face requirement in Georgia

17 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Moore v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1972 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1975–1977 2 sentences 1977The United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or punishment.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 794 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706). 1975In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 794 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706) (1972) it was said: "The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.” The requested statement was furnished appellant’s counsel at the time of his request.	3	3
Winfrey v. the Stategreen gactapp · 2017 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018On appeal, the Court of Appeals first considered its own jurisdiction to decide the case, and correctly concluded in the face of a challenge from the State that a direct appeal "is a prescribed way to challenge the guilty plea." Winfrey v. State , 340 Ga. App. 344 , 345, 795 S.E.2d 752 (2017) (internal citation and punctuation omitted). 2018On appeal, the Court of Appeals first considered its own jurisdiction to decide the case, and correctly concluded in the face of a challenge from the State that a direct appeal "is a prescribed way to challenge the guilty plea." Winfrey v. State , 340 Ga. App. 344 , 345, 795 S.E.2d 752 (2017) (internal citation and punctuation omitted).	1	2
Desai v. Silver Dollar City, Inc.green gactapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017See Desai, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 165 (3). 2017See Desai, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 165 (3).	1	1
Tennille v. Stategreen ga · 2005 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989). 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).	1	1
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commissiongreen scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w 2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w	1	1
Agan v. Stategreen ga · 2000 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989). 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).	1	1
Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'ngreen ga · 1983 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w 2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w	1	1
Parson v. Stategreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 1 sentence 1998See Parson, 229 Ga. App. at 118 .	1	1
McMurray v. Batemangreen ga · 1965 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 2 sentences 1996Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 210 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1) ( 437 SE2d 619 ); see also McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240 (3) ( 144 SE2d 345 ). 1996Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 210 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1) ( 437 SE2d 619 ); see also McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240 (3) ( 144 SE2d 345 ).	1	1
Strickland v. Washingtongreen scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996“In order to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), appellant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.	1	1
Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Ass'ngreen gactapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 2 sentences 1996Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 210 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1) ( 437 SE2d 619 ); see also McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240 (3) ( 144 SE2d 345 ). 1996Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 210 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1) ( 437 SE2d 619 ); see also McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240 (3) ( 144 SE2d 345 ).	1	1
Acker v. Jenkinsgreen gactapp · 1986 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987In the face of the presumption of regularity in the proceedings below (Acker v. Jenkins, 178 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 343 SE2d 160 )), such an “appeal” is patently without merit. 1987In the face of the presumption of regularity in the proceedings below (Acker v. Jenkins, 178 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 343 SE2d 160 )), such an “appeal” is patently without merit.	1	1
Housing Authority v. Goolsbygreen gactapp · 1975 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986 2 sentences 1986Appellant’s other contention regarding the charge is equally correct, since the charge is directly contrary to this court’s pronouncement in Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Goolsby, 136 Ga. App. 156, 158 ( 220 SE2d 466 ) (1975): “The just and adequate compensation which the condemnor must pay is assessed as of the day of taking. 1986Appellant’s other contention regarding the charge is equally correct, since the charge is directly contrary to this court’s pronouncement in Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Goolsby, 136 Ga. App. 156, 158 ( 220 SE2d 466 ) (1975): “The just and adequate compensation which the condemnor must pay is assessed as of the day of taking.	1	1
Rini v. Stategreen ga · 1975 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976 2 sentences 1976Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 794 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706) (1971), quoted in Rini v. State, 235 Ga. 60, 63 ( 218 SE2d 811 ). 1976Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 794 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706) (1971), quoted in Rini v. State, 235 Ga. 60, 63 ( 218 SE2d 811 ).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Ambles v. State green ga · 1989 2 sentences 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989). 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).	1	2006–2006
State v. Jackson green ga · 1998 2 sentences 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989). 2006See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 , 622 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1), 533 S.E.2d 60 (2000); State v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 , 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1), 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).	1	2006–2006
Sosebee v. State green ga · 1987 2 sentences 1992Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298 ( 357 SE2d 562 ) (1987); see White v. Illinois, _ U. S. __ (112 SC 736, 116 LE2d 848) (1992). 1992Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298 ( 357 SE2d 562 ) (1987); see White v. Illinois, _ U. S. __ (112 SC 736, 116 LE2d 848) (1992).	1	1992–1992
Glenn v. State green ga · 1962 2 sentences 1979Code Ann. § 59-909 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1225, 1226) provides as follows: "Upon final submission of the case to the jury said alternate jurors shall not retire with the jury of 12 for deliberation and the court may discharge the alternate jurors, but if the court deems it advisable it may direct that one or more of the alternate jurors be kept in custody of the sheriff or one or more court officers separate and apart from the regular 826 jurors until the jury have agreed upon a verdict.” See Glenn v. State, 217 Ga. 553 (2) ( 123 SE2d 896 ) (1962) (construing former Code Ann. § 59-904, the predece 1979Code Ann. § 59-909 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1225, 1226) provides as follows: "Upon final submission of the case to the jury said alternate jurors shall not retire with the jury of 12 for deliberation and the court may discharge the alternate jurors, but if the court deems it advisable it may direct that one or more of the alternate jurors be kept in custody of the sheriff or one or more court officers separate and apart from the regular 826 jurors until the jury have agreed upon a verdict.” See Glenn v. State, 217 Ga. 553 (2) ( 123 SE2d 896 ) (1962) (construing former Code Ann. § 59-904, the predece	1	1979–1979
Hutcheson v. Hutcheson green ga · 1944 2 sentences 1976Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, 197 Ga. 603 ( 30 SE2d 107 ) (1944). 1976Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, 197 Ga. 603 ( 30 SE2d 107 ) (1944).	1	1976–1976
Stringer v. Stringer neutral ga · 1894 2 sentences 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry. 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry.	1	1943–1943
Pendley v. Powers green ga · 1907 2 sentences 1943While it is true that a creditor of a decedent, in an equitable proceeding involving an insolvent estate, may contest the claim of another creditor if it is barred by the statute of limitations (Pendley v. Powers, 129 Ga. 69, 71 , 58 S. E. 653 ), it is also true that, unless the bar appears on the face of the claim or the pleading setting it up, the burden of proving the bar falls on the creditor thus attacking the claim. 1943While it is true that a creditor of a decedent, in an equitable proceeding involving an insolvent estate, may contest the claim of another creditor if it is barred by the statute of limitations (Pendley v. Powers, 129 Ga. 69, 71 , 58 S. E. 653 ), it is also true that, unless the bar appears on the face of the claim or the pleading setting it up, the burden of proving the bar falls on the creditor thus attacking the claim.	1	1943–1943
Brock v. Wildey green · 1909 2 sentences 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry. 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry.	1	1943–1943
Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co. green ga · 1916 2 sentences 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry. 1943Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga. 320 (2) ( 20 S. E. 242 ); Brock v. Wildey, 132 Ga. 19 (2), 23, 24 ( 63 S. E. 794 ); Curtis v. College Park Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 601 ( 89 S. E. 680 ); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry.	1	1943–1943
Raney v. McRae green · 1854 1 sentence 1940He would have been then put upon amending,1 and could have amended.” The right to amend to meet such a defect was upheld in Raney v. McRae, 14 Ga. 589 (5) ( 60 Am.	1	1940–1940

