98 California opinions name it 3 courts 1871–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurancegreen2 sentences2025(See Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1081 [“[T]he contract of insurance is unique in that the purchaser seeks not commercial advantage, but rather peace of mind and security in the event of unforeseen calamity.”].) The cases that Chicago Title relies on to defeat Bartel’s claim of bad faith are distinguishable. 2025(See Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1081 [“[T]he contract of insurance is unique in that the purchaser seeks not commercial advantage, but rather peace of mind and security in the event of unforeseen calamity.”].) The cases that Chicago Title relies on to defeat Bartel’s claim of bad faith are distinguishable. | 2 | 2 |
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Companygreen2 sentences2025(See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 [appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, reweigh the evidence, or assess the credibility of witnesses, rather it interprets evidence in the light most favorable to the order].) Ultimately, this court finds no error in the trial court’s consideration of evidence related to the relative balance of harms or in its ultimate determination that those harms weighed in favor of some form of injunctive relief. 2025(See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 [appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, reweigh the evidence, or assess the credibility of witnesses, rather it interprets evidence in the light most favorable to the order].) Ultimately, this court finds no error in the trial court’s consideration of evidence related to the relative balance of harms or in its ultimate determination that those harms weighed in favor of some form of injunctive relief. | 2 | 2 |
Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2010The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ].) Under controlling case law, however, Burns’s counsel was entitled to rely on his adversary’s actual and undisputed agreement; such reliance was not inexcusable neglect, even in the face of a rule r 2010The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ].) Under controlling case law, however, Burns’s counsel was entitled to rely on his adversary’s actual and undisputed agreement; such reliance was not inexcusable neglect, even in the face of a rule r | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Browngreen2 sentences1987Such a result flies in the face of the rule that “the community owns all pension rights attributable to employment during the marriage.” (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 838, 844 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 544 P.2d 561 , 94 A.L.R.3d 164 ], italics added.) Unlike a vesting period during which no benefits are acquired, but which is a prerequisite to receiving later-acquired benefits, Robert’s service during the last two years of marriage was not necessary to earn any benefits nor did it earn any additional benefits. 1987Such a result flies in the face of the rule that “the community owns all pension rights attributable to employment during the marriage.” (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 838, 844 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 544 P.2d 561 , 94 A.L.R.3d 164 ], italics added.) Unlike a vesting period during which no benefits are acquired, but which is a prerequisite to receiving later-acquired benefits, Robert’s service during the last two years of marriage was not necessary to earn any benefits nor did it earn any additional benefits. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Andersongreen2 sentences1987His situation is also distinguishable from that in which courts have held “the first few years of service (during the marriage) must be given just as much weight in computing total service as the last few years (after separation).” (In re Marriage of Anderson (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 36, 39 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 252 ].) In those cases the pension’s postseparation increase in value by reason of continued employment is not entirely separate property “because the amount of the pension is dependent upon the total number of years of service.” (Ibid.) By contrast, the last two years of Robert’s military servi 1987His situation is also distinguishable from that in which courts have held “the first few years of service (during the marriage) must be given just as much weight in computing total service as the last few years (after separation).” (In re Marriage of Anderson (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 36, 39 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 252 ].) In those cases the pension’s postseparation increase in value by reason of continued employment is not entirely separate property “because the amount of the pension is dependent upon the total number of years of service.” (Ibid.) By contrast, the last two years of Robert’s military servi | 2 | 2 |
Barnes v. Blue Haven Poolsgreen2 sentences1983(Ibid.) “The ruling in Rath is consistent with the holding of Barnes v. Bluehaven Pools (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 123, 127 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 444 ], which states: ‘There is nothing in the statute which lessens the burden of the moving party simply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the issue on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. 1983(Ibid.) “The ruling in Rath is consistent with the holding of Barnes v. Bluehaven Pools (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 123, 127 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 444 ], which states: ‘There is nothing in the statute which lessens the burden of the moving party simply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the issue on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. | 2 | 2 |
Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co.green2 sentences1983(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ]; Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 816 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 640 P.2d 764 ].) The existence and terms of an implied contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties. 1983(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ]; Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 816 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 640 P.2d 764 ].) The existence and terms of an implied contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Byrdgreen2 sentences1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei 1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei | 2 | 2 |
People v. McFarlandgreen2 sentences1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei 1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bugggreen2 sentences1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei 1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei | 2 | 2 |
People v. Barnesgreen2 sentences1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei 1967(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Barnes, 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 793 ]; People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 816-817 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 896 ] ; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 650 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 644 ].) The cause was submitted to the trial judge on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and while the stipulation submitting the case recited that all exhibits entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing were deemed entered at the trial subject to objections, it appears that through inadvertence nei | 2 | 2 |
