7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
T.F. v. State, Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2008Servs., 26 P.3d 1089, 1098 (Alaska 2001) (Matthews, J., dissenting) ("It should go without saying based on the supremacy clause of the federal constitution that the requirements of ICWA must be observed even if that means some slippage in the state statutory scheduling requirements." (footnote omitted)). 2008Servs., 26 P.3d 1089, 1098 (Alaska 2001) (Matthews, J., dissenting) ("It should go without saying based on the supremacy clause of the federal constitution that the requirements of ICWA must be observed even if that means some slippage in the state statutory scheduling requirements." (footnote omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Drumm v. Browngreen2 sentences2017I suppose it's possible, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated, that the U.S. Supreme Court could be deemed to have announced "substantive" federal common law that is "binding in state courts pursuant to the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." Drumm , 716 A.2d at 62 . 2017See infra Part II. 14 I suppose it’s possible, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated, that the U.S. Supreme Court could be deemed to have announced “substantive” federal common law that is “binding in state courts pursuant to the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.” Drumm, 716 A.2d at 62 . | 1 | 1 |
Giles v. Californiagreen1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Fed. § 3, at 619 (1998); see also United States v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir.1978) (recognizing power to “ ‘exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign at *898 tribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control’ ” (citation omitted)); Hernandez, 613 S.W.2d at 290 (“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that federal immigration law, not the decision of the trial court in this case, controls the circumstances under which appellant may or may not re-enter the United States.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jesus Hernandezgreen1 sentence1999Fed. § 3, at 619 (1998); see also United States v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir.1978) (recognizing power to “ ‘exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign at *898 tribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control’ ” (citation omitted)); Hernandez, 613 S.W.2d at 290 (“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that federal immigration law, not the decision of the trial court in this case, controls the circumstances under which appellant may or may not re-enter the United States.”). | 1 | 1 |
Mariniello v. Shell Oil Companygreen2 sentences1987If state law permitted deceptive trademarks to operate, "then the state law would, under the supremacy clause, be invalid.” Id. (citation omitted). 37 . 1987See Id. at 859 . 38 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
green
2 sentences2008Because the ICWA was adopted to prevent Indian children from spending even limited time separated from their Indian culture, see, e.g., Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49 -50 & n.24, and because extending the duration of a noncompliant placement increases the risk of subsequent disruption and trauma, the juvenile court should grant additional time only when DCFS can demonstrate meaningful attempts to comply with the ICWA preferences along with some articulated plan for completing those preference obligations. 2008Because the ICWA was adopted to prevent Indian children from spending even limited time separated from their Indian culture, see, eg., Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49 -50 & n. 24, 109 S.Ct. 1597 , and because extending the duration of a noncompliant placement increases the risk of subsequent disruption and trauma, the juvenile court should grant additional time only when DCFS can demonstrate meaningful attempts to comply with the ICWA preferences along with some articulated plan for completing those preference obligations. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Houlihan
green
1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doan v. Carter
green
1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In The Matter Of Johnnie Williams
green
1 sentence1976Williams v. Department of Social and Health Services, C.A. 9th 1976, 529 F.2d 1264 . . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.