reasoned analysis (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

reasoned analysis in California

98 California opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2026 26 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (34)

CaseFollowedCited
Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Boardgreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2019
2 sentences

2019(See Shapell , supra , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 235 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 .) As far as residential development, the District "engaged in a reasoned analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created." ( Ibid . ) The argument that the District lacked evidentiary support and failed to demonstrate a rational connection between the Level 2 fee and the project turns on the unique designation of the project as adults -only employee housing.

2019(See Shapell , supra , 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 235 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 .) As far as residential development, the District "engaged in a reasoned analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created." ( Ibid . ) The argument that the District lacked evidentiary support and failed to demonstrate a rational connection between the Level 2 fee and the project turns on the unique designation of the project as adults -only employee housing.

26
San Francisco Ecology Center v. City & County of San Franciscogreen
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2022
2 sentences

2022(San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 584, 596 ; Concerned Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-842.) While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.

2007What is required is evidence that the additional costs or lost profitability are sufficiently severe as to render it impractical to proceed with the project.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1181 , italics added.) While an EIR need not analyze “ ‘ “ ‘every imaginable alternative or mitigation measure,’ ” ’ ” “it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 , italics omitted; see San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 4

23
People v. Sydegreen
cal · 1951 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021(See People v. Syde (1951) 37 Cal.2d 765, 768 [“The Corporate Securities Law does not contain an all-inclusive formula by which to test the facts in every case.

2021(See People v. Syde (1951) 37 Cal.2d 765, 768 [“The Corporate Securities Law does not contain an all-inclusive formula by which to test the facts in every case.

22
Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protectiongreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020(Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 487, fn. 9 .) 2.

2020(Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 487, fn. 9 .) 2.

22
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordovagreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2026
2 sentences

2026An EIR evaluating a planned land use project must assume that all phases of the project will eventually be built and will need water, and must analyze, to the extent reasonably possible, the impacts of providing water to the entire proposed project.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431 .) “Third,” the Vineyard court continued, “the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project mus

2026An EIR evaluating a planned land use project must assume that all phases of the project will eventually be built and will need water, and must analyze, to the extent reasonably possible, the impacts of providing water to the entire proposed project.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431 .) “Third,” the Vineyard court continued, “the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project mus

18
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Los Angelesgreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2022
2 sentences

2019(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, 15088, subd. (c).) The EIR “must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible. [Citations.] While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1029 .) Finally, an agency need not “adopt every nickel and dime mitigation scheme brought to its attention or proposed in the project EIR,” but it must incorporate “feasible mitigation measures” “when such

2009“In keeping with the statute and guidelines, an adequate EIR must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1029 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 367 ].) “While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.” (Ibid.) That was done here.

14
California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa Claritagreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2011
2 sentences

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

13
Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Board of Supervisorsgreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2010
2 sentences

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

12
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislausgreen
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2010
2 sentences

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

12
Pierotti v. Toriangreen
calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026(See Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 32-33 [“[A]n opening brief is not an appropriate vehicle for an attorney to ‘vent his spleen’. . . .”].) “Ad hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve.

2026When counsel resort to name-calling and to unsupported claims of misconduct, they risk obscuring any meritorious arguments they may have.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) They also impose “a real cost to the opposing party and the state” (Pierotti v. Torian, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32-33), as both opposing counsel and the court must “spend additional resources filtering out the hyperbole.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) Counsel can zealously dispute the facts of a case or the merits of a rulin

11
Davenport v. Davenportgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Norrenberg and Demchak’s “[a]d hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 652 , 667; see In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537 [“Zeal and vigor in the representation of clients are commendable.

11
People v. Oatesgreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 (Oates) [declining to address an assertion where the appellant failed to expand on it with argument or citation to relevant authority]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 (Hardy) [same]; People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 333, fn. 11 (Verdugo) [“Issues not adequately developed in an appellate brief are generally deemed forfeited.”].) Moreover, the assertion lacks merit.

