63 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Albericogreen2 sentences2017Loper v. JMAR, 2013-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 311 P.3d 1184 . 10 An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount 11 to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision, and we are not prevented 12 from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert 13 testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with 14 the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 15 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Alberico, 1993-NMSC- 16 047, ¶ 63, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 . 2013“An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision,” and we are not prevented from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert testimony “to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case.” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206; see Torres, 1999-NMSC-010 , ¶ 27. | 13 | 19 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2026And this Court has specifically, and repeatedly, refused to “define the legal 16 boundaries of a ‘meaningful challenge’ to authority.” See State v. Jones, 2000- 17 NMCA-047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2002- 18 NMCA-036, ¶ 38, 131 N.M. 746 , 42 P.3d 851 (reiterating that “it is up to the jury to 19 decide whether the act of spitting also constituted a meaningful challenge to 20 authority”). 2026And this Court has specifically, and repeatedly, refused to “define the legal 16 boundaries of a ‘meaningful challenge’ to authority.” See State v. Jones, 2000- 17 NMCA-047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2002- 18 NMCA-036, ¶ 38, 131 N.M. 746 , 42 P.3d 851 (reiterating that “it is up to the jury to 19 decide whether the act of spitting also constituted a meaningful challenge to 20 authority”). | 11 | 12 |
State v. Albericogreen2 sentences2017Loper v. JMAR, 2013-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 311 P.3d 1184 . 10 An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount 11 to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision, and we are not prevented 12 from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert 13 testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with 14 the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 15 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Alberico, 1993-NMSC- 16 047, ¶ 63, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 . 2013“An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision,” and we are not prevented from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert testimony “to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case.” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206; see Torres, 1999-NMSC-010 , ¶ 27. | 5 | 10 |
State v. Williamsongreen2 sentences2025“This deferential standard of review 16 is appropriate to further the . . . strong preference for searches conducted pursuant 17 to a warrant and to encourage police officers to procure a search warrant.” Gurule, 18 2013-NMSC-025, ¶ 16 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted). 8 1 {16} Still, “the substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the 2 decision of the issuing court and does not preclude the reviewing court from 3 conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by 4 probable cause.” Williamson, 2009-NMS 2022State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 29-30 , 146 N.M. 488 , 212 P.3d 376 . “[T]he substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decision of the issuing court and does not preclude the reviewing court from conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.” Id. ¶ 30. | 3 | 9 |
State v. Padillagreen2 sentences2024On appeal, Defendant contends that the district erred by permitting the corrections officer to testify as to whether he considered Defendant’s actions to be a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority. [BIC 4-9] Defendant argues that because the charge against him of battery against a peace officer required the jury to find that Defendant’s conduct caused a meaningful challenge to the peace officer’s authority, the officer’s testimony constituted a legal conclusion that took this fact-finding function from the jury. [BIC 7-8; RP 193] See State v. Padilla, 1997-NMSC- 022, ¶¶ 4-8, 11, 123 2024On appeal, Defendant contends that the district erred by permitting the corrections officer to testify as to whether he considered Defendant’s actions to be a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority. [BIC 4-9] Defendant argues that because the charge against him of battery against a peace officer required the jury to find that Defendant’s conduct caused a meaningful challenge to the peace officer’s authority, the officer’s testimony constituted a legal conclusion that took this fact-finding function from the jury. [BIC 7-8; RP 193] See State v. Padilla, 1997-NMSC- 022, ¶¶ 4-8, 11, 123 | 3 | 7 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2018It should not prevent an appellate court from 18 conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of scientific 19 testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance 20 with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 21 Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047 , ¶ 63). 2013“An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision,” and we are not prevented from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert testimony “to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case.” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206; see Torres, 1999-NMSC-010 , ¶ 27. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Gurulegreen2 sentences2025“This deferential standard of review 16 is appropriate to further the . . . strong preference for searches conducted pursuant 17 to a warrant and to encourage police officers to procure a search warrant.” Gurule, 18 2013-NMSC-025, ¶ 16 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted). 