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14 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Safrengreen2 sentences2014“Because bankruptcy law is federal law, enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant of bankruptcy power, it preempts state law … pursuant to the supremacy clause….” Renges, Inc. v. PAC Financial Corp., (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 563, 566 (quoting In Re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. 1995"Because bankruptcy law is federal law, enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant of bankruptey power, it preempts state law ... pursuant to the supremacy clause...." Renges, Inc. v. PAC Financial Corp., (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 563, 566 (quoting In Re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986)). | 2 | 3 |
Hammes v. Brumleygreen2 sentences2014Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1027 (Ind.1995), reh’g denied. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) provides that federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all bankruptcy matters. 2014Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1027 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) provides that federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all bankruptcy matters. | 2 | 2 |
Renges, Inc. v. PAC Financial Corp.green2 sentences2014“Because bankruptcy law is federal law, enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant of bankruptcy power, it preempts state law … pursuant to the supremacy clause….” Renges, Inc. v. PAC Financial Corp., (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 563, 566 (quoting In Re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. 1995"Because bankruptcy law is federal law, enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant of bankruptey power, it preempts state law ... pursuant to the supremacy clause...." Renges, Inc. v. PAC Financial Corp., (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 563, 566 (quoting In Re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986)). | 2 | 2 |
Goodman v. Serinegreen1 sentence2016See Goodman v. Serine, 6 N.E.3d 481, 483-84 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). | 1 | 1 |
Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen v. Floriogreen2 sentences2006Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F.Supp. 602, 610 (D.N.J.1990) (a state gun control law need not contain an express acknowledgement of the supremacy of federal law and preemptive legislation to withstand a challenge brought under the supremacy clause). 2006Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F.Supp. 602, 610 (D.N.J.1990) (a state gun control law need not contain an express acknowledgement of the supremacy of federal law and preemptive legislation to withstand a challenge brought under the supremacy clause). | 1 | 1 |
Kellogg v. City of Garygreen1 sentence1999See Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 ; Werblo v. Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corp., 537 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.1989) (tort claims notice not applicable to a teacher’s civil rights claim against school district which arose from her discharge); George v. Hatcher, 527 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (the supremacy clause preempts ITCA tort claim rules in a § 1983 action). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Higgason v. Stogsdill
green
1 sentence2010Higgason, 818 N.E.2d at 490 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Community Action Program of Evansville v. Veeck
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Felder v. Casey
green
2 sentences2002In Felder v. Casey, the United States Supreme Court held that a state’s notice of claim statute was preempted by the supremacy clause when an action was brought in state court. 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). 2002In Felder v. Casey, the United States Supreme Court held that a state’s notice of claim statute was preempted by the supremacy clause when an action was brought in state court. 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
George v. Hatcher
green
1 sentence1999See Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 ; Werblo v. Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corp., 537 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.1989) (tort claims notice not applicable to a teacher’s civil rights claim against school district which arose from her discharge); George v. Hatcher, 527 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (the supremacy clause preempts ITCA tort claim rules in a § 1983 action). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Werblo v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORP.
green
1 sentence1999See Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 ; Werblo v. Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corp., 537 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.1989) (tort claims notice not applicable to a teacher’s civil rights claim against school district which arose from her discharge); George v. Hatcher, 527 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (the supremacy clause preempts ITCA tort claim rules in a § 1983 action). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
University of Alabama Hospitals v. Warren (In Re Warren)
green
1 sentence1987D.Ala.1980), 7 B.R. 201 (bankruptcy law is paramount over state law); cf. Cohen, supra (exercise of state jurisdiction which indirectly or directly nullifies bankruptcy laws regarding discharge would be contrary to federal supremacy clause). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.
green
2 sentences1983In Hodel, the Supreme Court determined that, pursuant to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Congress could regulate surface coal mining and that state law determinations conflicting with the federal law would be preempted. 452 U.S. at 200-91 , 101 S.Ct. at 2867 , 69 L.Ed. at 24-25. 1983In Hodel, the Supreme Court determined that, pursuant to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Congress could regulate surface coal mining and that state law determinations conflicting with the federal law would be preempted. 452 U.S. at 200-91 , 101 S.Ct. at 2867 , 69 L.Ed. at 24-25. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hines v. Davidowitz
green
2 sentences1982A federal law pre-empts state law wherever the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Perez v. Campbell, (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 649 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 , 85 L.Ed. 581 ). 1982A federal law pre-empts state law wherever the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Perez v. Campbell, (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 649 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 , 85 L.Ed. 581 ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Perez. v. Campbell
green
2 sentences1982A federal law pre-empts state law wherever the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Perez v. Campbell, (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 649 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 , 85 L.Ed. 581 ). 1982A federal law pre-empts state law wherever the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Perez v. Campbell, (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 649 , 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711 , 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 , 85 L.Ed. 581 ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Maryland v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1982The pre-emption doctrine is bottomed in the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, article VI, clause 2: “This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” “Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state 1982The pre-emption doctrine is bottomed in the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, article VI, clause 2: “This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” “Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state | 1 | 1982–1982 |
La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences1982We hold the ordinance as applied to this property does not conflict with FAA regulations and does not violate the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution.” LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, (1975) 34 Ill.App.3d 264, 275 , 340 N.E.2d 79, 87-88 . 6 . 1449 feet AMSL exceeds 500 feet ground level at the instant site. 7 . 1982We hold the ordinance as applied to this property does not conflict with FAA regulations and does not violate the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution.” LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, (1975) 34 Ill.App.3d 264, 275 , 340 N.E.2d 79, 87-88 . 6 . 1449 feet AMSL exceeds 500 feet ground level at the instant site. 7 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kisley v. City of Falls Church
green
2 sentences1978However, we must agree with our Supreme Court in Wright, supra, that because Ciándolo was previous to Kisley v. City of Falls Church (1972), 409 U.S. 907 , 93 S.Ct. 237 , 34 L.Ed.2d 169 , dismissing 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168 , and because Ciándolo was previous to numerous other cases cited in the Wright case, we must assume that Ciándolo, which invalidated a similar massage parlor ordinance, is now overruled. 1978However, we must agree with our Supreme Court in Wright, supra, that because Ciándolo was previous to Kisley v. City of Falls Church (1972), 409 U.S. 907 , 93 S.Ct. 237 , 34 L.Ed.2d 169 , dismissing 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168 , and because Ciándolo was previous to numerous other cases cited in the Wright case, we must assume that Ciándolo, which invalidated a similar massage parlor ordinance, is now overruled. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States Chamber of Commerce v. Francis
green
1 sentence1978However, we must agree with our Supreme Court in Wright, supra, that because Ciándolo was previous to Kisley v. City of Falls Church (1972), 409 U.S. 907 , 93 S.Ct. 237 , 34 L.Ed.2d 169 , dismissing 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168 , and because Ciándolo was previous to numerous other cases cited in the Wright case, we must assume that Ciándolo, which invalidated a similar massage parlor ordinance, is now overruled. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Solomon v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
green
1 sentence1978However, we must agree with our Supreme Court in Wright, supra, that because Ciándolo was previous to Kisley v. City of Falls Church (1972), 409 U.S. 907 , 93 S.Ct. 237 , 34 L.Ed.2d 169 , dismissing 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168 , and because Ciándolo was previous to numerous other cases cited in the Wright case, we must assume that Ciándolo, which invalidated a similar massage parlor ordinance, is now overruled. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.