meaningful defense in Kentucky

2012Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky.2003); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006).

2011Meece “is correct ... that under both the Kentucky and the United States Constitutions, he has the right to present a complete and meaningful defense.” Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 624 -25 (citing Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky.2003)); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006).

2015In Edmonson , the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to make up its mind as to the sentence to be imposed on a plea of guilty without allowing the defendant “a fair opportunity to present evidence at a meaningful hearing in favor of having the sentences run concurrently or present other matters in mitigation of punishment.” Id. at 596 .

2002Additionally, Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.02(1) requires the sentencing court to "consider the possibility of probation or conditional discharge" and to "afford the defendant and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to make a statement or statements in the defendant's behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment." In Edmonson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 595 (1987), we held that a trial court may only exercise its discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences after the defendant has been afforded "a fair opportunity to present evidence at a meaning

2024“Under the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution, an accused has a right to present a complete and meaningful defense.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63 , 84–85 (Ky. 2013) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577 , 624–25 (Ky. 2010)).

2024“Under the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution, an accused has a right to present a complete and meaningful defense.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63 , 84–85 (Ky. 2013) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577 , 624–25 (Ky. 2010)).

2011For example, the right to a defense includes the right to present evidence at trial of an alleged alternative perpetrator, Beaty, 125 S.W.3d at 204 ; the right to offer the testimony of witnesses and compel their attendance at trial, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); and the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses and challenge their testimony at trial, Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 ; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 41 , 107 S.Ct. 989 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (“the right to confrontation is a trial right”) (emphasis in original).

2011For example, the right to a defense includes the right to present evidence at trial of an alleged alternative perpetrator, Beaty, 125 S.W.3d at 204 ; the right to offer the testimony of witnesses and compel their attendance at trial, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); and the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses and challenge their testimony at trial, Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 ; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 41 , 107 S.Ct. 989 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (“the right to confrontation is a trial right”) (emphasis in original).

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2010See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (rules precluding hearsay and impeachment of one’s own witness, invoked to exclude three out-of-court admissions by a witness that he, and not the defendant, had committed the murder); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offense records, invoked to exclude the fact that key prosecution witness may have been biased in favor of the prosecution because he was on juvenile probation); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2007The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’ in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 , 87 S.Ct. at 1932 ; a “moment when available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 , 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); a period when counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful defense,” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 , 87 S.Ct. at 1931 ; a stage when “potential substantial

2006Id. at 630-31 , 125 S.Ct. at 2013 .

2006Id. at 630-31 , 125 S.Ct. at 2013 .

1971The Supreme Court of the United States in Bell v. Burson, Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , decided May 24, 1971, in considering the constitutionality of state financial responsibility laws stated: “Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.

1971The Supreme Court of the United States in Bell v. Burson, Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , decided May 24, 1971, in considering the constitutionality of state financial responsibility laws stated: “Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.