face hearing in North Carolina

1954S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 . ‘To make the statements of others evidence against one on the ground of his implied admission of their truth by silent acquiescence, they must be made on an occasion when a reply from him might be properly expected.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1954S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 . ‘To make the statements of others evidence against one on the ground of his implied admission of their truth by silent acquiescence, they must be made on an occasion when a reply from him might be properly expected.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1934We find that it is said in Bank v. Flippen, supra, pp. 335-6: “When such dividends, added to any sums collected by the creditor from collateral, shall have paid the debt in full, then dividends of course must cease, and the uncollected collateral delivered to the receiver. . . . *643 In Merrill v. Bank, 173 U. S., 131 , tbe Supreme Court of the United States holds that ‘A secured creditor of an insolvent bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his col-laterals or collections made therefro

1912In Merrill v. Bank, 173 U. S., 131 , the Supreme Court of the United States holds that “A secured creditor of an insolvent *336 bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his collaterals or collections made therefrom, after such' declaration, subject always to the proviso that dividends must cease when, from them and from collaterals realized, the claim has been paid in full.” The above, we think, is a succinct and correct synopsis of the great weight of authority.

2019In United States v. Sanford , the Court confirmed that "[t]he Government's right to retry the defendant, after a mistrial, in the face of his claim of double jeopardy is generally governed by the test laid down in Perez .... " 429 U.S. 14 , 16, 97 S. Ct. 20 , 21, 50 L.

2019In United States v. Sanford , the Court confirmed that "[t]he Government's right to retry the defendant, after a mistrial, in the face of his claim of double jeopardy is generally governed by the test laid down in Perez .... " 429 U.S. 14 , 16, 97 S. Ct. 20 , 21, 50 L.

2010In sum, voluntary payment of medical expenses, standing alone, "cannot in any sense be deemed an admission of liability." Knight v. Cannon Mills Co. , 82 N.C.

1990Id.

1989Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. 255, 265 , 302 S.E.2d 204, 210 .

1989Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. 255, 265 , 302 S.E.2d 204, 210 .

1983He relies on the discussion of good cause in Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373 , 289 S.E. 2d 357 (1982) wherein the following appears: “[I]t is generally recognized that chronic or persistent absenteeism, in the face of warnings, and without good cause may constitute wilful misconduct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 375 , 289 S.E. 2d at 359 .

1983He relies on the discussion of good cause in Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373 , 289 S.E. 2d 357 (1982) wherein the following appears: “[I]t is generally recognized that chronic or persistent absenteeism, in the face of warnings, and without good cause may constitute wilful misconduct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 375 , 289 S.E. 2d at 359 .

1981White v. White, 296 N.C. at 672 , 252 S.E.2d at 704 .

1981White v. White, 296 N.C. at 672 , 252 S.E.2d at 704 .

1950State v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 ." [ 205 N.C. 376 , 171 S.E. 338, 339 .] "The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting in inference of the truth of such statements." State v. Hawkins, supra, [ 214 N.C. 326 , 199 S.E. 284, 287 ].

1950State v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 ." [ 205 N.C. 376 , 171 S.E. 338, 339 .] "The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting in inference of the truth of such statements." State v. Hawkins, supra, [ 214 N.C. 326 , 199 S.E. 284, 287 ].

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1950S. v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; S. v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 .” “The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting an inference of the truth of such statements.” S. v. Hawkins, supra. The cases of S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709 , 97 S.E. 155 ; S. v. Walton, 172 N.C. 931 , 90 S.E. 518 , and Reid v. Barnhart, 54 N.C. 142 , cited and relied upon by the Attorney-General, are not in conflict with the above.

1950State v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 ." [ 205 N.C. 376 , 171 S.E. 338, 339 .] "The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting in inference of the truth of such statements." State v. Hawkins, supra, [ 214 N.C. 326 , 199 S.E. 284, 287 ].

1950State v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 ; State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 ." [ 205 N.C. 376 , 171 S.E. 338, 339 .] "The general rule is that statements made to or in the presence and hearing of a person, accusing him of the commission of or complicity in a crime, are, when not denied, admissible in evidence against him as warranting in inference of the truth of such statements." State v. Hawkins, supra, [ 214 N.C. 326 , 199 S.E. 284, 287 ].

1934We find that it is said in Bank v. Flippen, supra, pp. 335-6: “When such dividends, added to any sums collected by the creditor from collateral, shall have paid the debt in full, then dividends of course must cease, and the uncollected collateral delivered to the receiver. . . . *643 In Merrill v. Bank, 173 U. S., 131 , tbe Supreme Court of the United States holds that ‘A secured creditor of an insolvent bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his col-laterals or collections made therefro

1934We find that it is said in Bank v. Flippen, supra, pp. 335-6: “When such dividends, added to any sums collected by the creditor from collateral, shall have paid the debt in full, then dividends of course must cease, and the uncollected collateral delivered to the receiver. . . . *643 In Merrill v. Bank, 173 U. S., 131 , tbe Supreme Court of the United States holds that ‘A secured creditor of an insolvent bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his col-laterals or collections made therefro