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21 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte RECgreen2 sentences2025We conclude, therefore, that an order of commitment for a definite period does not offend the Act, even though the juvenile has not been adjudicated a serious juvenile offender, provided that the order is accompanied by specific findings of fact and a reasoned analysis as to how the determinate period is calculated to benefit the juvenile or to further his or her rehabilitation; and provided, further, that the court's intent to incorporate its order into the Plan plainly appears in the order." 678 So. 2d at 1043-45 . 2015“In Ex parte R.E.C., 678 So.2d 1041, 1045 (Ala.1995), the Alabama Supreme Court, in deciding whether the juvenile court had acted outside its jurisdiction in haying imposed a determinate sentence for a juvenile not considered a ‘serious juvenile offender,’ held that: ' “ ‘an order of commitment for a definite period does not offend the [Juve nile Justice Act], even though the juvenile has not been adjudicated a serious juvenile offender, provided that the order is accompanied by-specific findings of fact and a reasoned analysis as to how the determinate period is calculated to benefit the juve | 5 | 7 |
Bolton v. Barnett Lumber & Supply Companygreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., Bolton v. Barnett Lumber & Supply Co., 267 Ala. 74 , 100 So. 2d 9 (1958); Thomasson v. Benson Hardware Co., 222 Ala. 176 , 131 So. 563 (1930). 1991See, e.g., Bolton v. Barnett Lumber & Supply Co., 267 Ala. 74 , 100 So. 2d 9 (1958); Thomasson v. Benson Hardware Co., 222 Ala. 176 , 131 So. 563 (1930). | 3 | 3 |
TC v. Stategreen2 sentences2015DYS to ensure child receives educational placement and/or assistance.’ “(C. 47.) Like the order in T.C., the order in the present case did not include ‘specific findings of fact’ nor did it ‘include a reasoned analysis as to how the determinate period was calculated to benefit the appellant or to .further his rehabilitation.’ 989 So.2d at 1183 . 2013“After arguments and the taking of testimony, the Court finds that the child is unamenable to treatment. “• DYS to provide [Parole Officer] and Attorney with update on child’s progress every. 30 days. “• Attorney to provide the Court with child’s progress/status after six months. “• DYS to ensure child receives educational placement and/or assistance.” (C. 47.) Like the order in T.C., the order in the present case did not include “specific findings of fact” nor did it “include a reasoned analysis as to how the determinate period was calculated to benefit the appellant or to further his rehabil | 1 | 3 |
INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS v. Liaogreen2 sentences2003In Liao , the Court stated that "the better reasoned rule, one followed in a number of jurisdictions, is that equitable principles apply to all instances of subrogation except when the contract expressly provides otherwise. " 548 So.2d at 165 (emphasis added). 2003In Liao , the Court stated that "the better reasoned rule, one followed in a number of jurisdictions, is that equitable principles apply to all instances of subrogation except when the contract expressly provides otherwise. " 548 So.2d at 165 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
B.W. v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“In Ex parte R.E.C., 678 So.2d 1041, 1045 (Ala.1995), the Alabama Supreme Court, in deciding whether the juvenile court had acted outside its jurisdiction in haying imposed a determinate sentence for a juvenile not considered a ‘serious juvenile offender,’ held that: ' “ ‘an order of commitment for a definite period does not offend the [Juve nile Justice Act], even though the juvenile has not been adjudicated a serious juvenile offender, provided that the order is accompanied by-specific findings of fact and a reasoned analysis as to how the determinate period is calculated to benefit the juve 2013In his brief, T.L.S. concedes that while R.E.C., as well as B.W. v. State, 834 So.2d 816 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), authorizes a determinate commitment “in certain circumstances” (T.L.S.’s brief, at 42), neither opinion authorizes a determinate commitment for a misdemeanor. | 1 | 2 |
Steiner Bros. v. First National Bankgreen1 sentence2026Moore cites to prior cases attempting to argue that this Court has previously construed these requirements strictly; however, those cases are outdated and do not reflect this Court's " '…jettison [of] the theory of strict technical compliance to a more reasoned test, i.e., one of substantial compliance.' " Id. (citations omitted); see Steiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 115 Ala. 379, 385 , 22 So. 30 , 31 (1897). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Davidsongreen1 sentence2011We note, however, that our supreme court has held: “The filing of a petition to modify a domestic-relations judgment is, for purposes of applying the rules of procedure, treated as the filing of a separate action.” Ex parte Davidson, 782 So.2d 237, 240 (Ala.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co.green2 sentences1991See Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 218 La. 677 , 50 So.2d 803 (1951). 1991See Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 218 La. 677 , 50 So.2d 803 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thomasson v. Benson Hardware Co.
