supremacy clause in Maryland

2021This principle was established by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819), which held that “the states have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.” The leading Supreme Court case on Supremacy Clause immunity is In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).

2021In Neagle, 135 U.S. at 4 , Neagle, a United States Marshal, shot and killed the would-be assassin of Justice Field as the Justice made his rounds as a Ninth Circuit judge.

2021Implied Authority under Federal Law Battle argues that even if his actions were not expressly authorized by a federal statute, Supremacy Clause immunity still applies because, he says, he was at least acting with “implied authority.” His argument relies heavily on Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977).

2010With one exception, the case law is clear that both the Federal and the Maryland speech and debate provisions and, as we now hold, C.J.P. § 5-501, provide a limited form of privilege or immunity in both civil and criminal proceedings United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 , 86 S.Ct. 749 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Montgomery County v. Sehooley, 97 *368 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993) (Schooley); Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191 , 643 A.2d 931 (1994) (Manders ). 9 The one exception is that, because of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitution, State and local legislators, even if enjoying

2010With one exception, the case law is clear that both the Federal and the Maryland speech and debate provisions and, as we now hold, C.J.P. § 5-501, provide a limited form of privilege or immunity in both civil and criminal proceedings United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 , 86 S.Ct. 749 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Montgomery County v. Sehooley, 97 *368 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993) (Schooley); Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191 , 643 A.2d 931 (1994) (Manders ). 9 The one exception is that, because of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitution, State and local legislators, even if enjoying

2010With one exception, the case law is clear that both the Federal and the Maryland speech and debate provisions and, as we now hold, C.J.P. § 5-501, provide a limited form of privilege or immunity in both civil and criminal proceedings United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 , 86 S.Ct. 749 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Montgomery County v. Sehooley, 97 *368 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993) (Schooley); Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191 , 643 A.2d 931 (1994) (Manders ). 9 The one exception is that, because of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitution, State and local legislators, even if enjoying

2010With one exception, the case law is clear that both the Federal and the Maryland speech and debate provisions and, as we now hold, C.J.P. § 5-501, provide a limited form of privilege or immunity in both civil and criminal proceedings United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 , 86 S.Ct. 749 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Montgomery County v. Sehooley, 97 *368 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993) (Schooley); Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191 , 643 A.2d 931 (1994) (Manders ). 9 The one exception is that, because of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitution, State and local legislators, even if enjoying

2010With one exception, the case law is clear that both the Federal and the Maryland speech and debate provisions and, as we now hold, C.J.P. § 5-501, provide a limited form of privilege or immunity in both civil and criminal proceedings United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 , 86 S.Ct. 749 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Montgomery County v. Sehooley, 97 *368 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993) (Schooley); Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191 , 643 A.2d 931 (1994) (Manders ). 9 The one exception is that, because of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitution, State and local legislators, even if enjoying

2010The second prong of the State’s argument based on Gillock is that “[i]n Maryland, as under federal law, the separation of powers doctrine does not furnish a basis for extending the doctrine of official immunity to a State prosecution of a member of a local city council.” According to the State, this is because the Court of Appeals clearly held, in Wicomico County v. Todd, 256 Md. 459, 464-65 , 260 A.2d 328 (1970), that separation of powers, provided for in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, does not apply to local governments in Maryland.

2010The second prong of the State’s argument based on Gillock is that “[i]n Maryland, as under federal law, the separation of powers doctrine does not furnish a basis for extending the doctrine of official immunity to a State prosecution of a member of a local city council.” According to the State, this is because the Court of Appeals clearly held, in Wicomico County v. Todd, 256 Md. 459, 464-65 , 260 A.2d 328 (1970), that separation of powers, provided for in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, does not apply to local governments in Maryland.

2010United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 , 100 S.Ct. 1185 , 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980).

2010United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 , 100 S.Ct. 1185 , 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980).

2004We therefore begin with the presumption that Federal causes of action are enforceable in the courts of the Commonwealth”); Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, 268 A.D.2d at 177 , 710 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (“State courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are presumed to have jurisdiction over Federally created causes of action unless Congress dictates otherwise”); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., supra, 135 S.W.3d at 381 .

1994Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 , 63 S.Ct. 109 , 87 L.Ed. 106 (1942), held that the federal estate tax statutes did not preclude apportionment under state law.

1994Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 , 63 S.Ct. 109 , 87 L.Ed. 106 (1942), held that the federal estate tax statutes did not preclude apportionment under state law.

1986Martinez , indubitably, precludes Jackson from asserting the State law immunity defense to the § 1983 civil rights violation charged in count II of the appellants’ declaration. 1 Nevertheless, because Jackson was, at the time of the shooting, a police officer in the performance of his duty, he is entitled to a qualified immunity which protects him from liability for official acts performed in “good faith.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).

1986Martinez , indubitably, precludes Jackson from asserting the State law immunity defense to the § 1983 civil rights violation charged in count II of the appellants’ declaration. 1 Nevertheless, because Jackson was, at the time of the shooting, a police officer in the performance of his duty, he is entitled to a qualified immunity which protects him from liability for official acts performed in “good faith.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

1986A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced____ Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 8, reh ’g denied, 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed.2d 606 , citing, Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 , 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).