8 1 {16} Still, “the substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the 2 decision of the issuing court and does not preclude the reviewing court from 3 conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by 4 probable cause.” Williamson, 2009-NMS 2014“This standard, however, does not preclude the reviewing court from conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause, but rather precludes the reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the issuing judge[.]” Gurule, 2013-NMSC-025, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2026And this Court has specifically, and repeatedly, refused to “define the legal 16 boundaries of a ‘meaningful challenge’ to authority.” See State v. Jones, 2000- 17 NMCA-047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2002- 18 NMCA-036, ¶ 38, 131 N.M. 746 , 42 P.3d 851 (reiterating that “it is up to the jury to 19 decide whether the act of spitting also constituted a meaningful challenge to 20 authority”). 2026And this Court has specifically, and repeatedly, refused to “define the legal 16 boundaries of a ‘meaningful challenge’ to authority.” See State v. Jones, 2000- 17 NMCA-047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2002- 18 NMCA-036, ¶ 38, 131 N.M. 746 , 42 P.3d 851 (reiterating that “it is up to the jury to 19 decide whether the act of spitting also constituted a meaningful challenge to 20 authority”). | 2 | 11 |
State v. Downeygreen2 sentences2010It should not prevent an appellate court from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission [of] scientific testimony to ensure that the trial judge's decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case." Id. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206; see Downey, 2008-NMSC-061, ¶ 24 , 145 N.M. 232 , 195 P.3d 1244 (repeating this observation of Alberico ). 2010It should not prevent an appellate court from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission [of] scientific testimony to ensure that the trial judge's decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case." Id. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206; see Downey, 2008-NMSC-061, ¶ 24 , 145 N.M. 232 , 195 P.3d 1244 (repeating this observation of Alberico ). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Coopergreen2 sentences2022See State v. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-041 , ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 172 , 3 P.3d 149 (stating that battery on a peace officer is not judged in a vacuum, rather “[i]t must be viewed in light of the factual setting to determine whether an actual threat to safety or a meaningful challenge to authority occurred”). 2022See State v. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-041 , ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 172 , 3 P.3d 149 (stating that battery on a peace officer is not judged in a vacuum, rather “[i]t must be viewed in light of the factual setting to determine whether an actual threat to safety or a meaningful challenge to authority occurred”). | 2 | 2 |
Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. City Council of Albuquerquegreen2 sentences2009See ACP III, 2008-NMSC-025, ¶ 59 , 144 N.M. 99 , 184 P.3d 411 . 2009See ACP III, 2008-NMSC-025, ¶ 59 , 144 N.M. 99 , 184 P.3d 411 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008It should not prevent an appellate court from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission [of] scientific testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 116 N.M. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206 (citation omitted); accord State v. Anderson, 118 N.M. 284, 292 , 881 P.2d 29, 37 (1994). 2008It should not prevent an appellate court from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission [of] scientific testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 116 N.M. at 170, 861 P.2d at 206 (citation omitted); accord State v. Anderson, 118 N.M. 284, 292 , 881 P.2d 29, 37 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
Department of Social & Health Services v. Moseleygreen2 sentences1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was “fundamentally fair,” which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). 1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was “fundamentally fair,” which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). | 2 | 2 |
In Interest of Jcgreen2 sentences1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was "fundamentally fair," which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash. App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). 1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was “fundamentally fair,” which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Geistgreen2 sentences1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was "fundamentally fair," which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash. App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). 1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was “fundamentally fair,” which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Adoption of T.M.F.green2 sentences1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was "fundamentally fair," which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash. App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). 1993See Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201-03 (question is whether proceeding was “fundamentally fair,” which includes inquiry into whether counsel exercised professional skill and judgment); In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1040 (same); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (question is whether counsel was effective in providing a meaningful hearing); In re Moseley, 34 Wash.App. 179 , 660 P.2d 315, 318 (1983) (applying test). