face challenge in Texas

2016Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2015In the face of this presumption, a criminal defendant has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney failed to provide reasonably effective assistance. *268 Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 883 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

1998See Borden, 888 S.W.2d at 618-20 . 9 .

1998Borden, 888 S.W.2d at 618-20 ; see also Overhead Door, 970 5.W.2d at 78 n. 8.

2021Similarly, with respect to the plurality’s disregard of EMT Black’s testimony, Justice Christopher noted that such reasoning “flies in the face of our standard of review, which provides that when there is a conflict in the evidence, we must presume that the jury resolved the conflict in favor of the verdict.” Id. (citing Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2014Sheriff’s Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. 2008); see Tex. Const. art.

2014Sheriff's Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex.2008); see Tex. Const, art.

2000Davis v. City of Lubbock, supra, 326 S.W.2d at 704; Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, supra, 143 S.W.2d at 84; West v. Whitehead, supra. Such declaration is binding on the court unless it is manifestly wrong or unreasonable, or the purpose for which the declaration is enacted is “clearly and probably private.” West v. Whitehead, supra, at 978; See also Davis v. City of Lubbock, supra.; Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, supra; Comment, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 Tex. L.Rev. 1499, 1502-03 (1966).

2000Davis v. City of Lubbock, supra, 326 S.W.2d at 704; Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, supra, 143 S.W.2d at 84; West v. Whitehead, supra. Such declaration is binding on the court unless it is manifestly wrong or unreasonable, or the purpose for which the declaration is enacted is “clearly and probably private.” West v. Whitehead, supra, at 978; See also Davis v. City of Lubbock, supra.; Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, supra; Comment, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 Tex. L.Rev. 1499, 1502-03 (1966).

2025See Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 682 (“[A] statute will not be given extraterritorial effect by implication but only when such intent is clear.”).

2017Cf. Zwick v. Lodewijk Corp., 847 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (presenting common scenario in which lessor argues that lease’s nonwaiver provision prohibits waiver through repeated acceptance of late rent from lessee who was contractually required to promptly pay rent without demand).

2016And nothing on the face of rule 26 “compels the conclusion that only meritorious or potentially meritorious motions for new trial trigger the extension of the appeal deadline.” Popcap Games, Inc. v. Mumbojumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 717 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

2016De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim.

2015This is readily apparent from the face of the requirement, found in subsection (b) of section 2001.029—“A state agency shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule if a public hearing is requested . . . .”33 Similarly, the broader public-participation requirement that appears in subsection (a) of section 2001.029—“a state agency shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing”—is preceded by the qualifying clause, “Before adopting a rule, . . . .”34 Both requirements are phrased as 31 Se

2015This is readily apparent from the face of the requirement, found in subsection (b) of section 2001.029—“A state agency shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule if a public hearing is requested . . . .”33 Similarly, the broader public-participation requirement that appears in subsection (a) of section 2001.029—“a state agency shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing”—is preceded by the qualifying clause, “Before adopting a rule, . . . .”34 Both requirements are phrased as 31 Se

2015This is readily apparent from the face of the requirement, found in subsection (b) of section 2001.029—“A state agency shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule if a public hearing is requested . . . .”33 Similarly, the broader public-participation requirement that appears in subsection (a) of section 2001.029—“a state agency shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing”—is preceded by the qualifying clause, “Before adopting a rule, . . . .”34 Both requirements are phrased as 31 Se

2015App. 2013). 165 Lopez, 343 S.W.3d 143 ; Hernandez v. State, 01-12-01080-CR, 2014 WL 1101587 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2014, no pet.). 166 Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Bailey, 01-12-00200-CR, 2015 WL 4497773, at *8-9 . 167 Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2015This is readily apparent from the face of the requirement, found in subsection (b) of section 2001.029—“A state agency shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule if a public hearing is requested . . . .”33 Similarly, the broader public-participation requirement that appears in subsection (a) of section 2001.029—“a state agency shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing”—is preceded by the qualifying clause, “Before adopting a rule, . . . .”34 Both requirements are phrased as 31 Se

2014But so long as the defendant has raised a knowing-use claim at his first opportunity and with reasonable promptness, the State’s finality interest in the conviction in the face of such a claim 14 See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 287-88 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Curtis, 511 S.W.2d at 267 .