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28 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paulgreen2 sentences2011Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds of Boston, 415 Mass. 87, 90 (1993), citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 1993Where Congress has chosen to foreclose non-Federal regulation in a given area, the supremacy clause in art. 6 of the Constitution of the United States prohibits a State from applying its own law to that exclusively Federal area. 5 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-210 (1824). | 3 | 3 |
Dennis v. Higginsgreen2 sentences2012The supremacy clause is “ ‘not a source of any federal rights;’ rather, it ‘ “secure[s]” federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.’ ” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991), quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979). 2010The supremacy clause “is not a source of any federal rights; rather, it secure(s) federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
De Canas v. Bicared2 sentences2002See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power”). 1985Cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (State laws involving aliens are not “per se pre-empted” by exclusive Federal power over immigration); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 , 228 n.23 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Gibbons v. Ogdengreen2 sentences1999Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-210 (1824); art. 1993Where Congress has chosen to foreclose non-Federal regulation in a given area, the supremacy clause in art. 6 of the Constitution of the United States prohibits a State from applying its own law to that exclusively Federal area. 5 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-210 (1824). | 2 | 2 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen1 sentence2023VI, cl. 2. 18Conflict preemption occurs when "it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal requirements,' . . . or where [S]tate law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002), quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). 14 not to be superseded by . . . | 1 | 1 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marinegreen1 sentence2023VI, cl. 2. 18Conflict preemption occurs when "it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal requirements,' . . . or where [S]tate law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002), quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). 14 not to be superseded by . . . | 1 | 1 |
Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.green1 sentence2020See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169 , 184 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc.green1 sentence2012That is not a proper role for the Supremacy Clause, which simply ensures that the rule established by Congress controls.” Douglas, supra at 1212-1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 14 Even if the plaintiffs could bring their cause of action under the supremacy clause, the claim would still be barred by the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Alden v. Mainegreen1 sentence2012“The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because that law derives not from the State itself but from the national power.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authoritygreen1 sentence2012It is irrelevant that the same result could have been imposed on the State by the Federal government pursuant to the supremacy clause.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Finch, supra at 672. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organizationgreen1 sentence2012The supremacy clause is “ ‘not a source of any federal rights;’ rather, it ‘ “secure[s]” federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.’ ” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991), quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Chestnut-Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Fundsgreen1 sentence2011Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds of Boston, 415 Mass. 87, 90 (1993), citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Barannikova v. Town of Greenwichgreen2 sentences2011See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (although possessing plenary authority over immigration and naturalization, “Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause”); Barannikova v. Greenwich, 229 Conn. 664, 683 (1994) (“The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict with federal [alienage] legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection guarantee”). 2011See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (although possessing plenary authority over immigration and naturalization, "Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause"); Barannikova v. Greenwich, 229 Conn. 664, 683 (1994) ("The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict with federal [alienage] legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection guarantee"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. College Pro Painters (U.S.) Ltd.green1 sentence2011“Under the supremacy clause in art. 6 of the Constitution of the United States, we are obligated to declare invalid any State statute or regulation that purports to regulate a field that Congress has reserved exclusively to itself.” Commonwealth v. College Pro Painters (U.S.) Ltd., 418 Mass. 726, 728 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendongreen1 sentence2011The “ultimate touchstone” of preemption is congressional intent, which courts discern through “the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.” Gade, supra at 96 , quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990), and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2011See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (although possessing plenary authority over immigration and naturalization, “Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause”); Barannikova v. Greenwich, 229 Conn. 664, 683 (1994) (“The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict with federal [alienage] legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection guarantee”). 2011See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (although possessing plenary authority over immigration and naturalization, "Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause"); Barannikova v. Greenwich, 229 Conn. 664, 683 (1994) ("The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict with federal [alienage] legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection guarantee"). | 1 | 1 |
Qwest Corporation v. City of Santa Fegreen1 sentence2010E.g., Independent Living Ctr. of S. Cal, Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1052-53, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2008); Quest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (19th Cir. 2004); Pharm. | 1 | 1 |
Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewrygreen1 sentence2010E.g., Independent Living Ctr. of S. Cal, Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1052-53, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2008); Quest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (19th Cir. 2004); Pharm. | 1 | 1 |
Massachusetts Ass'n of Health Maintenance Organizations v. Ruthardtgreen1 sentence2004VI, cl. 2, does not tolerate a conflict between Federal and State law on a given subject, and that preemption may be implied as well as express, see Massachusetts Assn. of Health Maintenance Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1999), we do not discern in 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (b)(2)(A) an intention to displace traditional State regulation. | 1 | 1 |
Howlett Ex Rel. Howlett v. Rosegreen1 sentence2004See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Federicogreen1 sentence1994Commonwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485, 488-489 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Yazellgreen1 sentence1990The standard to be applied in determining whether the supremacy clause requires that the State family law be preempted is whether the State law does “ ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, supra, quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Ridgway v. Ridgwaygreen1 sentence1990See Rose v. Rose, supra; Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| McCarty v. McCartyred | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Rosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Plyler v. Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Max R. Kargman v. Thomas A. Sullivan, Bertram A. Druker v. City of Bostongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carleson v. Remillardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Environmental Source Corp. v. Massachusetts Division of Occupational Safety (In Re Environmental Source Corp.)
neutral
1 sentence2016VI, because it interfered with the purpose and policy of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which “includefs] the preservation and rehabilitation of financially distressed businesses.” 431 B.R. at 322 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
1 sentence2011The “ultimate touchstone” of preemption is congressional intent, which courts discern through “the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.” Gade, supra at 96 , quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990), and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.
green
1 sentence2011The “ultimate touchstone” of preemption is congressional intent, which courts discern through “the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.” Gade, supra at 96 , quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990), and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Graham v. Richardson
green
1 sentence2011Graham, supra. It is irrelevant that the same result could have been imposed on the State by the Federal government pursuant to the supremacy clause. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mary Alma Tierney v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Ava P. Trahan v. Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
green
1 sentence1997However, return information shall not be disclosed to such person or persons if the Secretary determines that such disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax administration.” A concurring opinion in Tierney v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 449 (D.C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
green
1 sentence1991Although it may be clear that the supremacy clause gives Congress the power to abrogate State court immunity in its own as well as in Federal courts, cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), we think that the Supreme Court’s understanding of the principles underlying the Eleventh Amendment would require Congress to use equally explicit language in both circumstances. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation
green
1 sentence1991Because the Supreme Court already has determined that the Jones Act does not abrogate State immunity in Federal courts, see Welch, supra, we think it cannot be interpreted as abrogating State court immunity. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| First Agricultural National Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Commission green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., International Association of Holiday Inns, Intervenor-Defendant green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Townsend v. Swank green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Perez. v. Campbell green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Adams v. Maryland green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.