supremacy clause in California

2007We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. *1265 II A. Introduction As we explained in Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 910 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 88 P.3d 1 ], the supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to preempt state law. “[S]tate law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ ” (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 407 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ] (Cipollone), quoting Maryland v. Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 746 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 576 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 ].) It is well establi

2007We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. *1265 II A. Introduction As we explained in Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 910 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 88 P.3d 1 ], the supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to preempt state law. “[S]tate law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ ” (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 407 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ] (Cipollone), quoting Maryland v. Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 746 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 576 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 ].) It is well establi

2002“The supremacy clause declares, in pertinent part, that ‘Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ (U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2.) [10 Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 [ 4 L.Ed. 579, 606 ], ‘it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect” ’ (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ].)” (Smi

2002“The supremacy clause declares, in pertinent part, that ‘Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ (U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2.) [10 Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 [ 4 L.Ed. 579, 606 ], ‘it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect” ’ (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ].)” (Smi

2014(See, e.g., Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d 351 , 366- 369]; Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n. (1948) 334 U.S. 410, 419 ; Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 .) Accordingly, even with respect to matters that ordinarily and historically are an appropriate subject of state regulation — such as a state‟s granting or denial of a license to practice law in the state — when the federal government has enacted a law restricting the right of a non-United States citizen to obtain such a professional license, under the supremacy clause the applicable federal statute wil

2014(See, e.g., Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d 351 , 366- 369]; Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n. (1948) 334 U.S. 410, 419 ; Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 .) Accordingly, even with respect to matters that ordinarily and historically are an appropriate subject of state regulation — such as a state‟s granting or denial of a license to practice law in the state — when the federal government has enacted a law restricting the right of a non-United States citizen to obtain such a professional license, under the supremacy clause the applicable federal statute wil

2012That principle is based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, which “ ‘makes federal law [(not advisory standards)] paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1059 ; see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills (2d Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 404, 414-415 [“The foundation of preemption doctrines is ‘the Supremacy Clause, . . . [which] invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law.’ ”].) “The FAA regulations have the force and effect of law binding upon pilots, FAA personne

2012That principle is based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, which “ ‘makes federal law [(not advisory standards)] paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1059 ; see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills (2d Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 404, 414-415 [“The foundation of preemption doctrines is ‘the Supremacy Clause, . . . [which] invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law.’ ”].) “The FAA regulations have the force and effect of law binding upon pilots, FAA personne

2023VI, cl. 2 [supremacy clause]; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 469, fn. 6 [United States Supreme Court “decisions on questions of federal constitutional law are binding on all state courts under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution”].) 23 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 491, 504 [“the normal rule [is] that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course”].) The courts have traditionally applied a presumption in favor of severability.

2023VI, cl. 2 [supremacy clause]; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 469, fn. 6 [United States Supreme Court “decisions on questions of federal constitutional law are binding on all state courts under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution”].) 23 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 491, 504 [“the normal rule [is] that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course”].) The courts have traditionally applied a presumption in favor of severability.

2018General preemption principles " 'The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.' [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?" ( Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307-308, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 505 ,

2018General preemption principles " 'The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.' [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?" ( Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307-308, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 505 ,

2022(See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 956 (Bronco Wine) [“party who claims that a state statute is preempted by federal law bears the burden of demonstrating preemption”]; Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443 [appellant bears burden of affirmatively demonstrating error].) 3 “Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art.

2019A Preemption Generally “ ‘The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.’ ” (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 307-308 .) Congress may expressly preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may imply preemption under three doctrines: (1) field preemption, when “Congress intended, by comprehensive legislation, to occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law”; (

2012Thus, when “a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way.” (Easterwood, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 663 ; accord, Maryland v. Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 746-747 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 576 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 ].) The United States Supreme Court has recognized three types of preemption under the supremacy clause: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.

2012Thus, when “a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way.” (Easterwood, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 663 ; accord, Maryland v. Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 746-747 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 576 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 ].) The United States Supreme Court has recognized three types of preemption under the supremacy clause: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.

2019(Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 331 .) “We apply a de novo standard of review . . . because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation].” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) A. General Preemption Principles. “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution . . . vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is

2019In any event, federal preemption can be raised for the first time on appeal. ( Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 331, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 .) "We apply a de novo standard of review ... because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation]." ( Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077 , 1089, fn. 10, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 .) A. General Preemption Principles . " ' "The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution ... vests Congress with the power to preempt state law." [Citations.] Similarly, federal agen

2010Preemption The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution preempts state law in three circumstances: (1) express preemption, *Page 795 (2) implied preemption (or field preemption), and (3) conflict preemption. ( Sanai, supra , 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 771 ; English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72 , 78-79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ].) Express preemption is at issue here — specifically, the scope of the FCRA's express preemption of state law.

2010Preemption The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution preempts state law in three circumstances: (1) express preemption, *Page 795 (2) implied preemption (or field preemption), and (3) conflict preemption. ( Sanai, supra , 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 771 ; English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72 , 78-79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ].) Express preemption is at issue here — specifically, the scope of the FCRA's express preemption of state law.

