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9 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Bergholmgreen2 sentences1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); 1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sparklingreen2 sentences2018The court reasoned that the rule it adopted was necessary to protect the broad right to the assistance of counsel recognized in Sparklin : *27 "As the court in Sparklin explained, the purpose of the Article I, section 11, right is to ensure that a defendant charged with a crime has the benefit of an attorney's presence, advice, and expertise 'in any situation where the state may glean involuntary and incriminating evidence or statements for use in the prosecution of its case against defendant.' 296 Or. at 93 [ 672 P.2d 1182 ] (emphasis added). 2018The court reasoned that the rule it adopted was necessary to protect the broad right to the assistance of counsel recognized in Sparklin : *27 "As the court in Sparklin explained, the purpose of the Article I, section 11, right is to ensure that a defendant charged with a crime has the benefit of an attorney's presence, advice, and expertise 'in any situation where the state may glean involuntary and incriminating evidence or statements for use in the prosecution of its case against defendant.' 296 Or. at 93 [ 672 P.2d 1182 ] (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. Lanegreen1 sentence2006The court reasoned that the rule announced in Apprendi — requiring any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt — is not a “watershed” rule because “[t]he rule [in Apprendi], by its terms, is not concerned with ensuring the accuracy of a criminal defendant’s conviction.” Id. at 390 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Watson v. Dodson
green
2 sentences1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); 1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Armstrong v. Stegen
neutral
2 sentences1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); 1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Longo v. Premo
green
1 sentence2020The court reasoned that the exception to the priv- ilege applicable in post-conviction proceedings is “a limited exception permitting disclosures of confidential information only as reasonably necessary for a lawyer to defend against allegations of breach of duty”; one that “applies only during the pendency of the post-conviction case, including appeal, and only as is reasonably necessary to defend against peti- tioner’s specific allegations of breach of duty.” Id. at 539 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Sanchez-Cruz
green
2 sentences2019But we also caution that that conclusion must be based on a reasoned analysis of the particular petition and the context of the legal issues that it raised or would have raised, and not simply on speculation that the court "might" have allowed the petition because it has the discretion to "allow or deny any petition." The Court of Appeals focused, in part, on our decision to deny review in State v. Sanchez-Cruz , 177 Or. 2019App. 332 , 33 P.3d 1037 (2001), rev. den. , 333 Or. 463 , 42 P.3d 1245 (2002). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dreyer v. Portland General Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2013The court determined that the circuit court had a legal duty to abate the proceedings pending resolution of the matters on remand to the PUC involving essentially the same controversy, because “the PUC proceeding that is underway thus has the potential for disposing of the central issue in these cases, viz., the issue whether plaintiffs have been injured (and, if they have been, the extent of the injury).” 341 Or at 285 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Buffum
green
2 sentences2000Ironically, a reasoned inquiry into whether the person to be committed has knowingly and voluntarily waived the reading of rights may well require a recitation of the rights themselves. [3] The dissent takes issue with our reasoning, asserting that (1) our analysis cannot be squared with State v. Buffum, 166 Or.App. 552 , 999 P.2d 541 (2000); and (2) in the absence of an explicit legislative directive, a requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver should not be judicially implied. 2000Ironically, a reasoned inquiry into whether the person to be committed has knowingly and voluntarily waived the reading of rights may well require a recitation of the rights themselves. [3] The dissent takes issue with our reasoning, asserting that (1) our analysis cannot be squared with State v. Buffum, 166 Or.App. 552 , 999 P.2d 541 (2000); and (2) in the absence of an explicit legislative directive, a requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver should not be judicially implied. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co.
green
1 sentence1998In so holding, the court reasoned that the instruction `encouraged the jury to award punitive damages for a [specific] purpose' and, consequently, that `[o]ffering [the] jury an additional, inappropriate basis for awarding punitive damages harmed the defendant.' Id. at 211, 212 [ 797 P.2d 1019 ]. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hernandez v. Barbo MacHinery Co.
green
2 sentences1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); 1998See also Brooks v. Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, 6 , 470 P.2d 154 (1970) (prejudicial error to refuse to give a limiting instruction cautioning the jury against considering the defendant's wealth in determining compensatory damages because the error `related to the amount of damages' and, therefore, the court `[could not] say that it did not affect the jury's verdict'); Armstrong v. Stegen, 251 Or. 340, 344 , 445 P.2d 509 (1968) (prejudicial error to submit to the jury a negligence allegation that was not supported by any evidence because doing so required the jury to speculate in reaching its result); | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Teledyne Wah Chang Albany v. Energy Facility Siting Council
neutral
1 sentence1987Siting Council, supra, 298 Or at 255 ; McCann v. OLCC, 27 Or App 487, 494 , 556 P2d 973 (1976), rev den 277 Or 99 (1977). 5 Therefore, we remand the case to the Superintendent to conduct an independent review of the record and to make appropriate findings and to provide a reasoned analysis for his conclusions. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
McCann v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission
green
2 sentences1987App. 487, 494 , 556 P.2d 973 (1976), rev. den. 277 Or. 99 (1977). [5] Therefore, we remand the case to the Superintendent to conduct an independent review of the record and to make appropriate findings and to provide a reasoned analysis for his conclusions. 1987Siting Council, supra, 298 Or at 255 ; McCann v. OLCC, 27 Or App 487, 494 , 556 P2d 973 (1976), rev den 277 Or 99 (1977). 5 Therefore, we remand the case to the Superintendent to conduct an independent review of the record and to make appropriate findings and to provide a reasoned analysis for his conclusions. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.