11
HOME BUILDERS ASSN. OF TULARE/KINGS COUNTIES, INC. v. City of Lemooregreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025However, if the [government’s] evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” (City of Lemoore, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 562 [“a plaintiff challenging an impact fee has to show that the record before the [government] cl

11
People v. Hardygreen
cal · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 (Oates) [declining to address an assertion where the appellant failed to expand on it with argument or citation to relevant authority]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 (Hardy) [same]; People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 333, fn. 11 (Verdugo) [“Issues not adequately developed in an appellate brief are generally deemed forfeited.”].) Moreover, the assertion lacks merit.

11
Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alamedagreen
calctapp5d · 2019 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025However, if the [government’s] evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” (City of Lemoore, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 562 [“a plaintiff challenging an impact fee has to show that the record before the [government] cl

2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an

11
Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.green
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Perhaps the DMV’s theory is based on Code of Civil Procedures section 1094.5, subdivision (a), which refers to a writ “issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision.” (Italics added; see Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055 [writ of administrative mandamus may be issued to review an administrative decision only if it is final].) These principles regarding administrative mandamus do not apply to Bonaudi’s challenge to the failure to rule on his request for a continuance, which is made in a petition for

11
Allen v. City of Sacramentogreen
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024(Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants”].) Instead, they argue in a summary fashion that the only specific allegations referencing them are protected activities and therefore this “necessarily means that Plaintiffs’ causes of action against [them] arise from those protected activities and shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to prove a probability of success on the merits . . . .” The officer defendants cite no authority for this conclusory argument, and we find it is contrary to Park

11
In Re Harrisgreen
calctapp · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
County of Santa Clara v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Cabell v. John H.green
cal · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 2015 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
In Re Younggreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
People v. Zichwicgreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
People v. Castillogreen
cal · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
John Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Incgreen
ca9 · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Maderagreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Traub v. Board of Retirementgreen
cal · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Stull v. Sparrowgreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
11
Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywoodgreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Transit Ads, Inc. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.green
calctapp · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
11
Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.green
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
11
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
11
People v. Merfeldgreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
11
People v. Woodheadgreen
cal · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (46)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Velasquez green
calctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2022(Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 .) The court reasoned that the standard version of CALCRIM No. 875 created juror confusion under the facts applicable to the case such that the jury could have convicted the defendant on four or five counts of assault without proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each element of the offense.

2022(Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 .) The court reasoned that the standard version of CALCRIM No. 875 created juror confusion under the facts applicable to the case such that the jury could have convicted the defendant on four or five counts of assault without proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each element of the offense.

32022–2022
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California green
cal · 2012
2 sentences

2013The court acknowledged the court‟s “gate-keeping” function for expert testimony enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 781 .

2013The court acknowledged the court‟s “gate-keeping” function for expert testimony enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 781 .

32013–2013
People v. Ahmed green
cal · 2011
2 sentences

2018Ahmed provided a reasoned analysis of when and how enhancements based on a defendant's conduct during a single crime fall within section 654's ambit. ( Ahmed, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 163 , 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 264 P.3d 822 .) The court explained, "enhancements are different from substantive crimes, a difference that affects how section 654 applies to enhancements.

2018Ahmed provided a reasoned analysis of when and how enhancements based on a defendant's conduct during a single crime fall within section 654's ambit. ( Ahmed, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 163 , 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 264 P.3d 822 .) The court explained, "enhancements are different from substantive crimes, a difference that affects how section 654 applies to enhancements.