2002“The supremacy clause declares, in pertinent part, that ‘Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ (U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2.) [10 Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 [ 4 L.Ed. 579, 606 ], ‘it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect” ’ (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ].)” (Smi

2002“The supremacy clause declares, in pertinent part, that ‘Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ (U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2.) [10 Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 [ 4 L.Ed. 579, 606 ], ‘it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect” ’ (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ].)” (Smi

2007(Compare Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. (1992) 505 U.S. 88, 108 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 73 , 112 S.Ct. 2374 ] [preemption doctrine is “derived” from the supremacy clause], and Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 152 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 664 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 ] [“The pre-emption doctrine ... has its roots in the Supremacy Clause”], with Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States (2005) 33 Pepperdine L.Rev. 39, 49-51 [arguing that the necessary and proper clause, U.S. Const., art.

2007(Compare Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. (1992) 505 U.S. 88, 108 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 73 , 112 S.Ct. 2374 ] [preemption doctrine is “derived” from the supremacy clause], and Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 152 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 664 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 ] [“The pre-emption doctrine ... has its roots in the Supremacy Clause”], with Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States (2005) 33 Pepperdine L.Rev. 39, 49-51 [arguing that the necessary and proper clause, U.S. Const., art.

2004Because the claim presentation requirement is a “state substantive limitation[] couched in procedural language” (Williams, at p. 841), we concluded that the supremacy clause precluded us from applying the requirement to the federal cause of action (id. at p. 842 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 ]).

2004Because the claim presentation requirement is a “state substantive limitation[] couched in procedural language” (Williams, at p. 841), we concluded that the supremacy clause precluded us from applying the requirement to the federal cause of action (id. at p. 842 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 ]).

2000In the leading case, Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284 [ 100 S.Ct. 553, 558 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 ], the court ruled unanimously a California statute which purported to immunize public entities and public employees from liability for parole release decisions was preempted by section 1983 “even though the federal cause of action [was] being asserted in the state courts.” In Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131 [ 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 ], involving a section 1983 action filed in a Wisconsin court, the Supreme Court held that under the supremacy clause the plaintiffs’ failure to

2000In the leading case, Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284 [ 100 S.Ct. 553, 558 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 ], the court ruled unanimously a California statute which purported to immunize public entities and public employees from liability for parole release decisions was preempted by section 1983 “even though the federal cause of action [was] being asserted in the state courts.” In Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131 [ 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 ], involving a section 1983 action filed in a Wisconsin court, the Supreme Court held that under the supremacy clause the plaintiffs’ failure to

2010Federal Law Does Not Preempt California Requirements Appellants argue we should not interpret the California statutes to prohibit unlicensed school personnel from administering insulin injections that diabetic students may require pursuant to a Section 504 Plan or IEP, as we have, because California law, so interpreted, would be preempted by federal law on the ground the California law "frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law." ( Perez v. Campbell (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 652 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 233, 244 , 91 S.Ct. 1704 ]; see Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 [ 85 L.Ed. 581, 587 , 61 S

2010Federal Law Does Not Preempt California Requirements Appellants argue we should not interpret the California statutes to prohibit unlicensed school personnel from administering insulin injections that diabetic students may require pursuant to a Section 504 Plan or IEP, as we have, because California law, so interpreted, would be preempted by federal law on the ground the California law "frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law." ( Perez v. Campbell (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 652 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 233, 244 , 91 S.Ct. 1704 ]; see Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 [ 85 L.Ed. 581, 587 , 61 S

1987Citing Cone Hospital, the court reiterated that the FAA had preempted the field: “In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements [governed by the FAA].” (Southland Corp. v. Keating, supra, 465 U.S. 1, 16 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 15 ].) The court held, therefore, that section 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violated the supremacy clause to the extent that it was used to bar the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the jurisdiction of t

1987Citing Cone Hospital, the court reiterated that the FAA had preempted the field: “In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements [governed by the FAA].” (Southland Corp. v. Keating, supra, 465 U.S. 1, 16 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 15 ].) The court held, therefore, that section 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violated the supremacy clause to the extent that it was used to bar the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the jurisdiction of t

2010Under the supremacy clause, the congressional Act preempts a conflicting state law. ( In re Brandon M., supra , 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 ; see also Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363 , 372-373 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 352 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 ] [state foreign trade act concerning Burma undermined purpose of, and was preempted by, the federal act, where it penalized individuals who were exempted from sanctions by the federal act].) Here, ICWA, expressly excludes from its application cases involving a placement based on an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime.

2010Under the supremacy clause, the congressional Act preempts a conflicting state law. ( In re Brandon M., supra , 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 ; see also Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363 , 372-373 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 352 , 120 S.Ct. 2288 ] [state foreign trade act concerning Burma undermined purpose of, and was preempted by, the federal act, where it penalized individuals who were exempted from sanctions by the federal act].) Here, ICWA, expressly excludes from its application cases involving a placement based on an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime.

