16 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oberschachtsiek v. Iowa Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2018Servs. , 298 N.W.2d 302 , 304 (Iowa 1980) ("State regulations which contravene the federal regulatory scheme are invalid under the supremacy clause."). 1985Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , 92 S.Ct. 502, 505 , 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 453 (1971); Oberschachtsiek v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 298 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1980) (“state regulations which contravene the federal regulatory scheme are invalid under the supremacy clause.”) Iowa has established such a program by statute. | 3 | 3 |
Fransen v. Iowa Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences1990Fransen v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 376 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1985). 1988Fransen v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 376 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1985). | 2 | 2 |
Townsend v. Swankgreen2 sentences1985Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , 92 S.Ct. 502, 505 , 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 453 (1971); Oberschachtsiek v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 298 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1980) (“state regulations which contravene the federal regulatory scheme are invalid under the supremacy clause.”) Iowa has established such a program by statute. 1985Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , 92 S.Ct. 502, 505 , 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 453 (1971); Oberschachtsiek v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 298 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1980) (“state regulations which contravene the federal regulatory scheme are invalid under the supremacy clause.”) Iowa has established such a program by statute. | 2 | 2 |
Romer v. Evansgreen2 sentences2017Ed. 2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 , 625–26, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L. 2017Ed. 2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 , 625–26, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L. | 1 | 3 |
Papasan v. Allaingreen2 sentences2017League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 , 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 , 158 L.Ed.2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855, 861-62 (1996) (considering various municipalities Federal Equal Protection Clause challenges to state constitutional provisions); Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 274-75 , 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2938-39 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209, 224-25 (1986) (remanding Equal Protection Clause challenges to state for consideration on merits); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. 2017League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 , 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 , 158 L.Ed.2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855, 861-62 (1996) (considering various municipalities Federal Equal Protection Clause challenges to state constitutional provisions); Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 274-75 , 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2938-39 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209, 224-25 (1986) (remanding Equal Protection Clause challenges to state for consideration on merits); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. | 1 | 3 |
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal Leaguegreen2 sentences2017League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 , 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 , 158 L.Ed.2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855, 861-62 (1996) (considering various municipalities Federal Equal Protection Clause challenges to state constitutional provisions); Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 274-75 , 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2938-39 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209, 224-25 (1986) (remanding Equal Protection Clause challenges to state for consideration on merits); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. 2017League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 , 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 , 158 L.Ed.2d 291, 299 (2004) (considering merits of municipalities’ Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 , 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1624 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855, 861-62 (1996) (considering various municipalities Federal Equal Protection Clause challenges to state constitutional provisions); Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 274-75 , 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2938-39 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209, 224-25 (1986) (remanding Equal Protection Clause challenges to state for consideration on merits); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1green2 sentences2017No. 4.0-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257-58 , 105 S.Ct. 695, 696 , 83 L.Ed.2d 635, 639 (1985) (considering merits of Supremacy Clause challenge, with Hunter cited in dissent); Washington v. Seattle Sch. 2017No. 4.0-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257-58 , 105 S.Ct. 695, 696 , 83 L.Ed.2d 635, 639 (1985) (considering merits of Supremacy Clause challenge, with Hunter cited in dissent); Washington v. Seattle Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austingreen2 sentences2004Id. at 282, 94 S.Ct. at 2780 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 760-61 (citations omitted, emphasis added); see John P. Ludington, Defamation: Designation as Scab, 65 A.L.R.4th 1000 , 1002 (1988) (Letter Carriers held “the Federal Constitution, under the . supremacy clause, precludes a state defamation suit for the use of the word ‘scab’ if the use of the word was in the course of activity protected by the federal labor laws and if the word was not used with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not — the familiar New York Times test.”) Analyzing the plaintiffs’ claims, 2004Id. at 282, 94 S.Ct. at 2780 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 760-61 (citations omitted, emphasis added); see John P. Ludington, Defamation: Designation as Scab, 65 A.L.R.4th 1000 , 1002 (1988) (Letter Carriers held “the Federal Constitution, under the . supremacy clause, precludes a state defamation suit for the use of the word ‘scab’ if the use of the word was in the course of activity protected by the federal labor laws and if the word was not used with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not — the familiar New York Times test.”) Analyzing the plaintiffs’ claims, | 1 | 1 |
Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co.green1 sentence1999As we noted in Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co., the federal preemption doctrine is grounded upon the supremacy clause of the federal constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 586 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 1998) (quoting in part U.S. Const, art. | 1 | 1 |
Gorrie v. Bowengreen1 sentence1991See Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 516 (8th Cir.1987); Phipps v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 409 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Phipps v. Iowa Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1991See Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 516 (8th Cir.1987); Phipps v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 409 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. First National Bank Of Montevideogreen2 sentences1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. 1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. | 1 | 1 |
Perez. v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1989Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1708 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233, 239 (1971). 1989Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1708 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233, 239 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gregory J. Carsongreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Barnette v. Evansgreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors
green
2 sentences1991First Nat’l Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 470 U.S. 583, 596 , 105 S.Ct. 1516, 1522 , 84 L.Ed.2d 535 (1985). 1991First Nat’l Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 470 U.S. 583, 596 , 105 S.Ct. 1516, 1522 , 84 L.Ed.2d 535 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Howze v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. 1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stapf v. United States
green
2 sentences1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. 1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Johnson v. First National Bank of Montevideo
green
2 sentences1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. 1989As stated in Johnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 1015 , 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984): Where Congress has chosen to exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. Federal Trade Commission
green
1 sentence1966Reynolds v. Sims, infra, 377 U.S., at 584, 84 S.Ct., at 1393 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.