20 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Woodsgreen2 sentences1993"Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law." Id. at 1075 (citation omitted). 'In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position The Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or federal proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the decisions of that court on national law have binding effect on all lower *95 cou 1983Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F. 2d 1072, 1075-1076 (7th Cir. 1970), that court said: “The Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or federal proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the decisions of that court on national law have binding effect on all lower courts whether state or federal. | 2 | 2 |
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences1990Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 1990Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). *22 [3] In general, it can be said, however, that the general presumption that arises out of the federal system of dual sovereignty is that there shall be no preemption unless that intent of congress is rather clear. | 1 | 2 |
Gibbons v. Ogdengreen2 sentences1985VI invalidates state laws which “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of *511 Congress.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824). 1970Ed. 579 , and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 22 U. S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 6 L. | 1 | 2 |
Kelly v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten 2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten | 1 | 1 |
SPANKOWSKI (ZUERCHER) v. Spankowskigreen2 sentences1994Spankowski v. Spankowski, 172 Wis. 2d 285, 291-92 , 493 N.W.2d 737, 740-41 (Ct. App. 1992). 1994Spankowski v. Spankowski, 172 Wis. 2d 285, 291-92 , 493 N.W.2d 737, 740-41 (Ct. App. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortiergreen2 sentences1993See Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2481 . 1993See Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2481 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Yazellgreen1 sentence1992United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
McCarty v. McCartyred1 sentence1992McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981).. 5 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a)(2) provides that a discharge in bankruptcy "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived." 6 Here, maintenance was denied to David, but Susan's maintenance was held open. | 1 | 1 |
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdogreen1 sentence1988State family law is not preempted by a federal statute unless it "conflicts with the express terms of federal law” and "sufficiently injure[s] the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition.” In re Marriage of Jacobs v. Jacobs, 138 Wis. 2d 19, 26 , 405 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 1987), quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Perez. v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1988See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (acts of the state legislatures which interfere with the laws of Congress are invalid under the supremacy clause). 1988See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (acts of the state legislatures which interfere with the laws of Congress are invalid under the supremacy clause). | 1 | 1 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF JACOBS v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences1988State family law is not preempted by a federal statute unless it "conflicts with the express terms of federal law” and "sufficiently injure[s] the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition.” In re Marriage of Jacobs v. Jacobs, 138 Wis. 2d 19, 26 , 405 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 1987), quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583 (1979). 1988State family law is not preempted by a federal statute unless it "conflicts with the express terms of federal law” and "sufficiently injure[s] the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition.” In re Marriage of Jacobs v. Jacobs, 138 Wis. 2d 19, 26 , 405 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 1987), quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Carleson v. Remillardgreen1 sentence1981See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600-01 (1972); King, 392 U.S. at 316 . | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.green1 sentence1980When a state law is challenged under the supremacy clause, we “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.green1 sentence1980See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,157 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green1 sentence1980See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,157 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hazelton v. State Personnel Commission
green
2 sentences2016Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 776, 786 , 505 N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1993) (footnote omitted). 2016Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 776, 786 , 505 N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1993) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Huggett v. State
green
2 sentences2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten 2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Huml v. Vlazny
green
2 sentences2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten 2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Foley
green
2 sentences2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten 2009Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the sovereignty of the state in criminal prosecutions, the restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution." State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 341-42 , 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct.App.1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). [24] The sentence also mentions exten | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Department of Social Services v. Saunders
green
1 sentence2003Sup. Ct. 1993) (same, and further concluding that to the extent state statutes might restrict a guardian from establishing a Medicaid-qualifying trust recognized by federal law, "they are not binding *692 on this court since any such inconsistency would be violative of the supremacy clause" of the U.S. Constitution). 6 The Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Department of Social Services v. Saunders, 724 A.2d 1093 (Conn. 1999), that a probate court in that state may exert considerable influence over the terms of the trust, thus ensuring that the trust would he managed to the court's satisfactio | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hogan v. Musolf
green
2 sentences2002Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991). 2002Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
California v. LaRue
green
2 sentences1995Id. 1995Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF ECKERT v. Eckert
green
2 sentences1994Id. at 775-79 , 424 N.W.2d at 761-63 . 11 Even if the motion had been properly before the court, we question whether § 806.07, Stats., can appropriately be used to, in essence, sanction a party for non-payment of a judgment. 12 Because the issue is not briefed and the record on appeal contains no insight from the bankruptcy court, we express no opinion as to which of Patricia's theories of nondischargeability may be argued in the state court upon remand. 1994Id. at 775-79 , 424 N.W.2d at 761-63 . 11 Even if the motion had been properly before the court, we question whether § 806.07, Stats., can appropriately be used to, in essence, sanction a party for non-payment of a judgment. 12 Because the issue is not briefed and the record on appeal contains no insight from the bankruptcy court, we express no opinion as to which of Patricia's theories of nondischargeability may be argued in the state court upon remand. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gilligan v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1993The Secretary of the Army, acting under authority delegated by the President as commander-in-chief, see Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-7 , issued Army Regulation 600-110 authorizing the termination of membership of HIV-positive members of the national guard. 1993The Secretary of the Army, acting under authority delegated by the President as commander-in-chief, see Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-7 , issued Army Regulation 600-110 authorizing the termination of membership of HIV-positive members of the national guard. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Farrey v. Sanderfoot
green
1 sentence1992By the Court. — Judgment reversed. 1 The recent United States Supreme Court decision Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1825 (1991), does not apply in this case and therefore whether Farrey would have retroactive affect need not be addressed. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 1990Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). *22 [3] In general, it can be said, however, that the general presumption that arises out of the federal system of dual sovereignty is that there shall be no preemption unless that intent of congress is rather clear. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hensley v. Eckerhart
green
2 sentences1983On the other hand, because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.” The Supreme Court discussed the question of awarding attorney’s fees under sec. 1988 in the recent case of Hensley v. Eckerhart, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983). 1983On the other hand, because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts." The Supreme Court discussed the question of awarding attorney's fees under sec. 1988 in the recent case of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
King v. Smith
green
1 sentence1981See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600-01 (1972); King, 392 U.S. at 316 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Townsend v. Swank
green
1 sentence1980Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
green
2 sentences1975Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132 , 141 , 83 S.Ct. 1210 , 1217 , 10 L.Ed.2d 248 , 256 . 1975Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132 , 141 , 83 S.Ct. 1210 , 1217 , 10 L.Ed.2d 248 , 256 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Railroad Co. v. Peniston green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Johnson v. Maryland green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| M'culloch v. State of Maryland green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Pennsylvania v. Nelson green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.