meaningful hearing in Washington

2025Due process requires that parents receive “[n]otice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.” In re Dependency of Moseley, 34 Wn.

2020Due process requires that parents receive “[n]otice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.” In re Moseley, 34 Wn.

2018Termination proceedings must accord parents strict due process protections, including "[n]otice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding." In re Dependency of H.W., 70 Wn.

2015The due process protections afforded a parent in a termination case include "[n]otice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding." In re Dependency of H.W., 70 Wn.

2006C.R.B., 62 Wash.App. 608 , 814 P.2d 1197 . ¶ 16 Here, however, there was a meaningful hearing.

2006C.R.B., 62 Wash.App. 608 , 814 P.2d 1197 . ¶ 16 Here, however, there was a meaningful hearing.

2018“An adequate inquiry must include a full airing of the concerns . . . and a meaningful inquiry by the trial court.” Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 610 .

2015Restorff challenges only the second factor, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his substitution motion without conducting an adequate inquiry into his issues with defense counsel. " An adequate inquiry must include a full airing of the concerns .. . and a meaningful inquiry by the trial court." State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 610 , 132 P. 3d 80 2006 ).

2020State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 610 , 132 P.3d 80 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1 , 427 P.3d 621 (2018).

2015Restorff challenges only the second factor, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his substitution motion without conducting an adequate inquiry into his issues with defense counsel. " An adequate inquiry must include a full airing of the concerns .. . and a meaningful inquiry by the trial court." State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 610 , 132 P. 3d 80 2006 ).

2019A meaningful hearing under Moseley “means, at a minimum, the opportunity to argue the strengths of one’s own position and to attack the State’s position.” J.M., 130 Wn.

2006In the Matter of the Welfare of J.M., 130 Wash.App. 912, 922 , 125 P.3d 245 (2005).

2018The Majority's Gunwall Analysis Ultimately Relies on Reinterpreting Miller and Offers No State Law Basis To Categorically Bar Juvenile LWOP for Homicide Offenses ¶ 54 The majority recognizes that a meaningful analysis under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986), must focus on "specific applications" of article I, section 14, not general comparisons of state and federal constitutional provisions.

2018The Majority's Gunwall Analysis Ultimately Relies on Reinterpreting Miller and Offers No State Law Basis To Categorically Bar Juvenile LWOP for Homicide Offenses ¶ 54 The majority recognizes that a meaningful analysis under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986), must focus on "specific applications" of article I, section 14, not general comparisons of state and federal constitutional provisions.

2015Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 720 ; State v. Hud low, 99 Wn.2d 1, 15 , 659 P.2d 514 (1983); State v. Rehak, 67 Wn.

2014Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 720 ; State v. Hudlow. 99 Wn.2d 1,15 , 659 P.2d 514 (1983); State v. Rehak, 67 Wn.

2007Although I would decline, as this court did in Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 778-80 , 658 P.2d 663 (1983), to require counsel at all .420 hearings, the Board should determine on a case-by-case basis whether counsel is necessary in order to protect an inmate’s due process right to a meaningful hearing. ¶26 The cases cited by the majority regarding “legal representation for offenders during other Board proceedings,” majority at 0, are inapposite here.

2007Although I would decline, as this court did in Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 778-80 , 658 P.2d 663 (1983), to require counsel at all .420 hearings, the Board should determine on a case-by-case basis whether counsel is necessary in order to protect an inmate’s due process right to a meaningful hearing. ¶26 The cases cited by the majority regarding “legal representation for offenders during other Board proceedings,” majority at 0, are inapposite here.

2007In In re Personal Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wn.2d 621 , 763 P.2d 199 (1988), we considered the unique sentence reviews conducted by the Board after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, was passed.

2007In In re Personal Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wn.2d 621 , 763 P.2d 199 (1988), we considered the unique sentence reviews conducted by the Board after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, was passed.

2006Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wn.2d at 731 .

2006Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash.2d at 731 , 16 P.3d 1 .

