meaningful hearing (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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meaningful hearing in Connecticut

25 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Jacksongreen
conn · 2020 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2025
2 sentences

2025See State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 813 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (explaining that state’s failure to timely disclose expert witness ‘‘rendered the defendant’s opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense effectively nonexistent’’).

2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv

22
Barzetti v. Maruccigreen
connappct · 2001 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2009
2 sentences

2009See Barzetti v. Marucci, 66 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 786 A.2d 432 (2001).

2009See Barzetti v. Marucci, 66 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 786 A.2d 432 (2001).

12
Ramos v. Ramosgreen
conn · 2004 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv

11
State v. Vargasgreen
conn · 2004 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv

11
Ramos v. Ramosgreen
connappct · 2003 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv

2021See generally State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 816, 821 , 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert to counter late disclosure of expert by state, which deprived defendant of meaning- ful opportunity to challenge state’s expert); see also Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn. App. 276 , 284–85, 835 A.2d 62 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for continuance to address late disclosure of plaintiff’s health condition, and court’s decision was harmful when defendant was denied opportunity to inv

11
Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Grempgreen
connappct · 2019 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020See Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App. 21, 31 , 223 A.3d 75 (2019) (‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been improp- erly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . .

11
Willie Reynolds v. Larry Norris, Arkansas Department of Correctiongreen
ca8 · 1996 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014As a general matter, nunc pro tunc competency hear- ings are meaningful ‘‘where the state of the record, together with such additional evidence as may be rele- vant and available, permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s condition at the time of the original . . . proceedings.’’ Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996).

11
Norman Silverstein v. Robert Hendersongreen
ca2 · 1983 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L.

11
Billy Keith McGregor v. Gary Gibson, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiarygreen
ca10 · 2001 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014For that reason, nunc pro tunc competency determina- tions are only permissible ‘‘whenever a court can con- duct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962 (10th Cir. 2001).

11
City of Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunitiesgreen
conn · 1975 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Although we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on the ground that the commission lacked jurisdiction, and need not discuss the basis on which the trial court dismissed the case, namely, the failure of the plaintiff to prove either waiver of the time requirement or equitable tolling; see Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89, 101 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975); we note that the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver.

1999Although we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on the ground that the commission lacked jurisdiction, and need not discuss the basis on which the trial court dismissed the case, namely, the failure of the plaintiff to prove either waiver of the time requirement or equitable tolling; see Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89, 101 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975); we note that the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver.

11
Barker v. Wingogreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981).

11
Fermont Division v. Smithgreen
conn · 1979 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
State v. Flandersgreen
conn · 1990 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
Conway v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
Rodriguez-Doshi v. General Services Administrationgreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
Richardson v. Henrygreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (32)

CaseCitedYears
Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc. neutral
connappct · 2025
2 sentences

2026“It was incumbent on the plaintiff to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim[s] . . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority and an application of that law to the facts in the present case. . . . [I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581 , 593–94, 344 A.3d 208 , cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926 , 345 A

2026“It was incumbent on the plaintiff to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim[s] . . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority and an application of that law to the facts in the present case. . . . [I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581, 593–94, 344 A.3d 208, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 345 A.3d

12026–2026
State v. FERNANDO A. green
conn · 2009
2 sentences

2022We recognize the ‘‘heavy flow of judicial business in the busy geographical area courts during arraignment sessions’’; State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 24 , 981 A.2d 427 (2009); along with the fact that it may be difficult at the time of a defendant’s arraignment for the parties to marshal the evidence necessary to hold a meaningful hearing in a relatively complex case involving high bonds, such as the present case.

2022We recognize the ‘‘heavy flow of judicial business in the busy geographical area courts during arraignment sessions’’; State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 24 , 981 A.2d 427 (2009); along with the fact that it may be difficult at the time of a defendant’s arraignment for the parties to marshal the evidence necessary to hold a meaningful hearing in a relatively complex case involving high bonds, such as the present case.

12022–2022
State v. Crespo green
conn · 2012
2 sentences

2018Relying on, inter alia, State v. Crespo , 303 Conn. 589 , 35 A.3d 243 (2012), the state further argues that any violation of the defendant's right to present a defense is purely "speculative" or "hypothetical," insofar as the defendant's failure to make an offer of proof in response to the trial court's ruling rendered it impossible for him to demonstrate on appeal the adverse effect of the trial court's ruling on his right to present defense. **593 In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's preclusion of evidence about the nature of

2018Relying on, inter alia, State v. Crespo , 303 Conn. 589 , 35 A.3d 243 (2012), the state further argues that any violation of the defendant's right to present a defense is purely "speculative" or "hypothetical," insofar as the defendant's failure to make an offer of proof in response to the trial court's ruling rendered it impossible for him to demonstrate on appeal the adverse effect of the trial court's ruling on his right to present defense. **593 In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's preclusion of evidence about the nature of

12018–2018
Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court of State of Nevada green
scotus · 1983
1 sentence

2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L.

12014–2014
Washington County Hospital Ass'n v. Morrison green
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L.

2014Sil- verstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 , 104 S. Ct. 195 , 78 L.

12014–2014
Soltesz v. Miller neutral
connappct · 1999
2 sentences

2013Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999), cited by the defendants in support of their argument that the trial court denied them their right to a meaningful hearing, is inapposite.

2013Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999), cited by the defendants in support of their argument that the trial court denied them their right to a meaningful hearing, is inapposite.

12013–2013
State v. Roman green
conn · 2003
1 sentence

2010With respect to this claim, the defendant relies on State v. Roman, supra, 262 Conn. 718 .

