combination factors in Connecticut

2018The combination of factors demonstrated a failure to act; however, such a failure is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." 10 Id., at 457-58 , 830 A.2d 372 ; see also Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 806 -807 , 924 A.2d 150 (testimony that employee's injuries were substantially certain to occur when employee's arm was crushed while positioning steel plate in metal bending machine was not sufficient to defeat summary judgment); DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , supra, 100 Conn. App. at 791 -93 , 919 A.2d 525 (expert testimony opining tha

2017The combination of factors demonstrated a failure to act; however, such a failure is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." Id., at 457-58 , 830 A.2d 372 ; see also Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn.App. at 807 , 924 A.2d 150 (holding substantial certainty exception did not apply where plaintiff inserted hand into machine and machine was subsequently turned on due to miscommunication with coworker because fact that plaintiff's employer knew machine was potentially dangerous did not constitute requisite level of intent required under exception).

2020The court discussed the evolution of the substantial certainty doc- trine in Suarez I; Suarez II; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc., supra, 47 Conn. Supp. 638 ; Sorban v. Sterling Engi- neering Corp., supra, 79 Conn. App. 444 ; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 91 ; and noted the factual distinctions and similarities between those cases and the facts of the present case.

2020The court discussed the evolution of the substantial certainty doc- trine in Suarez I; Suarez II; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc., supra, 47 Conn. Supp. 638 ; Sorban v. Sterling Engi- neering Corp., supra, 79 Conn. App. 444 ; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 91 ; and noted the factual distinctions and similarities between those cases and the facts of the present case.

2019Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 436 , 165 A.3d 148 (2017).

2019Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 436 , 165 A.3d 148 (2017).

2018The combination of factors demonstrated a failure to act; however, such a failure is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." 10 Id., at 457-58 , 830 A.2d 372 ; see also Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 806 -807 , 924 A.2d 150 (testimony that employee's injuries were substantially certain to occur when employee's arm was crushed while positioning steel plate in metal bending machine was not sufficient to defeat summary judgment); DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , supra, 100 Conn. App. at 791 -93 , 919 A.2d 525 (expert testimony opining tha

2018The combination of factors demonstrated a failure to act; however, such a failure is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." 10 Id., at 457-58 , 830 A.2d 372 ; see also Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 806 -807 , 924 A.2d 150 (testimony that employee's injuries were substantially certain to occur when employee's arm was crushed while positioning steel plate in metal bending machine was not sufficient to defeat summary judgment); DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , supra, 100 Conn. App. at 791 -93 , 919 A.2d 525 (expert testimony opining tha

2004Brown v. Connecticut, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S. Ct. 1568 , 146 L.

2004Brown v. Connecticut, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S. Ct. 1568 , 146 L.

2004Brown v. Connecticut, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S. Ct. 1568 , 146 L.

2004Intent to murder may be inferred from a combination of factors, including retrieving a gun and then returning to shoot the victim; State v. Tomasko, 238 Conn. 253, 259 , 681 A.2d 922 (1996); using a deadly weapon on the victim’s body parts; id.; fleeing from the crime scene with a participant in the crime; State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611, 653 , 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied sub nom.

2004Intent to murder may be inferred from a combination of factors, including retrieving a gun and then returning to shoot the victim; State v. Tomasko, 238 Conn. 253, 259 , 681 A.2d 922 (1996); using a deadly weapon on the victim’s body parts; id.; fleeing from the crime scene with a participant in the crime; State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611, 653 , 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied sub nom.

2004Intent to murder may be inferred from a combination of factors, including retrieving a gun and then returning to shoot the victim; State v. Tomasko, 238 Conn. 253, 259 , 681 A.2d 922 (1996); using a deadly weapon on the victim’s body parts; id.; fleeing from the crime scene with a participant in the crime; State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611, 653 , 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied sub nom.

2004Intent to murder may be inferred from a combination of factors, including retrieving a gun and then returning to shoot the victim; State v. Tomasko, 238 Conn. 253, 259 , 681 A.2d 922 (1996); using a deadly weapon on the victim’s body parts; id.; fleeing from the crime scene with a participant in the crime; State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611, 653 , 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied sub nom.

2001A combination of factors, any of which judged on their own would be much less compelling, provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable [trier of fact] to conclude that [the plaintiffs] explanation for failing to hire [the complainant] was a pretext for impermissible discrimination. " (Internal quotation marks omitted; parentheses omitted.) Id.

