meaningful hearing in Illinois

2019We conclude that the indictment was sufficient and not so overly broad as to impair defendant’s ability to present a meaningful defense. ¶ 24 Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on the out-of-state decisions in State v. Baker, 769 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 2015), and People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1986), is misplaced.

2018We conclude that the indictment was sufficient and not so overly broad as to impair defendant's ability to present a meaningful defense. ¶ 24 Furthermore, defendant's reliance on the out-of-state decisions in State v. Baker , 411 S.C. 583 , 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015), and People v. Keindl , 68 N.Y.2d 410 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 790 , 502 N.E.2d 577 (1986), is misplaced.

2019We conclude that the indictment was sufficient and not so overly broad as to impair defendant’s ability to present a meaningful defense. ¶ 24 Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on the out-of-state decisions in State v. Baker, 769 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 2015), and People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1986), is misplaced.

2018We conclude that the indictment was sufficient and not so overly broad as to impair defendant's ability to present a meaningful defense. ¶ 24 Furthermore, defendant's reliance on the out-of-state decisions in State v. Baker , 411 S.C. 583 , 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015), and People v. Keindl , 68 N.Y.2d 410 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 790 , 502 N.E.2d 577 (1986), is misplaced.

2023Johnson, 406 Ill.

2019Johnson, 406 Ill.

2018Because Stone Street has not alleged that the ALJ lacked discretion, or was otherwise vindictive, it cannot seriously claim that it was denied its due process right to a meaningful hearing. ¶ 30 In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that (1) “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear” and (2) the reasons for the increased sentenced “must be based upon objective -7- information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” P

2017Because Stone Street has not alleged that the ALJ lacked discretion, or was otherwise vindictive, it cannot seriously claim that it was denied its due process right to a meaningful hearing. ¶ 30 In Pearce , the Supreme Court held that (1) "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear" and (2) the reasons for the increased sentenced "must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Pear

2014Ace argues that it was denied a meaningful hearing in that the Commissioner failed to consider Kim’s lack of knowledge of his employee’s illegal conduct, which suggests a procedural due process challenge, but relies on Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board, 42 Ill. 2d 352 (1969), which involved a substantive due process analysis. ¶ 56 When determining whether an individual has received procedural due process, courts look to three factors: (1) “ ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ ”; (2) “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures u

2014Ace argues that it was denied a meaningful hearing in that the Commissioner failed to consider Kim’s lack of knowledge of his employee’s illegal conduct, which suggests a procedural due process challenge, but relies on Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board, 42 Ill. 2d 352 (1969), which involved a substantive due process analysis. ¶ 56 When determining whether an individual has received procedural due process, courts look to three factors: (1) “ ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ ”; (2) “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures u

2014(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee, 1991 WL 227750, at *6 .

2014(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee, 1991 WL 227750, at *6 .

2014More recently, in People v. McGhee, although we noted that the trend in Illinois has been to preclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, we commented that “[t]he efficacy of eyewitness identification testimony and current safeguards regarding its reliability is one of the most cutting-edge topics in modern criminal procedure, and the law is rapidly evolving.” People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 53 . ¶ 72 The importance of considering the specific circumstances of the case is illustrated by the facts here, where no direct physical evidence links the defe

2014More recently, in People v. McGhee, although we noted that the trend in Illinois has been to preclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, we commented that "[t]he efficacy of eyewitness identification testimony and current safeguards regarding its reliability is one of the most cutting- edge topics in modern criminal procedure, and the law is rapidly evolving." People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 53 . ¶ 72 The importance of considering the specific circumstances of the case is illustrated by the facts here, where no direct physical evidence links the def

2011We recognized that the benefits of our ruling were somewhat limited, because the district could still discharge the teacher from the extra-duty assignment without cause, but he "was entitled to some formality in a procedure in which he might have been able to persuade the Board to retain him." Harrisburg, 227 Ill.App.3d at 214 , 169 Ill.Dec. 205 , 591 N.E.2d at 89 . ¶ 17 In the present case, the arbitrator stated that "When a collective agreement requires a hearing it requires a meaningful hearing.

2011We recognized that the benefits of our ruling were somewhat limited, because the district could still discharge the teacher from the extra-duty assignment without cause, but he "was entitled to some formality in a procedure in which he might have been able to persuade the Board to retain him." Harrisburg, 227 Ill.App.3d at 214 , 169 Ill.Dec. 205 , 591 N.E.2d at 89 . ¶ 17 In the present case, the arbitrator stated that "When a collective agreement requires a hearing it requires a meaningful hearing.

