standard version of CALCRIM No. 875 created juror confusion under the facts applicable to the case such that the jury could have convicted the defendant on four or five counts of assault without proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each element of the offense. 2022(Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 .) The court reasoned that the standard version of CALCRIM No. 875 created juror confusion under the facts applicable to the case such that the jury could have convicted the defendant on four or five counts of assault without proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each element of the offense. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
green
2 sentences2013The court acknowledged the court‟s “gate-keeping” function for expert testimony enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 781 . 2013The court acknowledged the court‟s “gate-keeping” function for expert testimony enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 781 . | 3 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Ahmed
green
2 sentences2018Ahmed provided a reasoned analysis of when and how enhancements based on a defendant's conduct during a single crime fall within section 654's ambit. ( Ahmed, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 163 , 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 264 P.3d 822 .) The court explained, "enhancements are different from substantive crimes, a difference that affects how section 654 applies to enhancements. 2018Ahmed provided a reasoned analysis of when and how enhancements based on a defendant's conduct during a single crime fall within section 654's ambit. ( Ahmed, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 163 , 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 264 P.3d 822 .) The court explained, "enhancements are different from substantive crimes, a difference that affects how section 654 applies to enhancements. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f 2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f | 2 | 2007–2010 |
A. C. Label Co. v. Transamerica Insurance
green
2 sentences2000Label, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 , italics omitted.) Then the court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied because “although the damage allegedly occurred during the policy period, plaintiffs, the insureds, were not, and had not been, associated with the property or the groundwater contamination in any way at the time this damage occurred, and therefore plaintiffs were not liable for and could not have been held liable for this damage at the time that this damage occurred.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The court explained that “the absence of coverage ... is the natural consequen 2000Label, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 , italics omitted.) Then the court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied because "although the damage allegedly occurred during the policy period, plaintiffs, the insureds, were not, and had not been, associated with the property or the groundwater contamination in any way at the time this damage occurred, and therefore plaintiffs were not liable for and could not have been held liable for this damage at the time that this damage occurred." ( Ibid, italics omitted.) The court explained that "the absence of coverage . . . i | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences1993The court reasoned that the error in creating the mandatory presumptions relieved the People of their burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied the defendant his due process rights, subverted the presumption of innocence, and "invade[d] the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases." ( Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 265 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 221 ].) Noting that it had held that Sandstrom error was subject to the harmless error test in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , the court held that the judgment could be 1993The court reasoned that the error in creating the mandatory presumptions relieved the People of their burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied the defendant his due process rights, subverted the presumption of innocence, and “invade[d] the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.” (Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 265 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 221 ].) Noting that it had held that Sandstrom error was subject to the harmless error test in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , the court held that the judgment could be | 2 | 1991–1993 |
People v. Bradley
green
2 sentences1987The Supreme Court reversed for other reasons, specifically noting, however, that the defendant could not be required to serve a sentence for attempted murder should he be convicted of both offenses on retrial. ( Id., at p. 459.) *639 A well reasoned analysis of the issue is found in People v. Bradley, supra, 115 Cal. App.3d 744 . 1987(Id., at p. 459.) A well reasoned analysis of the issue is found in People v. Bradley, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 744 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Liberty National Enterprises v. Chicago Title Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 846 .) The lack of any citations in plaintiff’s briefs to the record on appeal severely hampers our ability to conduct a reasoned analysis of the merits of her various assertions.7 Thus, we could affirm the order awarding fees on the grounds that plaintiff has waived her arguments on appeal. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Barragan
green
1 sentence2025The court reasoned that that doctrine does not apply “where there is a ‘ “substantial difference in the evidence” ’ on retrial of the particular issue.” (Harden, supra, at p. 50, quoting People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246 .) Because “it is of course impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at an evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred,” the court concluded that “the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish disentitlement” to resentencing at the prima facie stage. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 .) There, the court expressly addressed the defendant’s claim that the instruction was “inconsistent” in that it “states that the CSAAS testimony is not evidence the defendant committed the charged crimes, and also that the jury may use the evidence in evaluating the believability of [the victim’s] testimony.” (Gonzales, at p. 503.) Gonzales rejected the argument that it was “impossible to use the CSAAS testimony to evaluate the believability of [the victim’s] testimony without using it as proof that Gonzales committed the charged 27 crimes. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cresta Bella v. Poway Unified School District
green
1 sentence2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy
green
1 sentence2024Conclusory statements unsupported by factual information will not suffice.’ [Citation.] The level of detail in the response may correspond to the level of detail in the comment, so that a general response is sufficient to a general comment, but a more detailed response is needed for a more detailed comment. [Citation.] The EIR ‘must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible. [Citations.] While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.’ ” (Covington, sup | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hughes Electronics Corp. v. Citibank Delaware green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. American Medical International, Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Mayo green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Aledamat
green
2 sentences2023But counsel never argued that, if [the defendant] did assault the victim with the box cutter, the box cutter was not a deadly weapon.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14 .) The Court reasoned defense counsel “could readily believe it would be pointless for him to argue that even if (contrary to the argument counsel did make) the jury found defendant assaulted the victim with the box cutter, it was not a deadly weapon.” (Ibid.) While a “box cutter is not inherently deadly because it is not designed for 30 that purpose,” if it is “used to assault someone, i.e., used as a weapon, a box cutter i 2023(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15 .) The Court explained that “under the instructions, the jury necessarily found the following: (1) defendant did an act with a deadly weapon (either inherently or as used) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force; (2) defendant was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone; and (3) defendant had the present ability to apply force with a deadly weapon to a person.” (Ibid.) If the jury “applied its c | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Vivar green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School District green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re Humphrey green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Miller v. McKinnon green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Greene v. Dillingham Construction N.A. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Habitat & Watershed Caretakers v. City of Santa Cruz green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Rolando S. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In re Lawrence green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Hubbart green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kleveland V.Siegel & Wolensky LLP green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Twain Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Tuolumne green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Warmington Old Town Associates, L.P. v. Tustin Unified School District green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Re Enrique G. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Knight v. Jewett green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.