face defense in Maryland

2016In the face of an instruction that “create[d] the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the State has not met its required burden of proof,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting), Respondent’s conviction is essentially a nullity, see Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (concluding that “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment” when the jurors did not receive a proper reasonable doubt instruction).

2016In the face of an instruction that “create[d] the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the State has not met its required burden of proof,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting), Respondent’s conviction is essentially a nullity, see Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (concluding that “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment” when the jurors did not receive a proper reasonable doubt instruction).

2016In the face of an instruction that “create[d] the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the State has not met its required burden of proof,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting), Respondent’s conviction is essentially a nullity, see Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (concluding that “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment” when the jurors did not receive a proper reasonable doubt instruction).

2016In the face of an instruction that “create[d] the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the State has not met its required burden of proof,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (White, J., dissenting), Respondent’s conviction is essentially a nullity, see Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (concluding that “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment” when the jurors did not receive a proper reasonable doubt instruction).

2015That the State already had a relatively strong case — especially in light of Nichols’s testimony that he knew Appellant for nine to ten years and identified him as his shooter and the dog sniff led the police to an apartment nearby the crime scene in which Appellant was found as well *667 as a camouflage jacket and handgun — does not preclude the State from further supporting its case; “[w]hen we are talking only about the legitimate prejudice that inevitably results from competent evidence enjoying a special or heightened relevance, there is no downside to making a strong case even stronger.”

2015That the State already had a relatively strong case — especially in light of Nichols’s testimony that he knew Appellant for nine to ten years and identified him as his shooter and the dog sniff led the police to an apartment nearby the crime scene in which Appellant was found as well *667 as a camouflage jacket and handgun — does not preclude the State from further supporting its case; “[w]hen we are talking only about the legitimate prejudice that inevitably results from competent evidence enjoying a special or heightened relevance, there is no downside to making a strong case even stronger.”

2010While the majority accurately states the purpose of the DNA Collection Act 7 and the holding of Raines, 383 Md. at 5 , 857 A.2d at 21 , the case that upheld the statute in the face of challenge, its reliance on the statute and Raines is misplaced.

2010While the majority accurately states the purpose of the DNA Collection Act 7 and the holding of Raines, 383 Md. at 5 , 857 A.2d at 21 , the case that upheld the statute in the face of challenge, its reliance on the statute and Raines is misplaced.

2001C. of Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 279 ) nor did it show that any precaution had been taken in the face of warnings of heavy rain and wind to keep water from coming in under the doors of the warehouse.

1999Johnson, 355 Md. at 448-49 , 735 A.2d 1003 ; see Moten, 339 Md. at 409 , 663 A.2d 593 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (“In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.

1999Johnson, 355 Md. at 448-49 , 735 A.2d 1003 ; see Moten, 339 Md. at 409 , 663 A.2d 593 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (“In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.

1998Id.

1997Digressing slightly, it is worthy to note that even if the discovery rule is extended to the beginning of the statute of limitations in a given action, the bill of complaint must still state with specificity those grounds upon which relief is predicated and upon which it can be afforded, Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 28 , 690 A.2d 1000 (1997); see also Md.

1997Digressing slightly, it is worthy to note that even if the discovery rule is extended to the beginning of the statute of limitations in a given action, the bill of complaint must still state with specificity those grounds upon which relief is predicated and upon which it can be afforded, Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 28 , 690 A.2d 1000 (1997); see also Md.

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1996See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, Office of Employment Security, 439 So.2d 506, 509 (La.Ct.App.1983); Johnson v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229 , 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979); Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development, 77 Cal.App.3d 345 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1978); Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 250 N.E.2d 24 (Ind.Ct.App.1969); Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Crabtree, 365 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.1963).

1981In addressing an argument based on Crunkleton and Andrews , that court said (Id. at 593-94, 284 A.2d at 456 ): These cases clearly limit themselves to holding that the power of the Commission to modify or change its orders upon application made within three (now five) years next following the last payment of com *161 pensation [under present § 40 (c)] imposed no time limitation upon the Commission’s power to order payment of medical and related expenses, in the face of the requirement of § 37(a) that such benefits be provided "* * * for such period as the nature of the injury may require * * O

1974Rule 1087 provides: “On an appeal from a final judgment, every interlocutory order which has previously been entered in the action shall be open to review by this Court unless an appeal has theretofore been taken from such interlocutory order and been decided on the merits by this Court.” 6 In the face of the rule that there can be no appeal except from a final judgment, the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Special Appeals following its lead, have entertained an immediate appeal from the refusal of the trial court prior to trial to dismiss an indictment because of the lack of a speedy trial.

1974Rule 1087 provides: “On an appeal from a final judgment, every interlocutory order which has previously been entered in the action shall be open to review by this Court unless an appeal has theretofore been taken from such interlocutory order and been decided on the merits by this Court.” 6 In the face of the rule that there can be no appeal except from a final judgment, the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Special Appeals following its lead, have entertained an immediate appeal from the refusal of the trial court prior to trial to dismiss an indictment because of the lack of a speedy trial.

1974Rule 1087 provides: “On an appeal from a final judgment, every interlocutory order which has previously been entered in the action shall be open to review by this Court unless an appeal has theretofore been taken from such interlocutory order and been decided on the merits by this Court.” 6 In the face of the rule that there can be no appeal except from a final judgment, the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Special Appeals following its lead, have entertained an immediate appeal from the refusal of the trial court prior to trial to dismiss an indictment because of the lack of a speedy trial.

1973Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.” In Powell v. State, 16 Md.

1972Within this framework, to argue, as the appellants do, that petitions intended to take a bill to referendum cannot be circulated until a “bill” has become an “Act,” by virtue of the Governor’s signature is simply unrealistic, and flies in the face of the doctrine that effect will be given, wherever possible, to every part of a constitution or statute, Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357 , 127 A. 2d 625 (1956).

1972Within this framework, to argue, as the appellants do, that petitions intended to take a bill to referendum cannot be circulated until a “bill” has become an “Act,” by virtue of the Governor’s signature is simply unrealistic, and flies in the face of the doctrine that effect will be given, wherever possible, to every part of a constitution or statute, Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357 , 127 A. 2d 625 (1956).

1971We said in Subsequent Injury Fund v. Chapman, 11 Md.

1969In the face of a claim that Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 did not present a choice between prospective and retroactive application of new constitutional doctrine because the Court in that decision did not depart from any existing interpretations of the Constitution, but merely confirmed the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between “trespassory” searches and those in which there was no physical penetration of the protected premises, the Court said Katz recognized that the holdings in Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 and Olmstead v. United States, 2

1969In the face of a claim that Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 did not present a choice between prospective and retroactive application of new constitutional doctrine because the Court in that decision did not depart from any existing interpretations of the Constitution, but merely confirmed the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between “trespassory” searches and those in which there was no physical penetration of the protected premises, the Court said Katz recognized that the holdings in Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 and Olmstead v. United States, 2

1969In the face of a claim that Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 did not present a choice between prospective and retroactive application of new constitutional doctrine because the Court in that decision did not depart from any existing interpretations of the Constitution, but merely confirmed the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between “trespassory” searches and those in which there was no physical penetration of the protected premises, the Court said Katz recognized that the holdings in Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 and Olmstead v. United States, 2