face error in Iowa

2025In re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464 , 470 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up); see also DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]t is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” (cleaned up)).

2025See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]t is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” (citation omitted)).

2026Our error- preservation rules do not permit “a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, take a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 , 199 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015)).

2025As our supreme court has explained: Error preservation is important for several reasons: (1) it affords the district court an opportunity to avoid or correct error that may affect the future course of the trial; (2) it provides the appellate court with an adequate record for review; and (3) it disallows sandbagging— that is, it does not “allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, tak[e] a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 , 199 (Iowa 2

2022Error preservation is important for several reasons: (1) it affords the district court an opportunity to avoid or correct error that may affect the future course of the trial; (2) it provides the appellate court with an adequate record for review; and (3) it disallows sandbagging—that is, it does not “allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, tak[e] a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Pickett, 671 N.W

2020The preservation rules also prevent a party from “remain[ing] silent . . . in the face of error . . . and subsequently assert[ing] error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” Id. (citation omitted).

2022Drilling a bit deeper on the question of error preservation, we recognize that “it is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” Bill Grunder’s Sons Const., Inc. v. Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted); see also Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut.

2018Bill Grunder’s Sons Constr., Inc. v. Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 2004) (cleaned up).3 Ames 2304 claims it preserved error because its general argument—that the Board incorrectly interpreted the provisions of paragraph (i) as applying to the remodel because it increased the intensity of the nonconforming use—was raised and decided below and is being reasserted on appeal.

2017See 377 N.W.2d at 241 .

2017See 377 N.W.2d at 241 .

2025Confirmed as a “correct statement of law,” Crawford repeated “that ‘[t]he grounds of a motion for new trial must stand or fall on exceptions taken at trial and a party cannot in a post verdict motion amplify or add new grounds as a basis for relief.’” 972 N.W.2d at 197 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 1975)).

2023But even in the face of error, a jury admonition may suffice to “deal with the problem.” State v. Hamilton, 335 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Iowa 1983).

2022See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 2008).

2022See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 2008).

2020The motion also failed to specify which elements of the charge Cooks was challenging, which cannot preserve error.1 See State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2019).

2016But the “insurer has no duty to defend ‘if after construing both the policy in question, the pleadings of the 8 injured party and any other admissible and relevant facts in the record, it appears the claim made is not covered by the indemnity insurance contract.’” Id. at 406 (citation omitted); see also Turner § 2:1 (noting “breach of contract claim against the insured triggers the insurer’s duty to defend unless both the face of the claim or complaint and a thorough investigation of the facts reveal that the claim cannot possibly include a claim for any item of covered damages”).

2014Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Iowa 1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2004CL, 671 N.W.2d 482, 489 (Iowa 2003) (quoting DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002)); accord .

2001See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 , 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 801-02 (1968) (consent not voluntary when official claims he possesses a search warrant); State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983) (mere acquiescence to a search in the face of a claim of authority does not establish voluntary consent).

2001See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 , 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 801-02 (1968) (consent not voluntary when official claims he possesses a search warrant); State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983) (mere acquiescence to a search in the face of a claim of authority does not establish voluntary consent).

2001See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 , 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 801-02 (1968) (consent not voluntary when official claims he possesses a search warrant); State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983) (mere acquiescence to a search in the face of a claim of authority does not establish voluntary consent).

2001See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 , 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 801-02 (1968) (consent not voluntary when official claims he possesses a search warrant); State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983) (mere acquiescence to a search in the face of a claim of authority does not establish voluntary consent).

1999See Heartland, 503 N.W.2d at 588-89 .

1989Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215-16 (1981).

1989Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215-16 (1981).

1987See Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 187 .

1987See Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 187 .

1976In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795 , 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972), the Court said, “The heart of the *556 holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.

1976In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795 , 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972), the Court said, “The heart of the *556 holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.