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2022He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because his conduct did not constitute a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority or pose an actual threat to the officer’s safety. [BIC 1, 4-12] Defendant also asserts fundamental error on the basis that the jury was not instructed that a meaningful challenge to authority requires more than an affront to the officer’s dignity. [BIC 1-2, 12-17] Unpersuaded, we affirm. {3} “In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the 2022He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because his conduct did not cause actual injury, pose an actual threat to the officer’s safety, or constitute a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority. [BIC 1] Unpersuaded, we affirm. {3} “In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52 , 345 P.3d 1056 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Trujillogreen2 sentences2020State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 12 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 ; see State v. Trujillo, 2011-NMSC-040, ¶ 19 , 150 N.M. 721 , 266 P.3d 1 (“[U]nder a deferential standard the reviewing judge does not substitute his or her judgment for that of the issuing judge.”). {13} “[T]he substantial basis standard of review is more deferential than the de novo review applied to questions of law, but less deferential than the substantial evidence standard applied to questions of fact.” Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 30 . “[T]he substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decision of 2020State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 12 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 ; see State v. Trujillo, 2011-NMSC-040, ¶ 19 , 150 N.M. 721 , 266 P.3d 1 (“[U]nder a deferential standard the reviewing judge does not substitute his or her judgment for that of the issuing judge.”). {13} “[T]he substantial basis standard of review is more deferential than the de novo review applied to questions of law, but less deferential than the substantial evidence standard applied to questions of fact.” Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 30 . “[T]he substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decision of | 1 | 3 |
State v. Haidlegreen2 sentences2025“While we give deference to 5 a magistrate’s decision, and to an officer’s observations, experience, and training, 6 their conclusions must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances.” 7 Haidle, 2012-NMSC-033, ¶ 13 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation 8 omitted). 2013Haidle, 2012-NMSC-033, ¶ 10 ; Vest, 2011-NMCA-037, ¶ 7 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sladegreen1 sentence2022Further, “appellate courts do not search for inferences supporting a contrary verdict or re[]weigh the evidence because this type of analysis would substitute an appellate court’s judgment for that of the jury.” Slade, 2014-NMCA-088, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {3} The jury instructions for battery on a peace officer required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “[D]efendant intentionally touched or applied force to Mauricio Puente by spitting in his face”; (2) “At the time, Mauricio Puente was a peace officer and was performing the duties of a peace | 1 | 1 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2022See State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶ 3 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 . 2022See State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶ 3 , 137 N.M. 713 , 114 P.3d 393 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Benallygreen2 sentences2022See State v. Benally, 2001- NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258 , 34 P.3d 1134 (explaining that if jury instruction error was not preserved, “we review for fundamental error”). 2022See State v. Benally, 2001- NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258 , 34 P.3d 1134 (explaining that if jury instruction error was not preserved, “we review for fundamental error”). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jernigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Guerragreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Radosevichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Holtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Freedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Ernesto M., Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moorered | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Salgadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeGraffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Silvagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Brandtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Roygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Montoya
green
2 sentences2022He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because his conduct did not constitute a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority or pose an actual threat to the officer’s safety. [BIC 1, 4-12] Defendant also asserts fundamental error on the basis that the jury was not instructed that a meaningful challenge to authority requires more than an affront to the officer’s dignity. [BIC 1-2, 12-17] Unpersuaded, we affirm. {3} “In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the 2022He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because his conduct did not cause actual injury, pose an actual threat to the officer’s safety, or constitute a meaningful challenge to the officer’s authority. [BIC 1] Unpersuaded, we affirm. {3} “In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52 , 345 P.3d 1056 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 3 | 2022–2026 |
State v. Williamson
green
2 sentences2022State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 29-30 , 146 N.M. 488 , 212 P.3d 376 . “[T]he substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decision of the issuing court and does not preclude the reviewing court from conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.” Id. ¶ 30. 2012As we recently confirmed in State v. Williamson, the issuance of a search warrant is reviewed under a substantial basis standard. 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 29 , 146 N.M. 488 , 212 P.3d 376 (“A reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the issuing court... [but] must determine whether the affidavit as a whole, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, provide a substantial basis for determining that there is probable cause to believe that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing.”) “[T]he substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decisi | 3 | 2011–2022 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2022The Jones direction is encompassed by UJI 14-2211 NMRA, which was given in this case and, in relevant part, instructed the jury that Defendant’s conduct must have “caused a meaningful challenge to the authority of [Officer] Milks.” Defendant argues that more is required, but we presume uniform jury instructions are “correct statements of law.” State v. Wilson, 1994-NMSC-009 , ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 793 , 867 P.2d 1175 . 