face instruction in Oklahoma

2000Citing Mason v. McNeal, 187 Okla. 31 , 100 P.2d 451 (1939), the Sullivan Court stated that without "exception saved to the instruction as required by [§ 578], we are not at liberty to review the alleged error, except for fundamental errors of law." A "prejudicial misstatement of the law appearing on the face of an instruction constitutes fundamental error reviewable even in the absence of an exception taken pursuant to § 578." Sellars v. McCullough, 1989 OK 155 , 784 P.2d 1060, 1063 .

2000Citing Mason v. McNeal, 187 Okla. 31 , 100 P.2d 451 (1939), the Sullivan Court stated that without "exception saved to the instruction as required by [§ 578], we are not at liberty to review the alleged error, except for fundamental errors of law." A "prejudicial misstatement of the law appearing on the face of an instruction constitutes fundamental error reviewable even in the absence of an exception taken pursuant to § 578." Sellars v. McCullough, 1989 OK 155 , 784 P.2d 1060, 1063 .

1976Later, in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972)’, the Court declared: “The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.

1976Later, in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972)’, the Court declared: “The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.

2001Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 -96 (9th Cir.1989) [Even strict interpretation of Oregon workers' compensation statute would not bar a tort action against an employer where there was evidence that the employer exposed the employee to dangerous chemicals in the face of warnings of hazards and the hiring of temporary employees unfamiliar with the work.

1998A trial court commits fundamental, plain, or manifest error when "a substantial misstatement of a fundamental legal principle ... appears on the face of the instruction.” Wetsel v. Independent School Dist. 1-1, 670 P.2d 986, 995 , 1983 OK 85 . 11 .

1998A trial court commits fundamental, plain, or manifest error when "a substantial misstatement of a fundamental legal principle ... appears on the face of the instruction.” Wetsel v. Independent School Dist. 1-1, 670 P.2d 986, 995 , 1983 OK 85 . 11 .

1985Wiseman v. Boren, supra. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this cause of action, and its order denying the objection to jurisdiction must be reversed.

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977The English Court held in that case the uncancelled copy might be probated in the face of a presumption of revocation, since at most the presumption was a weak one and was overcome by the preservation of the duplicate copy. 3 . 307 Ky. 776 , 212 S.W.2d 299 (1948). 4 . § 82: No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 5

1977The English Court held in that case the uncancelled copy might be probated in the face of a presumption of revocation, since at most the presumption was a weak one and was overcome by the preservation of the duplicate copy. 3 . 307 Ky. 776 , 212 S.W.2d 299 (1948). 4 . § 82: No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 5

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1977Testacy is favored in the law, In Re Gilmore’s Estate, 76 Ariz. 313 , 264 P.2d 399 (1953); Policy favors testacy, In re Vermeerschs’ Estate, 109 Ariz. 125 , 506 P.2d 256 (1973); In re Barnes, 63 Cal.2d 580 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 407 P.2d 656 (1965).

1976Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence. . . . ” Although the Court went on to say: “We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. ...” (at 408 U.S. 795 , 92 S.Ct. 2568 ) In construing this doctrine, the Court in United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599 (2nd Cir. 1973), found the purpose of the Brady rule is not to provide a defendant with

1952We held in Denco Bus Co. v. Keller, 202 Okla. 263 , 212 P. 2d 469 , that “due care” was the same as “ordinary care”.

1952We held in Denco Bus Co. v. Keller, 202 Okla. 263 , 212 P. 2d 469 , that “due care” was the same as “ordinary care”.

1938Such conclusion is unavoidable in the face of the rule that the agreed statement supersedes the pleadings; and the further rule stated in McGrath v. Rorem, 123 Okla. 163 , 252 P. 418 , that “where the parties submit their controversy to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, such agreement has the effect to waive any error in the action of the court in its rulings on the pleadings.” If any error is waived, then the entire pleading is waived, .but, of course, there must be a case properly pending before the court.

1938Such conclusion is unavoidable in the face of the rule that the agreed statement supersedes the pleadings; and the further rule stated in McGrath v. Rorem, 123 Okla. 163 , 252 P. 418 , that “where the parties submit their controversy to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, such agreement has the effect to waive any error in the action of the court in its rulings on the pleadings.” If any error is waived, then the entire pleading is waived, .but, of course, there must be a case properly pending before the court.

1938Rucker v. Burke, 170 Okla. 243 , 39 P.2d 6 .

1938Rucker v. Burke, 170 Okla. 243 , 39 P.2d 6 .

1932I think this principle is well illustrated in the case of U. S. v. Carr, 132 U. S. page 644, in which Mr. Chief Justice Fuller qubtes w'ith approval from Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for the court in the case of U. S. v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281 -284: “The presumption that public officers have done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presumption ; but it does not supply proof of a substantive fact.