2011Id. at 563-69 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . ¶ 28 In the present case, claimants acknowledge that the Supreme Court in $8,850 did indeed frame the issue as "when a postseizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." They argue, however, that $8,850 does not apply to this case because $8,850 involved the seizure of cash and not the seizure of an automobile, upon which one's livelihood might depend.

2011Id. at 563-69 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . ¶ 28 In the present case, claimants acknowledge that the Supreme Court in $8,850 did indeed frame the issue as "when a postseizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." They argue, however, that $8,850 does not apply to this case because $8,850 involved the seizure of cash and not the seizure of an automobile, upon which one's livelihood might depend.

2011Claimant raised an affirmative defense to the suit, asserting that the government's "`dilatory processing' of her petition for remission or mitigation and `dilatory' commencement of the civil forfeiture action violated her" due process right to a hearing at a meaningful time. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 560-61 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 . ¶ 27 The Supreme Court in $8,850 framed the question before it as when does a postseizure delay "become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 562-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 .

2011Claimant raised an affirmative defense to the suit, asserting that the government's "`dilatory processing' of her petition for remission or mitigation and `dilatory' commencement of the civil forfeiture action violated her" due process right to a hearing at a meaningful time. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 560-61 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 . ¶ 27 The Supreme Court in $8,850 framed the question before it as when does a postseizure delay "become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time." $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 562-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 .

2010He cites our decision in People v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535 (2005).

2010He cites our decision in People v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535 (2005).

2010Johnson, 389 Ill.

2010Johnson, 389 Ill.

2009Indeed, Shelley has been widely criticized for a finding of state action that was not "`supported by any reasoning which would suggest that "state action" is a meaningful requirement rather than a nearly empty or at least extraordinarily malleable formality.'" Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill.2d at 465 , 261 Ill.Dec. 492 , 763 N.E.2d 741 , quoting L.

2009Indeed, Shelley has been widely criticized for a finding of state action that was not “ ‘supported by any reasoning which would suggest that “state action” is a meaningful requirement rather than a nearly empty or at least extraordinarily malleable formality.’ ” Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d at 465 , quoting L.

2006My colleagues in the majority then hold that this court’s holdings in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977), and In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33 (1977), “apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing *** precludes application of due process protections to such cases.” (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill. 2d at 347.

2006My colleagues in the majority then hold that this court's holdings in People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261 , 5 Ill.Dec. 832 , 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977), and In re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33 , 7 Ill.Dec. 85 , 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), " apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing * * * precludes application of due process protections to such cases." (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill.2d at 347 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 548 , 856 N.E.2d at 353 .

2006My colleagues in the majority then hold that this court’s holdings in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977), and In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33 (1977), “apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing *** precludes application of due process protections to such cases.” (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill. 2d at 347.

2006My colleagues in the majority then hold that this court's holdings in People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261 , 5 Ill.Dec. 832 , 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977), and In re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33 , 7 Ill.Dec. 85 , 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), " apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing * * * precludes application of due process protections to such cases." (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill.2d at 347 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 548 , 856 N.E.2d at 353 .

1984App. 3d 335 , 315 N.E.2d 229 .) The purpose of the hearing “is merely to comply with the due process clause to provide defendant with a forum and to afford him a meaningful hearing to determine if he refused to consent to a breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” ( 21 Ill.

1984App. 3d 335 , 315 N.E.2d 229 .) The purpose of the hearing “is merely to comply with the due process clause to provide defendant with a forum and to afford him a meaningful hearing to determine if he refused to consent to a breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” ( 21 Ill.

1979(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings ‘a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court’ (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).

1976(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings “a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court” (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).

1979Thus, the mockery of justice’ standard is not to be taken literally, but rather is to be employed ‘as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness.’ (McQueen v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1974), 498 F.2d 207, 214 .) In the final analysis, the question of whether or not a defendant was adequately represented by competent counsel must be answered solely from the circumstances of each particular case.

1976Thus, the “mockery of justice” standard is not to be taken literally, but rather is to be employed “as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness.” (McQueen v. Swenson (8th Cir. 1974), 498 F.2d 207, 214 .) In the final analysis, the question of whether or not a defendant was adequately represented by competent counsel must be answered solely from the circumstances of each particular case.

1979(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings ‘a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court’ (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).

1976(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings “a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court” (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).

1979(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings ‘a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court’ (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).

1979(Witherspoon; People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39 , 280 N.E.2d 433 .) While it has been said that for a defendant to have been denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that what was or was not done by the defendant’s attorney made the proceedings ‘a farce and a mockery of justice shocking to the conscience of the Court’ (O’Malley v. United States (6th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d 733 -734), this heavy standard was not meant to be an impenetrable obstacle to a meaningful analysis of the facts of any particular case (United States v. Hager (8th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 737 ).