1999Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 515 , 144 A.2d 306 (1958), and the majority in this case recognizes, Elm City’s use of return milk, its supplier and customer lists, and the unique process used to quickly dry the cheese product, catering to a niche market, gave it the “ability to combine these elements into a successful. . . process, like the creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients, [and] is a trade secret entitled to protection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This, however, is only the first statutory requirement necessary to qualify as a trade secret.

1999Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 515 , 144 A.2d 306 (1958), and the majority in this case recognizes, Elm City’s use of return milk, its supplier and customer lists, and the unique process used to quickly dry the cheese product, catering to a niche market, gave it the “ability to combine these elements into a successful. . . process, like the creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients, [and] is a trade secret entitled to protection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This, however, is only the first statutory requirement necessary to qualify as a trade secret.

1999Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp. , 552 F.2d 1277 , 1282 (CA 7, 1977) 2 The Fifth Circuit adopted a combination test for the last criteria which said that "after the termination, the employer hired a person not in [the plaintiff's] protected class or retained those having comparable or lesser CT Page 8698 qualifications not in plaintiff's protected class." Whiting v. Jackson State University , 616 F.2d 116 , 121 (CA 5, 1980).

1999Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp. , 552 F.2d 1277 , 1282 (CA 7, 1977) 2 The Fifth Circuit adopted a combination test for the last criteria which said that "after the termination, the employer hired a person not in [the plaintiff's] protected class or retained those having comparable or lesser CT Page 8698 qualifications not in plaintiff's protected class." Whiting v. Jackson State University , 616 F.2d 116 , 121 (CA 5, 1980).

1998"A public nuisance exists if: (1) the condition complained of has a natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created is a continuing one; (3) the use of the land is unreasonable or unlawful; and (4) the condition or conduct complained of interferes with a right common to the general public." Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook , 237 Conn. 135 , 162-63 , 676 A.2d 795 (1996). "[L]iability can be imposed on the municipality only in the event that, if the condition constitute[s] a nuisance, it was created by some positive act of the municipality." Id.

1998"A public nuisance exists if: (1) the condition complained of has a natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created is a continuing one; (3) the use of the land is unreasonable or unlawful; and (4) the condition or conduct complained of interferes with a right common to the general public." Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook , 237 Conn. 135 , 162-63 , 676 A.2d 795 (1996). "[L]iability can be imposed on the municipality only in the event that, if the condition constitute[s] a nuisance, it was created by some positive act of the municipality." Id.

1998In People v. Salley, 153 App. Div. 2d 704, 544 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1989), the court examined the issue of whether the defendant, a woman who was living with a man named Taylor and Kenneth, a three year old who was the son of Taylor’s estranged wife and another man, as well as five other children, was guilty of manslaughter in the second degree for failing to secure medical attention for Kenneth, who was being physically abused by Taylor.

1986In State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418, 434 , 493 A.2d 513 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: “Although [a] trial court must carefully consider [a] prosecutor’s decision to reprosecute in reaching its conclusion regarding dismissal, and defer to it when the balance does not otherwise compel dismissal, [a] prosecutor’s discretion is itself subject to the power of the court.” In this case, the trial court found “cause” not to proceed with the defendant’s trial in a combination of factors including the improbability of further incarceration, even if the defendant were again convicted, and the

1986In State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418, 434 , 493 A.2d 513 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: “Although [a] trial court must carefully consider [a] prosecutor’s decision to reprosecute in reaching its conclusion regarding dismissal, and defer to it when the balance does not otherwise compel dismissal, [a] prosecutor’s discretion is itself subject to the power of the court.” In this case, the trial court found “cause” not to proceed with the defendant’s trial in a combination of factors including the improbability of further incarceration, even if the defendant were again convicted, and the

1985Id., 360 .

1984A combination of factors persuades us that the court not only “would have been well advised to have exercised its discretion in favor of permitting the inquiry”; State v. Asherman, supra, 721 ; but also that it abused its admittedly “wide discretion in fixing the limits of cross-examination . . . on the issue of credibility”; State v. Miller, 186 Conn. 654, 670 , 443 A.2d 906 (1982); in barring that inquiry.

1984A combination of factors persuades us that the court not only “would have been well advised to have exercised its discretion in favor of permitting the inquiry”; State v. Asherman, supra, 721 ; but also that it abused its admittedly “wide discretion in fixing the limits of cross-examination . . . on the issue of credibility”; State v. Miller, 186 Conn. 654, 670 , 443 A.2d 906 (1982); in barring that inquiry.

1942Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 Conn. 221, 227 , 10 Atl. (2d) 600.