Where else courts name it

MO 113 (1907–2025) CA 98 (1871–2025) PA 64 (1909–2024) TX 63 (1931–2025) OR 56 (1918–2025) IA 54 (1939–2026) LA 46 (1933–2023) NY 44 (1882–2017) IL 44 (1974–2024) WY 30 (1925–2026) NJ 27 (1905–2022) FL 27 (1954–2024) MI 24 (1903–2025) CT 24 (1941–2017) UT 21 (1946–2025) MT 20 (1935–2024) IN 20 (1877–2023) MD 18 (1969–2016) MA 18 (1932–2022) NC 18 (1912–2019) GA 17 (1940–2018) AL 17 (1922–2026) MS 16 (1893–2020) DC 15 (1973–2011) WA 14 (1913–2019) OK 13 (1932–2001) OH 13 (1919–2023) TN 12 (1908–2020) VT 11 (1959–2026) NM 11 (1965–2011) WI 11 (1901–2001) MN 10 (1908–2014) CO 9 (1965–2020) ID 9 (1941–2023) KY 7 (1957–2026) KS 7 (1933–2022) AZ 7 (1970–2015) AR 6 (1917–2006) NE 6 (1903–1996) RI 6 (1968–2017) HI 6 (1994–2023) WV 6 (1897–1989) ND 5 (1975–2022) VA 5 (1940–2026) ME 4 (1995–2016) DE 4 (1973–2020) SD 3 (1944–1998) AK 2 (1979–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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