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.green2 sentences2021Courts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in such contracts to create a binding contract in the face of a claim that the contract is illusory. [Citation.] However, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing is imposed where the contract is adequately supported by adequate consideration regardless of the discretionary power.” (Avidity, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 .) Nor does this implied covenant provide a basis for imposing substantive terms and conditions on a contracting party beyond those actually agreed upon: “The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law i 2014(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 20 .) 9 presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. [Citations.] “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. [Citation.] The plaintiff must then have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-356, fn. omitted. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015“The admission into evidence of photographs lies within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 852 .) A trial court has broad discretion to admit photographs “in the face of a claim that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938 .) “ ‘[M]urder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical evidence in such a case are always unpleasant . . . .’ ” (People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 211 , quoting People v. Long (1974) 38 1995(P eople v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ].) As we have explained, “a trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of murder victim photographs in the face of a claim . . . they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory.” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 , 838 P.2d 1212 ].) We see no abuse of discretion here. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Trimblegreen2 sentences1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi 1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Whalengreen2 sentences1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi 1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Birchgreen2 sentences1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi 1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Salasgreen2 sentences1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi 1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi | 1 | 2 |
| Forrest v. Department of Corporationsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Medinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seligsohn v. Daygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Karisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stitelygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Crewgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cvrcek v. State Personnel Bd.green | 1 | 1 |
| St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Claremont University Center & Graduate Schoolgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2015(Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1029-1030.) Again quoting its strong policy statement in Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1156 , the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claims, stating: "In [ Williams, supra,] 44 Cal.3d 1127 , we affirmed the judgment in the face of a claim that disruptive courtroom conduct had prejudiced the jury. [Citation.] 'As a matter of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct.' (Id. at p. 1156.) We adhere to that commonsense view here. 2015(Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1029-1030.) Again quoting its strong policy statement in Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1156 , the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claims, stating: "In [ Williams, supra,] 44 Cal.3d 1127 , we affirmed the judgment in the face of a claim that disruptive courtroom conduct had prejudiced the jury. [Citation.] 'As a matter of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct.' (Id. at p. 1156.) We adhere to that commonsense view here. | 3 | 2006–2015 |
Curtis O. Griess & Sons, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Insurance
green
2 sentences2024Insurers cannot take in premium for a coverage grant that names a specifically covered risk—here virus contamination—and then justify denying coverage for it under all circumstances because some other risk may be covered under the same coverage grant.” Next, Sentinel asserts that the Policy is not illusory because, as set forth in Curtis O., supra, 528 N.W.2d 329 , a virus can result from a windstorm, which is a specified cause of loss. 2024Insurers cannot take in premium for a coverage grant that names a specifically covered risk—here virus contamination—and then justify denying coverage for it under all circumstances because some other risk may be covered under the same coverage grant.” Next, Sentinel asserts that the Policy is not illusory because, as set forth in Curtis O., supra, 528 N.W.2d 329 , a virus can result from a windstorm, which is a specified cause of loss. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2015(Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1029-1030.) Again quoting its strong policy statement in Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1156 , the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claims, stating: "In [ Williams, supra,] 44 Cal.3d 1127 , we affirmed the judgment in the face of a claim that disruptive courtroom conduct had prejudiced the jury. [Citation.] 'As a matter of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct.' (Id. at p. 1156.) We adhere to that commonsense view here. 2015(Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1029-1030.) Again quoting its strong policy statement in Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1156 , the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claims, stating: "In [ Williams, supra,] 44 Cal.3d 1127 , we affirmed the judgment in the face of a claim that disruptive courtroom conduct had prejudiced the jury. [Citation.] 'As a matter of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct.' (Id. at p. 1156.) We adhere to that commonsense view here. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi 1998The court was therefore under no duty to instruct on grand theft." Other decisions uphold convictions in the face of a claim that lesser offense instructions should been given when the accused denied any participation in the charged offense. ( People v. Tumble (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 ; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103,118-119 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 472 ; People v. Solas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 607-608 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; People v. Whalen (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 282 ; People v. Birch (1969) 3 Cal. App.3d 167, 176 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 98 .) Thi | 2 | 1998–1998 |
In Re Robert S.
