25 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2025See State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 813 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (explaining that state’s failure to timely disclose expert witness ‘‘rendered the defendant’s opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense effectively nonexistent’’). 2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv | 2 | 2 |
Barzetti v. Maruccigreen2 sentences2009See Barzetti v. Marucci, 66 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 786 A.2d 432 (2001). 2009See Barzetti v. Marucci, 66 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 786 A.2d 432 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
Ramos v. Ramosgreen1 sentence2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vargasgreen1 sentence2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv | 1 | 1 |
Ramos v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv 2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv | 1 | 1 |
Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Grempgreen1 sentence2020See Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App. 21, 31 , 223 A.3d 75 (2019) (‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been improp- erly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Willie Reynolds v. Larry Norris, Arkansas Department of Correctiongreen1 sentence2014As a general matter, nunc pro tunc competency hear- ings are meaningful ‘‘where the state of the record, together with such additional evidence as may be rele- vant and available, permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s condition at the time of the original . . . proceedings.’’ Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Norman Silverstein v. Robert Hendersongreen1 sentence2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L. | 1 | 1 |
Billy Keith McGregor v. Gary Gibson, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiarygreen1 sentence2014For that reason, nunc pro tunc competency determina- tions are only permissible ‘‘whenever a court can con- duct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962 (10th Cir. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
City of Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunitiesgreen2 sentences1999Although we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on the ground that the commission lacked jurisdiction, and need not discuss the basis on which the trial court dismissed the case, namely, the failure of the plaintiff to prove either waiver of the time requirement or equitable tolling; see Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89, 101 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975); we note that the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver. 1999Although we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on the ground that the commission lacked jurisdiction, and need not discuss the basis on which the trial court dismissed the case, namely, the failure of the plaintiff to prove either waiver of the time requirement or equitable tolling; see Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89, 101 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975); we note that the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver. | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Fermont Division v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Flandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conway v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez-Doshi v. General Services Administrationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2026“It was incumbent on the plaintiff to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim[s] . . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority and an application of that law to the facts in the present case. . . . [I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581 , 593–94, 344 A.3d 208 , cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926 , 345 A 2026“It was incumbent on the plaintiff to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim[s] . . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority and an application of that law to the facts in the present case. . . . [I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581, 593–94, 344 A.3d 208, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 345 A.3d | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. FERNANDO A.
green
2 sentences2022We recognize the ‘‘heavy flow of judicial business in the busy geographical area courts during arraignment sessions’’; State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 24 , 981 A.2d 427 (2009); along with the fact that it may be difficult at the time of a defendant’s arraignment for the parties to marshal the evidence necessary to hold a meaningful hearing in a relatively complex case involving high bonds, such as the present case. 2022We recognize the ‘‘heavy flow of judicial business in the busy geographical area courts during arraignment sessions’’; State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 24 , 981 A.2d 427 (2009); along with the fact that it may be difficult at the time of a defendant’s arraignment for the parties to marshal the evidence necessary to hold a meaningful hearing in a relatively complex case involving high bonds, such as the present case. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Crespo
green
2 sentences2018Relying on, inter alia, State v. Crespo , 303 Conn. 589 , 35 A.3d 243 (2012), the state further argues that any violation of the defendant's right to present a defense is purely "speculative" or "hypothetical," insofar as the defendant's failure to make an offer of proof in response to the trial court's ruling rendered it impossible for him to demonstrate on appeal the adverse effect of the trial court's ruling on his right to present defense. **593 In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's preclusion of evidence about the nature of 2018Relying on, inter alia, State v. Crespo , 303 Conn. 589 , 35 A.3d 243 (2012), the state further argues that any violation of the defendant's right to present a defense is purely "speculative" or "hypothetical," insofar as the defendant's failure to make an offer of proof in response to the trial court's ruling rendered it impossible for him to demonstrate on appeal the adverse effect of the trial court's ruling on his right to present defense. **593 In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's preclusion of evidence about the nature of | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court of State of Nevada
green
1 sentence2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Washington County Hospital Ass'n v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L. 2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Soltesz v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences2013Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999), cited by the defendants in support of their argument that the trial court denied them their right to a meaningful hearing, is inapposite. 2013Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999), cited by the defendants in support of their argument that the trial court denied them their right to a meaningful hearing, is inapposite. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Roman
green
1 sentence2010With respect to this claim, the defendant relies on State v. Roman, supra, 262 Conn. 718 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Fitzgerald
green
1 sentence2001Although the Appellate Court stated in a footnote that “the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver,” and, “[t]here is little or no merit to the plaintiffs claim of equitable tolling”; Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 54 Conn. App. 258 n.6 ; this was dictum, and the plaintiffs claim should be addressed on its merits. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Marquis
green
2 sentences1999The defendant also claims that he was not afforded a meaningful hearing on the Jarzbek motion as required by State v. Marquis, 241 Conn. 823 , 699 A.2d 893 (1997). 1999The defendant also claims that he was not afforded a meaningful hearing on the Jarzbek motion as required by State v. Marquis, 241 Conn. 823 , 699 A.2d 893 (1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co.
green
2 sentences1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L. 1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Nims
green
1 sentence1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Lloyd
green
1 sentence1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co.
green
1 sentence1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Westberry v. Oliver
green
1 sentence1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
New England Savings Bank v. Lopez
green
2 sentences1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). 1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Frillici v. Town of Westport
green
2 sentences1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). 1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1996See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 208 ; State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 721 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993). 1996See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 208 ; State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 721 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of New Haven v. United Illuminating Co.
green
2 sentences1996"To determine whether such procedural due process requirements apply, the court must first determine whether a party has been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government. . ." New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478 , 494 , 362 A.2d 785 (1975). 19 The plaintiffs cannot and do not claim that they will be deprived of liberty by the operation of General Statutes § 12-157 . 1996"To determine whether such procedural due process requirements apply, the court must first determine whether a party has been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government. . ." New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478 , 494 , 362 A.2d 785 (1975). 19 The plaintiffs cannot and do not claim that they will be deprived of liberty by the operation of General Statutes § 12-157 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In re the Estate of Sunshine
green
1 sentence1995The attorney trial referee drew the following conclusions from these findings of fact: (1) that it would have been impossible for the plaintiff to have understood the agreement, the side letter of September 22, 1988, and the financial disclosure, all within the limited time period during which she was in the decedent's lawyer's office; (2) that the September 22, 1988 letter from Corriss to the plaintiff was irrelevant, did not constitute a meaningful waiver of counsel, and did not play any part in the referee's conclusions and recommendations; (3) that neither the decedent nor his lawyer made | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Dills v. Town of Enfield green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| McHugh v. McHugh green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Goldberg v. Kelly green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In re the Estate of Sunshine green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Altholtz v. Connecticut Dental Commission green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Jucker v. Jucker green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Monroe v. Monroe green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Raitport v. Lyons green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Wolman v. Walter green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Carter v. Texas green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Baker v. Baker green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Gannett Co. v. DePasquale green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.