face principle in Washington

2001Ed. 2d 426 , 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a trial court’s failure, in the face of defense counsel’s warning that he had a possible conflict of interest, to either ascertain that the risk of conflict was remote or appoint different counsel per se deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.

2001In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a trial court's failure, in the face of defense counsel's warning that he had a possible conflict of interest, to either ascertain that the risk of conflict was remote or appoint different counsel per se deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶ 44 Second, and determinatively, "`[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.'" In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wash.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶44 Second, and determinatively, “ ‘[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.’ ” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wn.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶ 44 Second, and determinatively, "`[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.'" In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wash.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶44 Second, and determinatively, “ ‘[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.’ ” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wn.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶ 44 Second, and determinatively, "`[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.'" In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wash.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶44 Second, and determinatively, “ ‘[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.’ ” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wn.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶ 44 Second, and determinatively, "`[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.'" In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wash.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2010Shepard here engaged in a pattern of neglect, but that pattern, by itself, does not make the injury serious. ¶44 Second, and determinatively, “ ‘[u]nchallenged findings of fact made by the hearing officer and unchanged by the Board are viewed as verities on appeal.’ ” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wn.2d 774, 781 , 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 829 , 168 P.3d 408 (2007)).

2009State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶11 Both state and federal courts have declined to address search and seizure issues first raised on appeal in the face of a waiver in the trial court.

2009State v. Womac, 160 Wash.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶ 11 Both state and federal courts have declined to address search and seizure issues first raised on appeal in the face of a waiver in the trial court.

2009State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶11 Both state and federal courts have declined to address search and seizure issues first raised on appeal in the face of a waiver in the trial court.

2009State v. Womac, 160 Wash.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶ 11 Both state and federal courts have declined to address search and seizure issues first raised on appeal in the face of a waiver in the trial court.

1999In doing so they fly in the face of the principle that “if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary.” State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 617 P.2d 993 (1980), superseded by statute rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Barr, 99 Wn.2d 75 , 658 P.2d 1247 (1983); see also State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 237 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (“When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, this court must apply the statute as written.”).

1999In doing so they fly in the face of the principle that “if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary.” State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 617 P.2d 993 (1980), superseded by statute rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Barr, 99 Wn.2d 75 , 658 P.2d 1247 (1983); see also State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 237 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (“When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, this court must apply the statute as written.”).

1999In doing so they fly in the face of the principle that “if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary.” State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 617 P.2d 993 (1980), superseded by statute rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Barr, 99 Wn.2d 75 , 658 P.2d 1247 (1983); see also State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 237 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (“When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, this court must apply the statute as written.”).

1999In doing so they fly in the face of the principle that “if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary.” State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 617 P.2d 993 (1980), superseded by statute rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Barr, 99 Wn.2d 75 , 658 P.2d 1247 (1983); see also State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 237 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (“When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, this court must apply the statute as written.”).

1999Our conclusion that foreseeability is not required is buttressed by the fact that the "authority to impose restitution is not an inherent power of the court, but is derived from statutes." Davison, 116 Wash.2d at 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 ; see State v. Moen, 129 Wash.2d 535, 543 , 919 P.2d 69 (1996).

1999Our conclusion that foreseeability is not required is buttressed by the fact that the “authority to impose restitution is not an inherent power of the court, but is derived from statutes.” Davison, 116 Wn.2d at 919 ; see State v. Moen, 129 Wn.2d 535, 543 , 919 P.2d 69 (1996).

2019In that federal circuit, the court would not reverse unless the mistake rose to “plain error.” 3 F.3d at 528 .

1996In Commonwealth v. Willis, *459 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986) the court upheld the validity of Kentucky’s statute in the face of a challenge under the state constitution.

1978In this regard, the Bar Association refers this court to In re Krogh, 85 Wn.2d 462 , 536 P.2d 578 (1975), where the disciplinary board recommended disbarment in contravention of the hearing panel's recommendation of a 9-month suspension.

1978In this regard, the Bar Association refers this court to In re Krogh, 85 Wn.2d 462 , 536 P.2d 578 (1975), where the disciplinary board recommended disbarment in contravention of the hearing panel's recommendation of a 9-month suspension.

1972We cannot agree with this contention in the face of the presumption against intestacy, Erickson v. Reinbold, 6 Wn.

1972App. 407 , 493 P.2d 794 (1972), and the presumption that a testator intends to dispose of his entire estate rather than die intestate as to any portion.

1913In County of Alameda v. Evers, 136 Cal. 132 , 68 Pac. 475 , the claim of the coroner for services, which upon the face of the claim was a legal charge against the county, was allowed by the board of supervisors, and a warrant drawn upon its order was paid.

1913In County of Alameda v. Evers, 136 Cal. 132 , 68 Pac. 475 , the claim of the coroner for services, which upon the face of the claim was a legal charge against the county, was allowed by the board of supervisors, and a warrant drawn upon its order was paid.