reasoned rule in Kansas

2011In a footnote, the Court observed there were other hearsay exceptions which “similarly rest on tire belief that certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 362 n.9.

2011In a footnote, the Court observed there were other hearsay exceptions which “similarly rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 362 n.9.

2024We find that State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St. 3d 160 , 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983), presents a reasoned analysis of the issue.

2024We find that State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St. 3d 160 , 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983), presents a reasoned analysis of the issue.

2023In State v. Patterson, 311 Kan. 59 , 70, 455 P.3d 792 (2020), the prosecutor informed a prospective juror that the jury must follow the instructions they receive, and they cannot debate the law.

2021The court reasoned that to rule otherwise would be "illogical" and allow a defendant to "manipulate" the UADA. 16 Kan.

2019In reaching these conclusions, the court reasoned that the violation of a protection order statute did not address consent; the Legislature did not affirmatively establish consent as a defense elsewhere in the *373 statute; the statute reflected the Legislature's belief that there is a public interest in preventing domestic violence; and the statutory act required notice and a hearing to modify a protection order, whereas consent would result in de facto modification. 136 Wash. 2d at 943 -45 , 969 P.2d 90 ; see also In re Shirley , 28 A.3d 506 , 513 (D.C. 2011) (holding "consent of the petitio

2019In reaching these conclusions, the court reasoned that the violation of a protection order statute did not address consent; the Legislature did not affirmatively establish consent as a defense elsewhere in the *373 statute; the statute reflected the Legislature's belief that there is a public interest in preventing domestic violence; and the statutory act required notice and a hearing to modify a protection order, whereas consent would result in de facto modification. 136 Wash. 2d at 943 -45 , 969 P.2d 90 ; see also In re Shirley , 28 A.3d 506 , 513 (D.C. 2011) (holding "consent of the petitio

2019In reaching these conclusions, the court reasoned that the violation of a protection order statute did not address consent; the Legislature did not affirmatively establish consent as a defense elsewhere in the *373 statute; the statute reflected the Legislature's belief that there is a public interest in preventing domestic violence; and the statutory act required notice and a hearing to modify a protection order, whereas consent would result in de facto modification. 136 Wash. 2d at 943 -45 , 969 P.2d 90 ; see also In re Shirley , 28 A.3d 506 , 513 (D.C. 2011) (holding "consent of the petitio

2019In reaching these conclusions, the court reasoned that the violation of a protection order statute did not address consent; the Legislature did not affirmatively establish consent as a defense elsewhere in the *373 statute; the statute reflected the Legislature's belief that there is a public interest in preventing domestic violence; and the statutory act required notice and a hearing to modify a protection order, whereas consent would result in de facto modification. 136 Wash. 2d at 943 -45 , 969 P.2d 90 ; see also In re Shirley , 28 A.3d 506 , 513 (D.C. 2011) (holding "consent of the petitio

2017Consequently, if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs." 431 U.S. at 662 .

2011Morgan, 818 So.2d at 1174 .

2011Morgan, 818 So. 2d at 1174 .

2010In Allen , the court reasoned that a challenge to the constitutional validity of prior convictions required that the court do more than merely “presume that all of the actions of the municipal court followed the law . . ., there must be a showing that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and the attempted waiver must be strictly construed.” 28 Kan.

1999The State directs this court’s attention to State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 140, 150 , 871 P.2d 1246 (1994), where defendant complained that his statement was obtained in violation of the disciplinary rule that preceded KRPC 4.2.

1999The State directs this court’s attention to State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 140, 150 , 871 P.2d 1246 (1994), where defendant complained that his statement was obtained in violation of the disciplinary rule that preceded KRPC 4.2.

1997We take this position not only because of the fact that it represents the majority, view but also because we consider it the better reasoned rule and more in line with the rationale of prior decisions of this court.” 216 Kan. at 733-34 .

1989The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed a similar situation in the very recent case of Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589 , 524 N.E.2d 829 (1988).

1989The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed a similar situation in the very recent case of Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589 , 524 N.E.2d 829 (1988).

1986The court reasoned that this instruction might be interpreted by the jury as creating either a conclusive presumption or a burden-shifting presumption. 442 U.S. at 524 .

1985In Ragland, Comm’r v. K-Mart Corp., 274 Ark. 297 , a case with closely analogous facts to those of the instant case, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that preprinted advertising supplements which were printed by an out-of-state printer and delivered to in-state newspapers by K-Mart for distribution with the newspapers were not a component part of the newspapers and were not exempt from the use tax as being “newspapers.” The Court considered a number of factors in determining whether preprinted advertising supplements are a component part of a newspaper.

1985In Ragland, Comm'r v. K-Mart Corp., 274 Ark. 297 , a case with closely analogous facts to those of the instant case, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that preprinted advertising supplements which were printed by an out-of-state printer and delivered to in-state newspapers by K-Mart for distribution with the newspapers were not a component part of the newspapers and were not exempt from the use tax as being "newspapers." The Court considered a number of factors in determining whether pre-printed advertising supplements are a component part of a newspaper.

1981The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in Ford Motor Credit Company v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918 (4th Cir.1973), states: "Drawing on several North Carolina cases, the district court correctly formulated the following rules for a creditor's standing to sue corporate directors for fraud or negligent mismanagement: "`1.

1981The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in Ford Motor Credit Company v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1973), states: “Drawing on several North Carolina cases, the district court correctly formulated the following rules for a creditor’s standing to sue corporate directors for fraud or negligent mismanagement: “ T.

1975In In re Estate of Porter, 164 Kan. 92 , 187 P. 2d 520 , we summarized the rules which should be applied by our courts in construing wills.

1975In In re Estate of Porter, 164 Kan. 92 , 187 P. 2d 520 , we summarized the rules which should be applied by our courts in construing wills.

1960In the case of In re Estate of Julian, 184 Kan. 94 , 334 P. 2d 432 , we find a contest between “collateral heirs” and an alleged daughter of an intestate.

1960In the case of In re Estate of Julian, 184 Kan. 94 , 334 P. 2d 432 , we find a contest between “collateral heirs” and an alleged daughter of an intestate.

1960But on this record at this time, we should not impinge upon the well reasoned rule of the Welch case, supra. The rule of In re Estate of Welch, supra, has been approved and followed in Brent v. McDonald, 180 Kan. 142 , 300 P. 2d 396 ; In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238 , 326 P. 2d 264 , and In re Estate of Teeter, supra. We believe the rule of the case is founded upon reason and is sound.

1960But on this record at this time, we should not impinge upon the well reasoned rule of the Welch case, supra. The rule of In re Estate of Welch, supra, has been approved and followed in Brent v. McDonald, 180 Kan. 142 , 300 P. 2d 396 ; In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238 , 326 P. 2d 264 , and In re Estate of Teeter, supra. We believe the rule of the case is founded upon reason and is sound.

1960But on this record at this time, we should not impinge upon the well reasoned rule of the Welch case, supra. The rule of In re Estate of Welch, supra, has been approved and followed in Brent v. McDonald, 180 Kan. 142 , 300 P. 2d 396 ; In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238 , 326 P. 2d 264 , and In re Estate of Teeter, supra. We believe the rule of the case is founded upon reason and is sound.

1960But on this record at this time, we should not impinge upon the well reasoned rule of the Welch case, supra. The rule of In re Estate of Welch, supra, has been approved and followed in Brent v. McDonald, 180 Kan. 142 , 300 P. 2d 396 ; In re Estate of Walton, 183 Kan. 238 , 326 P. 2d 264 , and In re Estate of Teeter, supra. We believe the rule of the case is founded upon reason and is sound.