meaningful hearing in Georgia

2012See Lawrence v. State, 305 Ga. App. 199, 203 (3), n. 3 ( 699 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that Quiroz, supra at 428 (4), upon which Abercrombie relied, “requires only that an express finding of the probity be made to ensure that the court engaged in a meaningful analysis”).

2012See Lawrence v. State, 305 Ga. App. 199, 203 (3), n. 3 ( 699 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that Quiroz, supra at 428 (4), upon which Abercrombie relied, “requires only that an express finding of the probity be made to ensure that the court engaged in a meaningful analysis”).

2025However, although the trial court did not include any written discussion explaining why it excluded the 2014 incident from the trials on the 2021 incidents (limiting its written discussion to the 2021 incidents themselves), “absent some express showing that the trial court did not understand its obligation to conduct the [Rule 403] balancing test, we will not read such error into the trial court’s ruling.” Dixon v. State, 350 Ga. App. 211, 214 (1) ( 828 SE2d 427 ) (2019).

2025However, although the trial court did not include any written discussion explaining why it excluded the 2014 incident from the trials on the 2021 incidents (limiting its written discussion to the 2021 incidents themselves), “absent some express showing that the trial court did not understand its obligation to conduct the [Rule 403] balancing test, we will not read such error into the trial court’s ruling.” Dixon v. State, 350 Ga. App. 211, 214 (1) ( 828 SE2d 427 ) (2019).

2024In Sallie, we held that “OCGA § 17-3-3 provides an extension of the statute of limitation[s] period and not an exception to it that must be pled in the indictment.” 276 Ga. at 513-514 (12).

2024In Sallie, we held that “OCGA § 17-3-3 provides an extension of the statute of limitation period and not an exception to 19 it that must be pled in the indictment.” 276 Ga. at 513-514 (12).

2023See also Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2) (c) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019) (“A criminal defense attorney does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2023See also Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2) (c) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019) (“A criminal defense attorney does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2023Blalock further contends that “[t]he issue of the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-16-4 is a critical argument” that this Court needs to address — in light of the increase in the amount of discovery over the last decade which negatively impacts “criminal defendants’ ability to prepare a meaningful defense” — and thus, the failure of his trial counsel to properly assert and preserve this issue prevented Blalock from seeking a ruling thereon and prejudiced him in this case. 27 Blalock has not cited any case addressing a constitutional challenge to OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3) (A), either on its face or

2023Blalock further contends that “[t]he issue of the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-16-4 is a critical argument” that this Court needs to address — in light of the increase in the amount of discovery over the last decade which negatively impacts “criminal defendants’ ability to prepare a meaningful defense” — and thus, the failure of his trial counsel to properly assert and preserve this issue prevented Blalock from seeking a ruling thereon and prejudiced him in this case. 27 Blalock has not cited any case addressing a constitutional challenge to OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3) (A), either on its face or

2023See Dunbar v. State, 309 Ga. 252, 257 (3) ( 845 SE2d 607 ) (2020).

2023See Dunbar v. State, 309 Ga. 252, 257 (3) ( 845 SE2d 607 ) (2020).

2013We also have noted a distinction in some cases between “substance” and mere “procedure,” explaining that “there are no vested rights in any course of procedure.” Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 278 (4) ( 658 SE2d 603 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013We also have noted a distinction in some cases between “substance” and mere “procedure,” explaining that “there are no vested rights in any course of procedure.” Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 278 (4) ( 658 SE2d 603 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2010See Quiroz, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 428 (4) (requires only that an express finding of the probity be made to ensure that the court engaged in a meaningful analysis).

1988Removal of a public official under OCGA § 45-4-6 without a meaningful hearing not only denies the public official his right to due process, it abolishes the right of his constituents to have their duly elected official in office, and it denies the official a fundamental presumption in the law — “Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty.” 4 OCGA § 16-1-5. “[An] indictment is not evidence, but is merely the manner in which charges are brought before the court for trial.” Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 805 ( 364 SE2d 835 ) (1988).

1988Removal of a public official under OCGA § 45-4-6 without a meaningful hearing not only denies the public official his right to due process, it abolishes the right of his constituents to have their duly elected official in office, and it denies the official a fundamental presumption in the law — “Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty.” 4 OCGA § 16-1-5. “[An] indictment is not evidence, but is merely the manner in which charges are brought before the court for trial.” Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 805 ( 364 SE2d 835 ) (1988).

1975See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 . *348 Argued April 15, 1975 Decided May 6, 1975.