supremacy clause in Louisiana

1988Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 , 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375 , 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).

1988Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 , 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375 , 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).

2000The federal law supercedes the Louisiana Public Records Law by operation of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the state confidentiality procedure has been held to supercede the duty to produce of the custodian of Public Records Law in Buras v. State, 496 So.2d 517 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1986).

1999McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). [6] *284 In order for federal instrumentalities such as PCAs to be subject to state taxation, Congress must enact clear waivers of their exemptions. "[W]here there is federal immunity from taxation, Congress must express a clear, express, and affirmative desire to waive that exemption." Federal Reserve Bank of St.

1999McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). [6] *284 In order for federal instrumentalities such as PCAs to be subject to state taxation, Congress must enact clear waivers of their exemptions. "[W]here there is federal immunity from taxation, Congress must express a clear, express, and affirmative desire to waive that exemption." Federal Reserve Bank of St.

1999McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 , 33 S.Ct. 431 , 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912).

1999McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 , 33 S.Ct. 431 , 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912).

1999McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 , 33 S.Ct. 431 , 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912).

1999McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 , 33 S.Ct. 431 , 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 , 32 S.Ct. 715 , 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912).

1992Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

1992Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

1991ISSUES Defendants raise the following issues in their application: (1) Whether or not Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) violates article III and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by attempting to vest Louisiana state courts with admiralty jurisdiction. (2) Whether defendants were entitled to demand a jury trial after plaintiffs withdrew their original request for trial by jury. (3) Whether or not article 1732(6) violates constitutional provisions entitling defendants to equal protection, due process and equal access to the courts. (4) Whether or not plainti

1991ISSUES Defendants raise the following issues in their application: (1) Whether or not Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732(6) violates article III and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by attempting to vest Louisiana state courts with admiralty jurisdiction. (2) Whether defendants were entitled to demand a jury trial after plaintiffs withdrew their original request for trial by jury. (3) Whether or not article 1732(6) violates constitutional provisions entitling defendants to equal protection, due process and equal access to the courts. (4) Whether or not plainti

1991We held in Heinhuis, 558 So.2d at 1247 , that a plaintiff's cumulation of his Jones Act claim with an admiralty or general maritime claim does not open the door for his Jones Act employer to demand a jury trial.

1985The United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 , 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), held the supremacy clause of the federal constitution precluded application of state community property laws to division of military retirement benefits pursuant to a division of community property.

1985The United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 , 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), held the supremacy clause of the federal constitution precluded application of state community property laws to division of military retirement benefits pursuant to a division of community property.

1983However, the Court is aware that recently the Fourth Circuit Court in the case of Dorothy Washington v. Steven Washington [ 418 So.2d 748 , La.App.], No. 12990, decided on August 13th, 1982— the Fourth Circuit, in its infinite wisdom, if one wants to call it that, has indicated as follows: "In view of the Supremacy clause, U.S. Const. Art.

1981State family law precepts will be set aside under the supremacy clause only if Congress "has positively required by direct enactment that state law be pre-empted." Id. (emphasis added).

1981For state family law to be pre-empted, it must conflict with the "express terms" of a congressional enactment and "sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program." Id. 99 S.Ct. at 809 .

1980The Court specifically rejected the husband's constitutional argument, stating that: "... the supremacy clause of the U. S. Constitution does not prevent a state from classifying military retirement benefits as community property." 345 So.2d at 176 The Court again cited the California case of Fithian, supra, for this proposition. . . . . .

1977In Re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.3d 592 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 517 P.2d 449 (1974), certiorari denied 419 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 41 , 42 L.Ed.2d 48 .

1977In Re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.3d 592 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 517 P.2d 449 (1974), certiorari denied 419 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 41 , 42 L.Ed.2d 48 .

1977In Re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.3d 592 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 517 P.2d 449 (1974), certiorari denied 419 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 41 , 42 L.Ed.2d 48 .

1976Prior cases, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 641 , 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 , 62 S.Ct. 24 , 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), to the extent that they held state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state had a legitimate purpose in mind other than frustration of the federal law, were overruled.

1976Prior cases, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 641 , 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 , 62 S.Ct. 24 , 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), to the extent that they held state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state had a legitimate purpose in mind other than frustration of the federal law, were overruled.

1976Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The function of the court in a supremacy clause case is "to determine whether a challenged state statute `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fu

1976Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The function of the court in a supremacy clause case is "to determine whether a challenged state statute `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fu

1976Prior cases, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 641 , 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 , 62 S.Ct. 24 , 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), to the extent that they held state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state had a legitimate purpose in mind other than frustration of the federal law, were overruled.

1976Prior cases, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 641 , 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 , 62 S.Ct. 24 , 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), to the extent that they held state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state had a legitimate purpose in mind other than frustration of the federal law, were overruled.

1976Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The function of the court in a supremacy clause case is "to determine whether a challenged state statute `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fu

1976Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The function of the court in a supremacy clause case is "to determine whether a challenged state statute `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fu

1976The precise issue involved in the instant case was recently presented to and decided by the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F.Supp. 1277 (W.D.La.1975), appeal pending.

1966Opinion of the Justices of New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 106 , 151 A.2d 236 ; Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill.2d 55 , 153 N.E.2d 806 ; also by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company v. Saxon, 211 F.Supp. 576 (reversed on jurisdictional grounds).

1966Opinion of the Justices of New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 106 , 151 A.2d 236 ; Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill.2d 55 , 153 N.E.2d 806 ; also by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company v. Saxon, 211 F.Supp. 576 (reversed on jurisdictional grounds).

1966Opinion of the Justices of New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 106 , 151 A.2d 236 ; Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill.2d 55 , 153 N.E.2d 806 ; also by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company v. Saxon, 211 F.Supp. 576 (reversed on jurisdictional grounds).

1966The United States Supreme Court granted a motion to dismiss the appeal from the decision in the Illinois case, supra, in a memorandum decision which stated: "Per Curiam: The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." 359 U.S. 311 , 79 S.Ct. 876 , 3 L.Ed.2d 831 .

1966The United States Supreme Court granted a motion to dismiss the appeal from the decision in the Illinois case, supra, in a memorandum decision which stated: "Per Curiam: The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." 359 U.S. 311 , 79 S.Ct. 876 , 3 L.Ed.2d 831 .

1966The United States Supreme Court granted a motion to dismiss the appeal from the decision in the Illinois case, supra, in a memorandum decision which stated: "Per Curiam: The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." 359 U.S. 311 , 79 S.Ct. 876 , 3 L.Ed.2d 831 .

1966Opinion of the Justices of New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 106 , 151 A.2d 236 ; Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill.2d 55 , 153 N.E.2d 806 ; also by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company v. Saxon, 211 F.Supp. 576 (reversed on jurisdictional grounds).

1966Opinion of the Justices of New Hampshire, 102 N.H. 106 , 151 A.2d 236 ; Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill.2d 55 , 153 N.E.2d 806 ; also by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company v. Saxon, 211 F.Supp. 576 (reversed on jurisdictional grounds).