neutral
2 sentences1991See, e.g., Bolton v. Barnett Lumber & Supply Co., 267 Ala. 74 , 100 So. 2d 9 (1958); Thomasson v. Benson Hardware Co., 222 Ala. 176 , 131 So. 563 (1930). 1991See, e.g., Bolton v. Barnett Lumber & Supply Co., 267 Ala. 74 , 100 So. 2d 9 (1958); Thomasson v. Benson Hardware Co., 222 Ala. 176 , 131 So. 563 (1930). | 3 | 1978–1991 |
Westendorf Ex Rel. Westendorf v. Stasson
green
2 sentences1990Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1983); Wimberly v. American Cas. 1989Westendorf v. Stasson , 330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1983); Wimberly v. American Cas. | 2 | 1989–1990 |
T.L.S. v. State
green
1 sentence2015In T.L.S. v. State, 153 So.3d 829 (Ala.Crim.App.2013), this Court addressed this issue when considering the sufficiency of a similar order by the juvenile court as to a determinate-period commitment of a juvenile who was not a serious juvenile offender. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Jackson
red
1 sentence2011Id. at 897-898 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Esab Group, Incorporated v. Centricut, Incorporated
green
1 sentence2003The court reasoned that analysis of pendent personal jurisdiction under a state's long-arm statute is the same as the analysis of the issue where a court exercises pendent personal jurisdiction under a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process: " ESAB [Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir.1997),] recognized pendent personal jurisdiction over state *546 law claims when a district court has first obtained personal jurisdiction over a defendant by reason of a federal claim authorizing nationwide service of process. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Miller v. SMS Schloemann-Siemag, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003A careful reading of the underlying analysis in ESAB, however, demonstrates it would also apply to reach all state law claims in an action where (1) jurisdiction is approved for at least one substantial state claim; and (2) all of the claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact." 203 F.Supp.2d at 643 n. 7. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1997The Court reasoned that this rule was necessary to ensure the public’s interest in conducting fair criminal trials and guaranteeing efficient administration of justice: 8 Later, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court refined its holding in Brady , not only by giving a definition of “materiality” in relation to a Brady analysis, 9 but also by making it clear that the. defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the prosecution free of all obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. 10 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 66 1997The Court reasoned that this rule was necessary to ensure the public’s interest in conducting fair criminal trials and guaranteeing efficient administration of justice: 8 Later, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court refined its holding in Brady , not only by giving a definition of “materiality” in relation to a Brady analysis, 9 but also by making it clear that the. defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the prosecution free of all obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. 10 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 66 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences1997The Court reasoned that this rule was necessary to ensure the public’s interest in conducting fair criminal trials and guaranteeing efficient administration of justice: 8 Later, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court refined its holding in Brady , not only by giving a definition of “materiality” in relation to a Brady analysis, 9 but also by making it clear that the. defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the prosecution free of all obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. 10 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 66 1997The Court reasoned that this rule was necessary to ensure the public’s interest in conducting fair criminal trials and guaranteeing efficient administration of justice: 8 Later, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court refined its holding in Brady , not only by giving a definition of “materiality” in relation to a Brady analysis, 9 but also by making it clear that the. defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the prosecution free of all obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. 10 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 66 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Powell v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
green
1 sentence1990I recognize that this Court has held that equitable principles must be applied to every contract of this nature, Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So.2d 772 (Ala. 1990), but I dissented in Powell , and the facts of this case show exactly the reasons why I dissented in Powell . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Troupe v. Rowe
green
1 sentence1979Matlack, Laird and Pratts , all supra." Probably the case in which the circumstances are most nearly in point is that of Troupe v. Rowe, Fla., 283 So.2d 857 (1973), in which it was held that, where a voluntary plea of guilty was entered and sentence imposed and hearing concluded, jeopardy had attached and sentence which had been imposed could not thereafter be increased. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.