combination factors in Colorado

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in c

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in h

2015The court’s findings are supported by the record, see, e.g. , People v. Frost , 5 P.3d 317, 323 (Colo. App. 1999), and the combination of factors relied on are sufficient to support the court’s decision.

2015The court’s findings are supported by the record, see, e.g. , People v. Frost , 5 P.3d 317, 323 (Colo. App. 1999), and the combination of factors relied on are sufficient to support the court’s decision.

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in c

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in h

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in c

2015See People v. Phillips , 2012 COA 176 , ¶¶144-45 (there was no abuse of discretion in finding child’s statements reliable, even though four of the eight reliability factors were not met); People v. Rojas , 181 P.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that child’s statements were sufficiently reliable where they were made in response to nonleading, open-ended questions, in age-appropriate language, with no evidence of bias, and victim “made substantially similar statements to more than one person”); People v. Trujillo , 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996) (court did not err in h

2014“Moreovér, while individual factors considered separately may not require that a challenge for cause be granted, the combination of factors may compel dismissal of the juror.” Id. (citing People v. Reddick, 44 Colo.App. 278 , 610 P.2d 1359 (1980)).

2014“Moreovér, while individual factors considered separately may not require that a challenge for cause be granted, the combination of factors may compel dismissal of the juror.” Id. (citing People v. Reddick, 44 Colo.App. 278 , 610 P.2d 1359 (1980)).

2024See People v. Coughlin, 304 P.3d 575, 586 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that it was not error for a court not to give an instruction where a general credibility instruction was given and where neither party took advantage of the lack of instruction during their closing argument). ¶ 38 The combination of these factors convinces us that the admission of the previous convictions without a contemporaneous limiting instruction did not contribute to the jury’s decision to convict Sais of sexual assault and kidnapping.

2012See id. at -.

2010In assessing whether to admit evidence of a single prior incident under the doctrine of chances, we turn for guidance to the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. Johns, 301 Or. 585, 554-55 , 725 P.2d 312, 324 (1986): Is one prior similar incident enough to justify admission ... ? [[Image here]] We believe no categorical statement can be made one way or the other.

2008People v. Caulley, 197 Mich.App. 177, 184 , 494 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1992), is inapposite because the defendant there had asserted additional defenses, including Michigan's version of diminished capacity and insanity, and the defendant was required to show that he met the statutory definition of insanity to establish the defense of involuntary intoxication.

2008People v. Caulley, 197 Mich.App. 177, 184 , 494 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1992), is inapposite because the defendant there had asserted additional defenses, including Michigan's version of diminished capacity and insanity, and the defendant was required to show that he met the statutory definition of insanity to establish the defense of involuntary intoxication.

2008Cf. In re Marriage of Weck, 706 P2d 436, 437 (Colo.App.1985) (where parties' agreement, including stipulated values and property division, was made in open court in the presence of counsel for both parties, wife acknowledged she understood agreement and was satisfied it was fair and equitable, and there was no evidence of overreaching, concealment of assets, sharp dealing, or fraud, there was no basis to conclude agreement was unconscionable).

2008People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 295-96 , 300 Ill.Dec. 91 , 843 N.E.2d 349, 361 (2006), is Hikewise not pertinent because, although the defendant there had been diagnosed with a variety of conditions, including major depression and paranoid personality disorder, the combination of factors that the Illinois Supreme Court focused on in concluding that the defendant had raised an involuntary intoxication defense-medication, plus the defendant's "lack of sleep and alcohol dependency"-did not involve a mental disease or defect.

2008People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 295-96 , 300 Ill.Dec. 91 , 843 N.E.2d 349, 361 (2006), is Hikewise not pertinent because, although the defendant there had been diagnosed with a variety of conditions, including major depression and paranoid personality disorder, the combination of factors that the Illinois Supreme Court focused on in concluding that the defendant had raised an involuntary intoxication defense-medication, plus the defendant's "lack of sleep and alcohol dependency"-did not involve a mental disease or defect.

2005See In re Marriage of Boyer, supra, 538 N.W.2d at 296 .

2001Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo.1992). [2] In Walton , where a student was injured when a ladder she was using to remove supplies from a loft slipped on a floor that had been recently stripped and sealed, we pointed out that the injuries at issue there resulted from a combination of factors, including a physical condition proximately caused by the public entity's negligence in maintaining its floor, which is a quintessential act of maintenance within the meaning of section 24-10-103(1).

2001Morales, 935 P.2d at 941 ; Boylan, 854 P.2d at 812 (holding that, while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion, a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement).

2001Morales, 935 P.2d at 941 ; Boylan, 854 P.2d at 812 (holding that, while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion, a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement).

1993Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319; O’Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1005 .

1993Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319 ; O'Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1005 .