2003We have either said an act was necessary, see, e.g., Andrews v. Munro, 102 Wn.2d 761 , 689 P.2d 399 (1984) (timber taxation); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326 , 662 P.2d 821 (1983) (state lottery); State ex rel.

2003We have either said an act was necessary, see, e.g., Andrews v. Munro, 102 Wn.2d 761 , 689 P.2d 399 (1984) (timber taxation); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326 , 662 P.2d 821 (1983) (state lottery); State ex rel.

2003We have either said an act was necessary, see, e.g., Andrews v. Munro, 102 Wn.2d 761 , 689 P.2d 399 (1984) (timber taxation); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326 , 662 P.2d 821 (1983) (state lottery); State ex rel.

2003We have either said an act was necessary, see, e.g., Andrews v. Munro, 102 Wn.2d 761 , 689 P.2d 399 (1984) (timber taxation); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326 , 662 P.2d 821 (1983) (state lottery); State ex rel.

1983In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841 (1975); Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wn.2d 408 , 526 P.2d 893 (1974); In re Luscier, supra; In re Messmer, 52 Wn.2d 510 , 326 P.2d 1004 (1958); In re Ross, 45 Wn.2d 654 , 277 P.2d 335 (1954); In re Petrie, 40 Wn.2d 809 , 246 P.2d 465 (1952); In re Darrow, 32 Wn.

1983In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841 (1975); Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wn.2d 408 , 526 P.2d 893 (1974); In re Luscier, supra; In re Messmer, 52 Wn.2d 510 , 326 P.2d 1004 (1958); In re Ross, 45 Wn.2d 654 , 277 P.2d 335 (1954); In re Petrie, 40 Wn.2d 809 , 246 P.2d 465 (1952); In re Darrow, 32 Wn.

2025“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.” Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 178 Wn.

2020State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 610 , 132 P.3d 80 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1 , 427 P.3d 621 (2018).

2019“The probationer may not sit by, without objection (and in fact use similar hearsay evidence), and then on appeal for the first time claim lack of due process.” Id. 9 No. 35979-4-111; No. 35980-8-111; No. 35981-6-111; No. 35982-4-111 Parental Rights to MS.D., H.G.D., S.F.D., & N.L.M J.D. had a meaningful hearing because his counsel confronted DSHS's witnesses and argued that the required services were not understandably offered and that termination was not in the children's best interests.

2017Ed. 2d 18 (1976); Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L.

2017Ed. 2d 18 (1976); Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L.

2017To decide whether a procedure violates due process, a court balances three factors: (1) the parents' interests, (2) the risk of error created by the procedures used, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.3 Applying these principles, the due process protections afforded parents in a termination hearing include notice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.4 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court "shall appoint a guardian ad litem"

2017To decide whether a procedure violates due process, a court balances three factors: (1) the parents' interests, (2) the risk of error created by the procedures used, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.3 Applying these principles, the due process protections afforded parents in a termination hearing include notice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.4 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court "shall appoint a guardian ad litem"

2017To decide whether a procedure violates due process, a court balances three factors: (1) the parents' interests, (2) the risk of error created by the procedures used, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.3 Applying these principles, the due process protections afforded parents in a termination hearing include notice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.4 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court "shall appoint a guardian ad litem"

2017To decide whether a procedure violates due process, a court balances three factors: (1) the parents' interests, (2) the risk of error created by the procedures used, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.3 Applying these principles, the due process protections afforded parents in a termination hearing include notice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding.4 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court "shall appoint a guardian ad litem"

2015State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821,856 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2015State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821,856 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2015The guiding principle is a result based on a meaningful analysis and a proper balancing of the equities and rights at issue.” Id. at 142. ¶18 In Cahill , the Delaware Supreme Court considered the proper standard to apply when faced with a public *54 figure plaintiff’s request to unmask an anonymous defendant. 884 A.2d at 457 .

2015The Cahill court adopted a “modified Dendrite standard consisting only of Dendrite requirements one and three: the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant and must satisfy the summary judgment standard.” 4 Id. at 461 .