13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clayton v. Gibsongreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect 2000Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir.1999). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Arnoldgreen2 sentences1988People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). 1988People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). | 1 | 2 |
v. Sausergreen1 sentence2025See People v. Sauser, 2020 COA 174, ¶ 57 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2025See People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo. App. 2010). 3 could challenge the constitutionality of his convictions. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bostwickgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
Pate v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pendletongreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
Montclair Parkowners Association Hacienda Mobile Home Estates v. City of Montclair, a Municipal Corporationgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
Billy Keith McGregor v. Gary Gibson, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiarygreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
People v. Arygreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vasquezgreen1 sentence2017Because this issue is only relevant in the context of an affirmative defense of self-defense, which was not permitted in this case, we need not resolve the issue. ¶ 34 Insofar as the issue may arise on remand, we offer the following guidance: whether an act of violence or defendant’s discovery of such act is “too remote to create ... an apprehension or fear sufficient to justify the force used by defendant ... is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v. Vasquez, 148 P.3d 326, 331 (Colo. App. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Flowersgreen1 sentence2012People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Westendorfgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def 2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def | 1 | 1 |
People v. Donachygreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def 2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fuestongreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def | 1 | 1 |
People v. Broncuciagreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def 2010See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo.1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93 , 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37 , 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the def | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Durso v. Charles Rowegreen2 sentences1991See Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1371 (7th Cir.1978) (failure to accord prisoner a meaningful hearing prior to revoking prisoner's work-release program for allegedly violating rules of program violates due process of law). 1991See Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1371 (7th Cir.1978) (failure to accord prisoner a meaningful hearing prior to revoking prisoner’s work-release program for allegedly violating rules of program violates due process of law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greene v. Stategreen1 sentence2018But see Greene v. State, 264 S.W.3d 271, 273 (Tex. App. 2008) (declining to order a retrospective competency hearing because the defendant had possessed no meaningful level of competency since being convicted). 12 ¶ 22 On remand, the trial court must weigh four factors when considering whether a meaningful retrospective competency hearing can be held: (1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) defendant’s statements in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and witnesse | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2019It added that to broaden the Walder exception to encompass the impeachment of other defense witnesses would provide an incentive for law enforcement officers to illegally obtain evidence without furthering the truth-seeking function of the court and “dissuade defendants from presenting a meaningful defense through other witnesses.” Id. at 317–20. 2 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s assertion that James unequivocally applies and that only a higher court may conclude otherwise. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Edwards v. State
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing, in the context of defendant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the 11 propriety of allowing the state court to cure its omission of a competency hearing by conducting one retroactively if the record contained sufficient evidence to make one feasible); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011). ¶ 21 “Retrospective competency hearings are generally ‘disfavored’ but are ‘permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospect | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
green
2 sentences2015Rodriguez was convicted almost six years ago, and all that is left of his trial are transcripts, verdiet forms, and juror questionnaires. 120 However, the purpose of the Batson analysis is "to ferret out the unconstitutional use of race in jury selection." Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 266 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 (Breyer, J., concurring). 2015Rodriguez was convicted almost six years ago, and all that is left of his trial are transcripts, verdiet forms, and juror questionnaires. 120 However, the purpose of the Batson analysis is "to ferret out the unconstitutional use of race in jury selection." Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 266 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 (Breyer, J., concurring). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Salazar
green
2 sentences2012People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 17 , 272 P.3d 1067 ("The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."). 2012People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 17 , 272 P.3d 1067 ("The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Matthews
green
1 sentence2000Nor do we read Jones v. District Court, supra, or People v. Matthews, supra, to require that a competency hearing be held immediately when the issue of competency is raised during the trial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.