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11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1995This combination of factors... raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. *274 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citations omitted). 1995This combination of factors... raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. *274 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Teaglegreen1 sentence2017To establish reasonable suspicion in a case such as this, the combination of factors must serve to “distinguish between suspect and innocent behaviors” and eliminate a “substantial portion of innocent travelers,” so as not to “cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to ‘virtually random seizures.’” See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 , ¶ 22 (quoting 5 STATE v. PAUL Decision of the Court Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 25 , and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam)). ¶17 Here, the short period of detention required to conduct the canine search was supported by reasonable suspicion o | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Georgiagreen1 sentence2017To establish reasonable suspicion in a case such as this, the combination of factors must serve to “distinguish between suspect and innocent behaviors” and eliminate a “substantial portion of innocent travelers,” so as not to “cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to ‘virtually random seizures.’” See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 , ¶ 22 (quoting 5 STATE v. PAUL Decision of the Court Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 25 , and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam)). ¶17 Here, the short period of detention required to conduct the canine search was supported by reasonable suspicion o | 1 | 1 |
JEB v. Alabama Ex Rel. TBgreen1 sentence1995Requiring the challenging party to comply with the first step of the Batson analysis is not intended to be a meaningless exercise. "[A] party alleging [racial or] gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike." J.E.B., ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1429 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jeffersgreen2 sentences1994Id. at 405, 684 P.2d at 235 (citing Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 429 , 661 P.2d at 1130 (pointing gun to quiet third person)); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 503 , 707 P.2d 289, 301 (1985) (risk to others factor could not be found merely because defendant took weapon into crowded public place where bystander could be hurt). 1994Id. at 405, 684 P.2d at 235 (citing Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 429 , 661 P.2d at 1130 (pointing gun to quiet third person)); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 503 , 707 P.2d 289, 301 (1985) (risk to others factor could not be found merely because defendant took weapon into crowded public place where bystander could be hurt). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1994Id. at 405, 684 P.2d at 235 (citing Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 429 , 661 P.2d at 1130 (pointing gun to quiet third person)); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 503 , 707 P.2d 289, 301 (1985) (risk to others factor could not be found merely because defendant took weapon into crowded public place where bystander could be hurt). 1994Id. at 405, 684 P.2d at 235 (citing Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 429 , 661 P.2d at 1130 (pointing gun to quiet third person)); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 503 , 707 P.2d 289, 301 (1985) (risk to others factor could not be found merely because defendant took weapon into crowded public place where bystander could be hurt). | 1 | 1 |
Daou v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1989See Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 , 678 P.2d 934 (1984). 2 Likewise in Kleinke , a combination of factors led the New Jersey court to conclude that excusable neglect existed for failure to comply with the New Jersey claims statute. 1989See Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 , 678 P.2d 934 (1984). 2 Likewise in Kleinke , a combination of factors led the New Jersey court to conclude that excusable neglect existed for failure to comply with the New Jersey claims statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sweeney
green
1 sentence2017To establish reasonable suspicion in a case such as this, the combination of factors must serve to “distinguish between suspect and innocent behaviors” and eliminate a “substantial portion of innocent travelers,” so as not to “cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to ‘virtually random seizures.’” See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 , ¶ 22 (quoting 5 STATE v. PAUL Decision of the Court Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 25 , and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam)). ¶17 Here, the short period of detention required to conduct the canine search was supported by reasonable suspicion o | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences1990Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 17. 1990Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 17. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Davis v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1989In making the “ignorance” argument Pritchard relies upon two cases, Davis v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz.App. 402 , 544 P.2d 226 (1976), and Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 , 371 A.2d 785 (1977). 1989In making the “ignorance” argument Pritchard relies upon two cases, Davis v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz.App. 402 , 544 P.2d 226 (1976), and Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 , 371 A.2d 785 (1977). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kleinke v. City of Ocean City
green
2 sentences1989In making the “ignorance” argument Pritchard relies upon two cases, Davis v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz.App. 402 , 544 P.2d 226 (1976), and Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 , 371 A.2d 785 (1977). 1989In making the “ignorance” argument Pritchard relies upon two cases, Davis v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz.App. 402 , 544 P.2d 226 (1976), and Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575 , 371 A.2d 785 (1977). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Koory v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.
neutral
2 sentences1987Paul for the proposition that windstorm insurance covers an insured’s loss only if (1) the damage to the insured property is caused solely by the unaided force of the wind, and (2) the insured property is in “reasonable condition.” These prerequisites were lacking in this case, the trial court reasoned, because “the collapse of the roof was due to a combination of factors, and thus not due to the ‘unaided’ force of the wind____” The court of appeals also framed the issue as “whether the loss resulted from the wind alone,” 153 Ariz. at 410 , 737 P.2d at 386 , and therefore affirmed the trial co 1987Paul for the proposition that windstorm insurance covers an insured’s loss only if (1) the damage to the insured property is caused solely by the unaided force of the wind, and (2) the insured property is in “reasonable condition.” These prerequisites were lacking in this case, the trial court reasoned, because “the collapse of the roof was due to a combination of factors, and thus not due to the ‘unaided’ force of the wind____” The court of appeals also framed the issue as “whether the loss resulted from the wind alone,” 153 Ariz. at 410 , 737 P.2d at 386 , and therefore affirmed the trial co | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Campbell v. City of Palm Springs
green
1 sentence1969In Campbell> the court said, in part: “* * * that the vjew 0f defendant Ward was so blocked by said trees at the *124 intersection and the approaching Chevrolet driven by the defendant McGarrity was so concealed from the defendant Ward until he was in the place of danger, and such was a proximate cause of this accident, and that the condition created, constructed, maintained and operated by appellant City was a dangerous and defective condition, a traffic hazard to motorists using said intersection, and the combination of such factors then and there existing constituted a trap for travelers an | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Corrier v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1969In Corrier v. The Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz.App. 39 , 411 P.2d 462 (1966) this Court found present a combination of factors which converted the hernia situation from the statutory maximum of 60 days compensation (A.R.S. § 23-1043) to an unscheduled disability. 1969In Corrier v. The Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz.App. 39 , 411 P.2d 462 (1966) this Court found present a combination of factors which converted the hernia situation from the statutory maximum of 60 days compensation (A.R.S. § 23-1043) to an unscheduled disability. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Rose v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences1969In Rose v. Orange County, 94 Cal.App.2d 688 , 211 P.2d 45 (1949), the court allowed recovery against the public body on the theory that it had negligently failed to maintain a stop sign in place, which had been placed there by the public body, but which, at the time of the accident, was missing. 1969In Rose v. Orange County, 94 Cal.App.2d 688 , 211 P.2d 45 (1949), the court allowed recovery against the public body on the theory that it had negligently failed to maintain a stop sign in place, which had been placed there by the public body, but which, at the time of the accident, was missing. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Rice v. Standard Oil Co.
neutral
1 sentence1908C.), 134 Fed. 464 , Judge Panning quotes the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, and says: “In one count there may be a charge of an unlawful contract, and in another a charge of an unlawful combination or conspiracy; but the two unlawful things cannot be declared upon as synonymous terms, and charged in a single count.” See, also, Chicago W. & V. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.