2022The Jones direction is encompassed by UJI 14-2211 NMRA, which was given in this case and, in relevant part, instructed the jury that Defendant’s conduct must have “caused a meaningful challenge to the authority of [Officer] Milks.” Defendant argues that more is required, but we presume uniform jury instructions are “correct statements of law.” State v. Wilson, 1994-NMSC-009 , ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 793 , 867 P.2d 1175 . | 3 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences2022It is further well established that “definitional instructions are not required when the terms are used in their ordinary sense and no error is committed in refusing to instruct on a term or word with a common meaning.” State v. Gonzales, 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30, 112 N.M. 544 , 817 P.2d 1186 . 2022It is further well established that “definitional instructions are not required when the terms are used in their ordinary sense and no error is committed in refusing to instruct on a term or word with a common meaning.” State v. Gonzales, 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30, 112 N.M. 544 , 817 P.2d 1186 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Loper v. JMAR
green
2 sentences2020Loper v. JMAR, 2013-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 311 P.3d 1184 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2017Loper v. JMAR, 2013-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 311 P.3d 1184 . 10 An abuse of discretion standard of review, however, is not tantamount 11 to rubber-stamping the trial judge’s decision, and we are not prevented 12 from conducting a meaningful analysis of the admission of the expert 13 testimony to ensure that the trial judge’s decision was in accordance with 14 the Rules of Evidence and the evidence in the case. 15 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Alberico, 1993-NMSC- 16 047, ¶ 63, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 . | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Lee v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2010Moreover, in light of the liberal approach of our rules of evidence to the admission of evidence and the heightened qualifications of modern day jurors, any doubt regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence "should be resolved in favor of admission, rather than exclusion." Lee v. Martinez, 2004-NMSC-027, ¶ 16 , 136 N.M. 166 , 96 P.3d 291 (citing 1 Jack B. 2010Moreover, in light of the liberal approach of our rules of evidence to the admission of evidence and the heightened qualifications of modern day jurors, any doubt regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence "should be resolved in favor of admission, rather than exclusion." Lee v. Martinez, 2004-NMSC-027, ¶ 16 , 136 N.M. 166 , 96 P.3d 291 (citing 1 Jack B. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2023State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071 , ¶ 17, 116 N.M. 689 , 866 P.2d 1156 . {12} With respect to element 4, “[D]efendant’s conduct caused a meaningful challenge to the authority of Tyler Sanchez,” we note that what constitutes a meaningful challenge to authority is largely a question for the jury. [RP 165] See State v. Jones, 2000-NMCA- 047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 (declining to provide set boundaries for determining what constitutes a meaningful challenge to authority, and stating that juries must make that determination based on the circumstances and context in which the battery occurred 2023State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071 , ¶ 17, 116 N.M. 689 , 866 P.2d 1156 . {12} With respect to element 4, “[D]efendant’s conduct caused a meaningful challenge to the authority of Tyler Sanchez,” we note that what constitutes a meaningful challenge to authority is largely a question for the jury. [RP 165] See State v. Jones, 2000-NMCA- 047, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 165 , 3 P.3d 142 (declining to provide set boundaries for determining what constitutes a meaningful challenge to authority, and stating that juries must make that determination based on the circumstances and context in which the battery occurred | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Fuentes
green
2 sentences2022“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 13 , 147 N.M. 761 , 228 P.3d 1181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2022“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 13 , 147 N.M. 761 , 228 P.3d 1181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Reed v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Apodaca green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State Ex Rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Ruth Anne E. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Dowling green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Diaz green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Barber green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Lopez v. Reddy green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Parkhill v. Alderman-Cave Milling & Grain Co. of N.M. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Parkhill v. ADLERMAN-CAVE MILLING & GRAIN green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Sewell v. Wilson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Charles v. Regents of New Mexico State University green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Quintana v. Acosta green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Torrez green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Vest green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Ventresca green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Massachusetts v. Upton green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Silva green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Stills green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Roy Irby v. United States green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.