12010–2010
State v. Fitzgerald green
connappct · 1999
1 sentence

2001Although the Appellate Court stated in a footnote that “the plaintiff has not shown a meaningful waiver,” and, “[t]here is little or no merit to the plaintiffs claim of equitable tolling”; Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 54 Conn. App. 258 n.6 ; this was dictum, and the plaintiffs claim should be addressed on its merits.

12001–2001
State v. Marquis green
conn · 1997
2 sentences

1999The defendant also claims that he was not afforded a meaningful hearing on the Jarzbek motion as required by State v. Marquis, 241 Conn. 823 , 699 A.2d 893 (1997).

1999The defendant also claims that he was not afforded a meaningful hearing on the Jarzbek motion as required by State v. Marquis, 241 Conn. 823 , 699 A.2d 893 (1997).

11999–1999
Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co. green
conn · 1976
2 sentences

1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L.

1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L.

11999–1999
State v. Nims green
conn · 1980
1 sentence

1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981).

11999–1999
State v. Lloyd green
conn · 1981
1 sentence

1999In assessing speedy trial claims, courts consider four factors: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendants. "(N)one of these factors standing alone would demand a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant's right was violated." State v. Nims , 180 Conn. 589 , 591-92 (1980); see also Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530 (1972); State v. Wall , supra, 40 Conn. App. 651 ; State v. Lloyd , 185 Conn. 199 , 208 (1981).

11999–1999
Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co. green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L.

11999–1999
Westberry v. Oliver green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

1999If our constitution requires a meaningful hearing before a nonpossessory hen can be placed on real estate; Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 170 Conn. 155 , 365 A.2d 393 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 , 97 S. Ct. 246 , 50 L.

11999–1999
New England Savings Bank v. Lopez green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993).

1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993).

11996–1996
Frillici v. Town of Westport green
conn · 1994
2 sentences

1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993).

1996"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418 , 437 , 650 A.2d 557 (1994). 18 "The [plaintiffs'] claim is one of procedural due process: the right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." (Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270 , 276 , 630 A.2d 1010 (1993).

11996–1996
State v. Robinson green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

1996See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 208 ; State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 721 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993).

1996See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 208 ; State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 721 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993).

11996–1996
City of New Haven v. United Illuminating Co. green
conn · 1975
2 sentences

1996"To determine whether such procedural due process requirements apply, the court must first determine whether a party has been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government. . ." New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478 , 494 , 362 A.2d 785 (1975). 19 The plaintiffs cannot and do not claim that they will be deprived of liberty by the operation of General Statutes § 12-157 .

1996"To determine whether such procedural due process requirements apply, the court must first determine whether a party has been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government. . ." New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478 , 494 , 362 A.2d 785 (1975). 19 The plaintiffs cannot and do not claim that they will be deprived of liberty by the operation of General Statutes § 12-157 .

11996–1996
In re the Estate of Sunshine green
nyappdiv · 1976
1 sentence

1995The attorney trial referee drew the following conclusions from these findings of fact: (1) that it would have been impossible for the plaintiff to have understood the agreement, the side letter of September 22, 1988, and the financial disclosure, all within the limited time period during which she was in the decedent's lawyer's office; (2) that the September 22, 1988 letter from Corriss to the plaintiff was irrelevant, did not constitute a meaningful waiver of counsel, and did not play any part in the referee's conclusions and recommendations; (3) that neither the decedent nor his lawyer made

11995–1995
Dills v. Town of Enfield green
conn · 1989
11995–1995
McHugh v. McHugh green
conn · 1980
11995–1995
Goldberg v. Kelly green
scotus · 1970
11995–1995
In re the Estate of Sunshine green
ny · 1976
11995–1995
Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities green
conn · 1991
11993–1993
Altholtz v. Connecticut Dental Commission green
connappct · 1985
11993–1993
Jucker v. Jucker green
conn · 1983
11986–1986
Monroe v. Monroe green
conn · 1979
11986–1986
Raitport v. Lyons green
scotus · 1979
11986–1986
Wolman v. Walter green
scotus · 1979
11986–1986
Carter v. Texas green
scotus · 1979
11986–1986
Baker v. Baker green
conn · 1982
11986–1986
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale green
scotus · 1979
11980–1980

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 216 (1988–2026) CA 126 (1960–2026) NY 79 (1971–2026) IL 75 (1972–2026) PA 67 (1971–2026) WA 65 (1970–2025) NM 63 (1973–2026) OH 56 (1980–2026) LA 51 (1974–2025) WI 45 (1978–2026) MO 40 (1985–2025) FL 32 (1980–2026) WV 29 (1980–2026) CT 25 (1980–2026) UT 25 (2000–2025) TN 23 (1998–2024) MA 20 (1987–2025) ID 18 (1975–2025) KY 18 (1971–2025) DC 15 (1983–2022) NC 14 (1981–2025) IA 14 (1977–2023) MT 14 (1984–2024) MD 14 (1986–2023) GA 14 (1971–2025) CO 13 (1988–2025) MI 13 (1974–2026) KS 13 (1998–2024) MS 13 (1990–2023) WY 12 (1976–2020) AZ 11 (1982–2025) OK 11 (1976–2017) AK 10 (1981–2024) MN 10 (1987–2016) SC 10 (1992–2025) NJ 10 (1980–2021) AL 9 (1980–2025) HI 8 (1973–2023) IN 8 (1975–2019) ND 8 (1974–2014) OR 7 (1974–2010) AR 7 (1979–2021) RI 6 (1972–2018) NE 6 (1994–2025) NV 5 (1975–2022) DE 4 (1986–2024) SD 4 (1987–1995) VT 3 (2008–2025) NH 2 (2002–2010) VA 2 (2025–2025) VI 2 (2013–2015) ME 2 (2002–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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