reasoned analysis in Illinois

2017Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 315 Ill.

2017Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 315 Ill.

2019The ILRB also stated, “In choosing to adopt the three-factor critical issue impasse test, we find it unnecessary to apply the five[-]factor test that the Board has previously utilized to determine the existence of an impasse.” ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court has frequently held “an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). “[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis ***.” Greater Boston Televisio

2018The ILRB also stated, "In choosing to adopt the three-factor critical issue impasse test, we find it unnecessary to apply the five[-]factor test that the Board has previously utilized to determine the existence of an impasse." ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court has frequently held "an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner." Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 463 U.S. 29 , 48, 103 S.Ct. 2856 , 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). "[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned anal

2024See Reis, 28 A.3d at 466 .

2024See Reis, 28 A.3d at 466 .

2021In Enoch, the supreme court held that appellate review of issues not raised in a posttrial motion is limited to plain error, sufficiency of the evidence, and “constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition.” Id.; see People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶¶ 17-20 (holding that constitutional issue exception recognized in Enoch, a capital case, applies equally to noncapital cases). ¶ 83 The constitutional issue exception does not apply.

2019In Enoch, the supreme court held that appellate review of issues not raised in a post-trial motion is limited to plain error, sufficiency of the evidence, and “constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition.” Id.; see People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶¶ 17-20 (holding that constitutional-issue exception recognized in Enoch, a capital case, applies equally to non-capital cases). ¶ 83 The constitutional-issue exception does not apply.

2006The IELRB contends, on the other hand, that requiring the petitions to be filed within a reasonable time, after the relevant change in circumstances, "merely requires the petitioner to act in an expeditious manner and does not prevent the removal of statutorily excluded employees." The District counters that "[i]t is completely unreasonable, and against legislative intent, to find that an employer who fails to expeditiously file a unit clarification petition to exclude specific employment positions [is] to be banned forever from excluding them short of further negotiation with the Union." "To

2006The IELRB contends, on the other hand, that requiring the petitions to be filed within a reasonable time, after the relevant change in circumstances, “merely requires the petitioner to act in an expeditious manner and does not prevent the removal of statutorily excluded employees.” The District counters that “[i]t is completely unreasonable, and against legislative intent, to find that an employer who fails to expeditiously file a unit clarification petition to exclude specific employment positions [is] to be banned forever from excluding them short of further negotiation with the Union.” “To

1996To ensure a party receives due process, "`[a]n agency changing its course must apply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.'" Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1074 (1994).

1996To ensure a party receives due process, " '[a]n agency changing its course must apply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.’ ” Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1074 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.

2019The ILRB also stated, “In choosing to adopt the three-factor critical issue impasse test, we find it unnecessary to apply the five[-]factor test that the Board has previously utilized to determine the existence of an impasse.” ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court has frequently held “an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). “[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis ***.” Greater Boston Televisio

2018The ILRB also stated, "In choosing to adopt the three-factor critical issue impasse test, we find it unnecessary to apply the five[-]factor test that the Board has previously utilized to determine the existence of an impasse." ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court has frequently held "an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner." Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 463 U.S. 29 , 48, 103 S.Ct. 2856 , 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). "[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned anal

2026People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (1978).

2025See Freeman, 2018 IL App (2d) 170169, ¶¶ 13, 18-36 (where the propriety of a discovery order in an originally filed case was challenged by the plaintiff in her refiled case and then argued on appeal).

2019In People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 555 (2002), the court stated that it “decline[d] to impose a duty upon a trial court to sua sponte excuse a juror for cause in the absence of a defendant’s challenge for cause or exercise of a peremptory challenge.” The court reasoned that a rule imposing such a duty “would allow a defendant ‘two bites of the apple’ ” because a defendant could sit back and allow a questionable juror to be on the defendant’s jury and then, following conviction, “could claim that the trial court erred in failing to strike the juror sua sponte.” Id. at 555-56 .

2019In People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 555 (2002), the court stated that it “decline[d] to impose a duty upon a trial court to sua sponte excuse a juror for cause in the absence of a defendant’s challenge for cause or exercise of a peremptory challenge.” The court reasoned that a rule imposing such a duty “would allow a defendant ‘two bites of the apple’ ” because a defendant could sit back and allow a questionable juror to be on the defendant’s jury and then, following conviction, “could claim that the trial court erred in failing to strike the juror sua sponte.” Id. at 555-56 .

1993(See In re E.G. (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 105, 549 N.E.2d 322 ; Labrenz, 411 Ill. at 622 (review granted in both cases regarding Jehovah’s Witness members who refused to consent to blood transfusions, even though parties had already received transfusions, because failure to act quickly in similar cases in the future would lead to irreversible harm).) In determining whether a case exhibits the requisite degree of public interest, courts look to “the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, a

1993(See In re E.G. (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 98 , 105, 549 N.E.2d 322 ; Labrenz, 411 Ill. at 622 (review granted in both cases regarding Jehovah’s Witness members who refused to consent to blood transfusions, even though parties had already received transfusions, because failure to act quickly in similar cases in the future would lead to irreversible harm).) In determining whether a case exhibits the requisite degree of public interest, courts look to “the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, a