14 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawes v. CSA Architects and Engineersgreen2 sentences2023That is, when applying the abuse of discretion standard in the expert witness context, we reverse only where there is “a meaningful error in judgment.” Lawes, 963 F.3d at 90 (emphasis added). 2023Accordingly, the reviewing court will reverse a trial court’s decision if it determines the trial court “committed a material error of law or a meaningful error in judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
California v. Trombettagreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen1 sentence2020Cf. Ray, 203 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Parren v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See id. at 272-73, 523 A.2d 597 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2010As we noted in Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 319 , 825 A.2d 1008, 1028 (2003), even if the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954), and its progeny, does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the Maryland Declaration of Rights "requires such a presumption in limited egregious cases of juror and witness misconduct to insure that a criminal defendant receives adequate due process.” Accordingly, even if the Sixth Amendment does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the 2010As we noted in Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 319 , 825 A.2d 1008, 1028 (2003), even if the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954), and its progeny, does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the Maryland Declaration of Rights "requires such a presumption in limited egregious cases of juror and witness misconduct to insure that a criminal defendant receives adequate due process.” Accordingly, even if the Sixth Amendment does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the | 1 | 1 |
Remmer v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010As we noted in Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 319 , 825 A.2d 1008, 1028 (2003), even if the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954), and its progeny, does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the Maryland Declaration of Rights "requires such a presumption in limited egregious cases of juror and witness misconduct to insure that a criminal defendant receives adequate due process.” Accordingly, even if the Sixth Amendment does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the 2010As we noted in Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 319 , 825 A.2d 1008, 1028 (2003), even if the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954), and its progeny, does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the Maryland Declaration of Rights "requires such a presumption in limited egregious cases of juror and witness misconduct to insure that a criminal defendant receives adequate due process.” Accordingly, even if the Sixth Amendment does not permit a presumption of prejudice, the | 1 | 1 |
Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. Doe No. 3green2 sentences2009Id. at 760-61. 2009Id. at 760-61. | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES, ETC. v. Lane Const. Corp.green1 sentence1990With regard to the federal Miller Act, “the Supreme Court indicated that the word ‘subcontractor’ as used in the Miller Act is to be interpreted in its technical sense and was intended by Congress to distinguish a subcontractor from either a laborer or material supplier.” United States, etc. v. Lane Const. Corp., 477 F.Supp. 400, 410 (M.D.Pa.1979) (citing MacEvoy). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cumberland Insurance Group v. Delmarva Power
green
1 sentence2020Litigation ensued, and the utility moved for summary judgment on the basis that the demolition of the property “irreversibly crippled” the utility’s “ability to mount a meaningful defense.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Deck v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2016In-court physical restraints are inherently prejudicial to criminal defendants in that they can diminish the accused’s ability to mount a meaningful defense as well as his ability to communicate with his lawyer, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 , 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), and no reported Maryland decision has considered whether and under what circumstances a stun cuff can serve as a courtroom restraint during a jury trial. 2016In-court physical restraints are inherently prejudicial to criminal defendants in that they can diminish the accused’s ability to mount a meaningful defense as well as his ability to communicate with his lawyer, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 , 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), and no reported Maryland decision has considered whether and under what circumstances a stun cuff can serve as a courtroom restraint during a jury trial. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dillard v. State
green
2 sentences2011The defendant need not make a specific request that the trial court perform a voir dire of the jurors as part of its investigation into the jury’s misconduct because, “[o]nce the parties raise the issue of [jury misconduct], the trial judge must conduct a meaningful inquiry that will resolve the factual questions.” 415 Md. at 459 , 3 A.3d at 411 . 2011The defendant need not make a specific request that the trial court perform a voir dire of the jurors as part of its investigation into the jury’s misconduct because, “[o]nce the parties raise the issue of [jury misconduct], the trial judge must conduct a meaningful inquiry that will resolve the factual questions.” 415 Md. at 459 , 3 A.3d at 411 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Public Service Commission v. Patuxent Valley Conservation League
green
2 sentences2006While we appreciate the sensitivity of the Court of Special Appeals that a meaningful challenge to the allowed probing of the Board members’ thought processes might be lost if such a contention were not resolved on appeal until following a trial, see Montgomery Co., 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 207 , 477 A.2d at 763 , we perceive that the more limited inquiry permitted by the Circuit Court’s order, with respect to Lacer’s requested relief under the St. 2006While we appreciate the sensitivity of the Court of Special Appeals that a meaningful challenge to the allowed probing of the Board members’ thought processes might be lost if such a contention were not resolved on appeal until following a trial, see Montgomery Co., 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 207 , 477 A.2d at 763 , we perceive that the more limited inquiry permitted by the Circuit Court’s order, with respect to Lacer’s requested relief under the St. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Montgomery County v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2006While we appreciate the sensitivity of the Court of Special Appeals that a meaningful challenge to the allowed probing of the Board members’ thought processes might be lost if such a contention were not resolved on appeal until following a trial, see Montgomery Co., 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 207 , 477 A.2d at 763 , we perceive that the more limited inquiry permitted by the Circuit Court’s order, with respect to Lacer’s requested relief under the St. 2006While we appreciate the sensitivity of the Court of Special Appeals that a meaningful challenge to the allowed probing of the Board members’ thought processes might be lost if such a contention were not resolved on appeal until following a trial, see Montgomery Co., 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 207 , 477 A.2d at 763 , we perceive that the more limited inquiry permitted by the Circuit Court’s order, with respect to Lacer’s requested relief under the St. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Moon v. State
green
2 sentences2003The MVA asserts that this Court, in Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), condoned the Legislature’s declaration that breath test results are reliable evidence and therefore the suspension of driver’s licenses based upon certified test results satisfies the constitutional requirement that the statutory scheme be free from unwarranted risk of an erroneous outcome. 2003The MVA asserts that this Court, in Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), condoned the Legislature’s declaration that breath test results are reliable evidence and therefore the suspension of driver’s licenses based upon certified test results satisfies the constitutional requirement that the statutory scheme be free from unwarranted risk of an erroneous outcome. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1986The Commission found that “adequate equity funds for this project are not available if only limited *684 to future operational savings” and that “the Hospital’s liquid assets, alone, or in combination with operating surpluses, are not adequate to support a project of this scope.” It further found that with respect to “the applicant’s statement that, if necessary, the Hospital’s present investors will contribute to the project ... neither the availability nor the costs of funds provided through such investors has been described.” The Commission concluded that “the criterion at COMAR 10.24.01.06 1986The Commission found that “adequate equity funds for this project are not available if only limited *684 to future operational savings” and that “the Hospital’s liquid assets, alone, or in combination with operating surpluses, are not adequate to support a project of this scope.” It further found that with respect to “the applicant’s statement that, if necessary, the Hospital’s present investors will contribute to the project ... neither the availability nor the costs of funds provided through such investors has been described.” The Commission concluded that “the criterion at COMAR 10.24.01.06 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.