2024In particular, the Court explained, “[p]rovisions like the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause ‘confer fundamental rights on individual citizens’; the supremacy clause, in contrast, ‘establishes a structure of government which defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.’ [Citations.] Political subdivisions cannot assert ‘constitutional rights which are intended to limit governmental action vis-a-vis individual citizens’ but may invoke the supremacy clause to challenge preempted state law.” (Star–Kist, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) At issue in Star–Kist was a claim

2017"Standing" in the context of that case referred "not to traditional notions of a plaintiff's entitlement to seek judicial resolution of a dispute, but to a narrower, more specific inquiry focused upon the internal political organization of the state: whether counties and municipalities may invoke the federal Constitution to challenge a state law which they are otherwise duty-bound to enforce." *378 ( Id. at pp. 5-6, 227 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 719 P.2d 987 , fn. omitted.) In upholding the right of the local government agencies to challenge a state law as interfering with Congress' exclusive control ov

2025Though we agree state rules are properly applied under section 108(a)(1), the same cannot be said for section 108(a)(2). “[W]hether state law is federally preempted is “a pure question of law” that we independently review.” (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1 , 16.) “ ‘ “The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue re

2024General Preemption Principles “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?’ (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307–308 (Quesada).)” (Solus Indu

2015Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 936 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 , 162 P.3d 569 ].) Moreover, consideration of issues under the supremacy clause starts with the presumption that state laws are not to be preempted by a federal statute unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.

2015Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 936 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 , 162 P.3d 569 ].) Moreover, consideration of issues under the supremacy clause starts with the presumption that state laws are not to be preempted by a federal statute unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.

2015Principles of Preemption Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, “[w]hen a state statute, administrative rule, or common-law cause of action conflicts with a federal statute, it is axiomatic that the state law is without effect. [Citations.]” (Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 894 (Geier).) “In determining whether federal law preempts state law, a court’s task is to discern congressional intent. [Citation.] Congress’s express intent in this regard will be found when Congress explicitly states that it is preempting state authority. [Citation.] Congre

2015Principles of Preemption Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, “[w]hen a state statute, administrative rule, or common-law cause of action conflicts with a federal statute, it is axiomatic that the state law is without effect. [Citations]” (Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., (2000) 529 U.S. 861, 894 ) (Geier).) “In determining whether federal law preempts state law, a court’s task is to discern congressional intent. [Citation.] Congress’s express intent in this regard will be found when Congress explicitly states that it is preempting state authority. [Citation.] Congre

2003"The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our [federal] Constitution provided [in the supremacy clause] that the federal law must prevail. [Citation.]" ( Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663, 666 , 82 S.Ct. 1089 , 8 L.Ed.2d 180 .) Thus, the proper "inquiry" is "whether there is a conflict" between the state law and federal law, not the significance of the state public policy at issue. ( Ibid.; see also Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 153 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.

2003"The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our [federal] Constitution provided [in the supremacy clause] that the federal law must prevail. [Citation.]" ( Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663, 666 , 82 S.Ct. 1089 , 8 L.Ed.2d 180 .) Thus, the proper "inquiry" is "whether there is a conflict" between the state law and federal law, not the significance of the state public policy at issue. ( Ibid.; see also Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 153 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.

2018General preemption principles " 'The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.' [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?" ( Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307-308, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 505 ,

2018General preemption principles " 'The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.' [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?" ( Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307-308, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 505 ,

2008In 1992, a Bay Area legislator asked for an opinion on the following question: “May a city prohibit its officers and employees from cooperating in their official capacities with Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation, detention, or arrest procedures relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration laws.” ( 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 270 (1992).) Relying in part upon Gates, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 205 at page 219, the Attorney General answered that, “[d]ue to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,” a city may not impose such a prohibition

1997"The principles which govern our disposition . . . were set forth in large part by the United States Supreme Court in De Canas v. Bica (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 354-357 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 43, 48-50 , 96 S.Ct. 933 ]: `Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.

1986The correct standard for review under *51 the supremacy clause was stated by the United States Supreme Court recently in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1979) 439 U.S. 572 , at page 581 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 1 , at page 11, 99 S.Ct. 802 ]: ‘On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has “positively required by direct enactment” that state law be preempted. [Citation.]’ Hisquierdo also said: ‘[S]tate interests “should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear a

1986The correct standard for review under the supremacy clause was stated by the United States Supreme Court recently in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1979) 439 U.S. 572 , at page 581 . . .: ‘On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has “positively required by direct enactment” that state law be preempted. [Citation.]’ Hisquierdo also said: ‘[S]tate interests “should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National G

2024General Preemption Principles “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?’ (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307–308 (Quesada).)” (Solus Indu

2024General Preemption Principles “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?’ (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298 , 307–308 (Quesada).)” (Solus Indu

2021Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ [Citation.] Therefore, Congress has the power to enact federal laws that trump or ‘preempt’ conflicting state laws and may exercise that power by enacting an express preemption provision, . . . or courts may infer preemption.” (Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 377, 383 .) “In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ [citation], [the court must] ‘start with the assumption that the historic police 12 Gunther’s unop

2012(See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. (1992) 505 U.S. 88, 98 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 73 , 112 S.Ct. 2374 ].) “Federal preemption ‘fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, [citation], when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, [citation], where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, [citation], where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, [citation], whe