22018–2018
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles green
calctapp · 2003
2 sentences

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

2010(Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 431; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 715 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 ]; Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, 206 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ].) “Third, the future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under CEQA. [Citation.] An EIR for a land use project must address the impacts of likely f

22007–2010
A. C. Label Co. v. Transamerica Insurance green
calctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2000Label, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 , italics omitted.) Then the court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied because “although the damage allegedly occurred during the policy period, plaintiffs, the insureds, were not, and had not been, associated with the property or the groundwater contamination in any way at the time this damage occurred, and therefore plaintiffs were not liable for and could not have been held liable for this damage at the time that this damage occurred.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The court explained that “the absence of coverage ... is the natural consequen

2000Label, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 , italics omitted.) Then the court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied because "although the damage allegedly occurred during the policy period, plaintiffs, the insureds, were not, and had not been, associated with the property or the groundwater contamination in any way at the time this damage occurred, and therefore plaintiffs were not liable for and could not have been held liable for this damage at the time that this damage occurred." ( Ibid, italics omitted.) The court explained that "the absence of coverage . . . i

22000–2000
Rose v. Clark green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

1993The court reasoned that the error in creating the mandatory presumptions relieved the People of their burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied the defendant his due process rights, subverted the presumption of innocence, and "invade[d] the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases." ( Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 265 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 221 ].) Noting that it had held that Sandstrom error was subject to the harmless error test in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , the court held that the judgment could be

1993The court reasoned that the error in creating the mandatory presumptions relieved the People of their burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied the defendant his due process rights, subverted the presumption of innocence, and “invade[d] the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.” (Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 265 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 221 ].) Noting that it had held that Sandstrom error was subject to the harmless error test in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , the court held that the judgment could be

21991–1993
People v. Bradley green
calctapp · 1981
2 sentences

1987The Supreme Court reversed for other reasons, specifically noting, however, that the defendant could not be required to serve a sentence for attempted murder should he be convicted of both offenses on retrial. ( Id., at p. 459.) *639 A well reasoned analysis of the issue is found in People v. Bradley, supra, 115 Cal. App.3d 744 .

1987(Id., at p. 459.) A well reasoned analysis of the issue is found in People v. Bradley, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 744 .

21987–1987
Liberty National Enterprises v. Chicago Title Insurance green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2025Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 846 .) The lack of any citations in plaintiff’s briefs to the record on appeal severely hampers our ability to conduct a reasoned analysis of the merits of her various assertions.7 Thus, we could affirm the order awarding fees on the grounds that plaintiff has waived her arguments on appeal.

12025–2025
People v. Barragan green
cal · 2004
1 sentence

2025The court reasoned that that doctrine does not apply “where there is a ‘ “substantial difference in the evidence” ’ on retrial of the particular issue.” (Harden, supra, at p. 50, quoting People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246 .) Because “it is of course impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at an evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred,” the court concluded that “the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish disentitlement” to resentencing at the prima facie stage.

12025–2025
People v. Gonzales green
calctapp5d · 2017
1 sentence

2025(People v. Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 .) There, the court expressly addressed the defendant’s claim that the instruction was “inconsistent” in that it “states that the CSAAS testimony is not evidence the defendant committed the charged crimes, and also that the jury may use the evidence in evaluating the believability of [the victim’s] testimony.” (Gonzales, at p. 503.) Gonzales rejected the argument that it was “impossible to use the CSAAS testimony to evaluate the believability of [the victim’s] testimony without using it as proof that Gonzales committed the charged 27 crimes.

12025–2025
Cresta Bella v. Poway Unified School District green
calctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an

12025–2025
Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy green
calctapp · 2006
1 sentence

2024Conclusory statements unsupported by factual information will not suffice.’ [Citation.] The level of detail in the response may correspond to the level of detail in the comment, so that a general response is sufficient to a general comment, but a more detailed response is needed for a more detailed comment. [Citation.] The EIR ‘must respond to specific suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested mitigation is facially infeasible. [Citations.] While the response need not be exhaustive, it should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis.’ ” (Covington, sup

12024–2024
Hughes Electronics Corp. v. Citibank Delaware green
calctapp · 2004
12023–2023
Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. American Medical International, Inc. green
calctapp · 1995
12023–2023
Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. green
calctapp · 2013
12023–2023
People v. Mayo green
calctapp · 1961
12023–2023
People v. Aledamat green
cal · 2019
2 sentences