green
2 sentences1990It does not follow, however, that such violation is jurisdictional. " ( Averill v. Lincoln, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 764 , italics added.) Aside from use of the word "shall," there is nothing on the face of rule 244 to guide us in determining its effect. (4) Nonetheless we note, as did the court in In re Robert S., supra, 197 Cal. App.3d at page 1265 , that until 1966 the constitutional provision which permitted referees to act as temporary judges also provided that they " shall also be subject to such regulations and orders as may be prescribed by the Judicial Council. " (Former art. 1990Nonetheless we note, as did the court in In re Robert S., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at page 1265 , that until 1966 the constitutional provision which permitted referees to act as temporary judges also provided that they “shall also be subject to such regulations and orders as may be prescribed by the Judicial Council. ” (Former art. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Averill v. Lincoln
green
2 sentences1990It does not follow, however, that such violation is jurisdictional. " ( Averill v. Lincoln, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 764 , italics added.) Aside from use of the word "shall," there is nothing on the face of rule 244 to guide us in determining its effect. (4) Nonetheless we note, as did the court in In re Robert S., supra, 197 Cal. App.3d at page 1265 , that until 1966 the constitutional provision which permitted referees to act as temporary judges also provided that they " shall also be subject to such regulations and orders as may be prescribed by the Judicial Council. " (Former art. 1990It does not follow, however, that such violation is jurisdictional. ” (Averill v. Lincoln, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 764 , italics added.) Aside from use of the word “shall,” there is nothing on the face of rule 244 to guide us in determining its effect. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Brown v. Brown
green
2 sentences1987Such a result flies in the face of the rule that "the community owns all pension rights attributable to employment during the marriage. " ( In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 844 [ 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 , 544 P.2d 561 , 94 A.L.R.3d 164 ], italics added.) Unlike a vesting period during which no benefits are acquired, but which is a prerequisite to receiving later-acquired benefits, Robert's service during the last two years of marriage was not necessary to earn any benefits nor did it earn any additional benefits. 1987Such a result flies in the face of the rule that “the community owns all pension rights attributable to employment during the marriage.” (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 838, 844 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 544 P.2d 561 , 94 A.L.R.3d 164 ], italics added.) Unlike a vesting period during which no benefits are acquired, but which is a prerequisite to receiving later-acquired benefits, Robert’s service during the last two years of marriage was not necessary to earn any benefits nor did it earn any additional benefits. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Rath Packing Co.
green
2 sentences1983Code, § 660), and concluded that it did not relieve the moving party ... of the necessity to ‘demonstrate that there is no possible way in which [the opposing party] can claim error in the weighing procedures used . . . .’ (People v. Rath Packing Company, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 65 .) Consequently, the court concluded that in the face of such a presumption, ‘the resisting party need only demonstrate a “possibility” of being able to rebut the presumed . . .’ fact. 1980Code, § 660), and concluded that it did not relieve the moving party (the People) of the necessity to “demonstrate that there is no possible way in which Rath can claim error in the weighing procedures used....” (People v. Rath Packing Co., supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 65 .) Consequently, the court concluded that in the face of such a presumption, “the resisting party need only demonstrate a ‘possibility’ of being able to rebut the presumed...” fact. | 2 | 1980–1983 |
Carroll v. Siebenthaler
neutral
2 sentences1914(Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193 ; Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151 , [ 38 Pac. 682 ]; Ventura Co. v. Clay, 114 Cal. 242 , [ 46 Pac. 9 ]; Power v. May, 114 Cal. 207 , [ 46 Pac. 6 ].) Section 4041 of the Political Code declares that “boards of supervisors shall have jurisdiction and power, under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law, to examine, settle and allow accounts legally chargeable against the county.” Section 4075 of the same code provides that the board “must not hear or consider any claim ... in favor of any person . . . nor allow any claim or bill agains 1896This doctrine is subject to the exception that, if it appears on the face of the claim that it is one over wdiich the board of supervisors had no jurisdiction, or that they acted in excess of their jurisdiction, the auditor may refuse to draw his warrant in pay ment of the claim, or, having done so, the treasurer may refuse payment: Linden v. Case, 46 Cal. 171 ; Merriam v. Board, 72 Cal. 518 , 14 Pac. 137 ; Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193 ; McFarland v. McCowen, supra. There is no brief on file on behalf of defendant, and, if the contract set out in the answer is ultra vires the powers of | 2 | 1896–1914 |
Oldham v. Kizer
green
1 sentence2025Since the trial court found Madec credible, we must accept his testimony unless it was “inherently improbable or incredible.” (Oldham, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065 .) Madec testified he provided food to team members because there were food insecurities on campus, he was doing what he “felt was the right thing to do is feed people when they’re hungry, especially when they’re in such need,” and he offered food to athletes who were not basketball team members because he was concerned about food insecurity. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Veale
green
1 sentence2025To succeed in the face of this standard, a “defendant bears an enormous burden.” (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46 .) 1. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Ayers
green
1 sentence2024We reject Jones’s position, which flies in the face of the principle that “[j]urors are presumed to be intelligent people, capable of understanding and correlating all instructions.” (People v. Ayers (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 988, 997 ; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 .) Jones also argues that the two juror declarations submitted with his motion for a new trial “definitely prove[]” that some jurors did not actually understand that a true finding on the burglary circumstance at issue required them to conclude he had the intent to commit a sexual offense when he entered the apartment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2024We reject Jones’s position, which flies in the face of the principle that “[j]urors are presumed to be intelligent people, capable of understanding and correlating all instructions.” (People v. Ayers (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 988, 997 ; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 .) Jones also argues that the two juror declarations submitted with his motion for a new trial “definitely prove[]” that some jurors did not actually understand that a true finding on the burglary circumstance at issue required them to conclude he had the intent to commit a sexual offense when he entered the apartment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Avidity Partners v. State of California green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Stover v. Bruntz green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Reyes green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Mendoza red | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Blacksher green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Moon green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Rountree green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Pierce green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Long green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Ramirez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Coleman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| The People v. Weber green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Dickey green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mesler v. Bragg Management Company green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Shalant v. Girardi green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Tully green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Shazier green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Avila green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Young green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.