2023But counsel never argued that, if [the defendant] did assault the victim with the box cutter, the box cutter was not a deadly weapon.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14 .) The Court reasoned defense counsel “could readily believe it would be pointless for him to argue that even if (contrary to the argument counsel did make) the jury found defendant assaulted the victim with the box cutter, it was not a deadly weapon.” (Ibid.) While a “box cutter is not inherently deadly because it is not designed for 30 that purpose,” if it is “used to assault someone, i.e., used as a weapon, a box cutter i

2023(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15 .) The Court explained that “under the instructions, the jury necessarily found the following: (1) defendant did an act with a deadly weapon (either inherently or as used) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force; (2) defendant was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone; and (3) defendant had the present ability to apply force with a deadly weapon to a person.” (Ibid.) If the jury “applied its c

12023–2023
People v. Vivar green
cal · 2021
12021–2021
City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School District green
calctapp · 2012
12021–2021
In re Humphrey green
calctapp5d · 2018
12021–2021
Miller v. McKinnon green
cal · 1942
12020–2020
San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City & County of San Francisco green
calctapp · 1989
12019–2019
Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC green
calctapp5d · 2018
12019–2019
Greene v. Dillingham Construction N.A. green
calctapp · 2002
12018–2018
Habitat & Watershed Caretakers v. City of Santa Cruz green
calctapp · 2013
12017–2017
People v. Rolando S. green
calctapp · 2011
12016–2016
In re Lawrence green
cal · 2008
12016–2016
People v. Hubbart green
calctapp · 2001
12015–2015
People v. Scott green
cal · 1994
12015–2015
Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority green
cal · 2013
12015–2015
Kleveland V.Siegel & Wolensky LLP green
calctapp · 2013
12015–2015
People v. Smith green
cal · 2001
12015–2015
In Re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke green
calctapp · 2008
12014–2014
Twain Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Tuolumne green
calctapp · 1982
12013–2013
Warmington Old Town Associates, L.P. v. Tustin Unified School District green
calctapp · 2002
12013–2013
In Re Enrique G. green
calctapp · 2006
12008–2008
Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors green
calctapp · 1988
12007–2007
San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco green
calctapp · 2002
12007–2007
Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford green
calctapp · 1990
12007–2007
Knight v. Jewett green
cal · 1992
12006–2006

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (7) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 801 (6) CA § Cal. Government Code § 65995 (6) CA § Cal. Education Code § 17620 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 65000 (5) CA § Cal. Water Code § 10910 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 66473.7 (4) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 211 (4) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1107 (3) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 459 (3) CA § Cal. Public Resources Code § 21000 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 98 (1975–2026) IL 47 (1975–2026) NY 43 (1965–2025) WA 36 (1970–2022) TX 35 (1967–2023) FL 34 (1977–2023) DC 31 (1978–2021) NJ 25 (1981–2025) MD 21 (1980–2021) CT 21 (1984–2021) AL 21 (1978–2026) ND 19 (1968–2019) CO 18 (1961–2008) IN 18 (1963–2020) KS 17 (1960–2024) PA 17 (1975–2026) WI 16 (1987–2025) OH 16 (1978–2023) MI 15 (1974–2023) UT 15 (1980–2026) NC 14 (1979–2022) AZ 13 (1966–2023) TN 13 (1956–2025) ID 12 (1936–2026) LA 11 (1960–2009) MA 11 (1983–2026) MO 10 (1967–2013) MN 9 (1984–2024) MT 9 (1939–2010) OR 9 (1987–2020) VA 9 (1968–2016) NM 8 (1979–2022) MS 8 (1961–2025) RI 7 (1982–2019) AR 6 (1997–2018) WV 6 (1941–2015) WY 6 (1982–2004) SC 5 (1990–2020) KY 5 (2001–2025) AK 4 (1980–2022) IA 4 (1976–2018) ME 4 (1971–2021) OK 4 (1967–2024) GA 3 (1989–2011) SD 3 (1976–2006) NE 3 (1988–1995) VT 3 (1988–2024) HI 2 (1987–2016) DE 2 (1974–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check