combination factors in Florida

2023The Court concluded its analysis by showing that a combination of factors created the competent substantial evidence of donative intent: While one factor independently—such as Wife signing the Warranty Deed or being listed on the mortgage, or Wife’s unfettered access to and autonomy in residing, maintaining, and improving [the marital residence]—does not establish an interspousal gift for purposes of equitable distribution in a dissolution of marriage, viewing Husband’s actions comprehensively leads us to conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that [th

2014Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A. v. Mullin, 602 So.2d 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), Bradstreet v. Taraschi, 529 So.2d 809, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), and Palmer v. Servís, 393 So.2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), are prejudgment discovery cases which require more narrowly tailored discovery requests and which do not involve the same considerations as postjudgment discovery cases (i.e., enabling the judgment creditor to locate assets in aid of execution of judgment).

2014Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A. v. Mullin, 602 So.2d 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), Bradstreet v. Taraschi, 529 So.2d 809, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), and Palmer v. Servís, 393 So.2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), are prejudgment discovery cases which require more narrowly tailored discovery requests and which do not involve the same considerations as postjudgment discovery cases (i.e., enabling the judgment creditor to locate assets in aid of execution of judgment).

2014Id.

2011Thus, obtaining blood based on probable cause appears to be constitutionally permissible even in misdemeanor DUI cases not involving an accident or serious injury. [2] The trial court also found that the blood draw was not authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a), which mandates that a police officer shall require a driver to submit to a blood test, by reasonable force if necessary, if the officer has probable cause to believe "that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages ... has caused the death or serious bodily injury of

2011Sincerely, Pam Bondi Attorney General PB/tgh 1 See http://www.biscayneparkfl.gov/index.asp, Biscayne Park Foundation, and Village of Biscayne Park, Biscayne Park Foundation Board Member Application. 2 "Corporate Purposes," Articles of Incorporation of Biscayne Park Foundation, Inc., executed April 10, 2007. 3 See Bylaw I: Membership, Amended Bylaws of Biscayne Park Foundation, Inc., adopted September 14, 2010. 4 Id. ss. 1, 3, and 5, Bylaw II: Board of Directors. 5 See s. 4, Bylaw II, supra n. 3. 6 Bylaw II: Board of Directors, supra n. 3. 7 Bylaw III: Officers, supra n. 3. 8 Sections 119.01 an

2011Sincerely, Pam Bondi Attorney General PB/tgh 1 See http://www.biscayneparkfl.gov/index.asp, Biscayne Park Foundation, and Village of Biscayne Park, Biscayne Park Foundation Board Member Application. 2 "Corporate Purposes," Articles of Incorporation of Biscayne Park Foundation, Inc., executed April 10, 2007. 3 See Bylaw I: Membership, Amended Bylaws of Biscayne Park Foundation, Inc., adopted September 14, 2010. 4 Id. ss. 1, 3, and 5, Bylaw II: Board of Directors. 5 See s. 4, Bylaw II, supra n. 3. 6 Bylaw II: Board of Directors, supra n. 3. 7 Bylaw III: Officers, supra n. 3. 8 Sections 119.01 an

1999As in Staten, 519 So.2d at 624 , where there was direct testimony that the defendant was present on numerous occasions when the proposed robbery was planned, further discussion as the group drove to the scene to execute the plan and the defendant waited in the car across the street, we find that "from this combination of factors, the jury could legitimately infer that [the defendant] was a participant in the crime." Id.

1999As in Staten, 519 So.2d at 624 , where there was direct testimony that the defendant was present on numerous occasions when the proposed robbery was planned, further discussion as the group drove to the scene to execute the plan and the defendant waited in the car across the street, we find that "from this combination of factors, the jury could legitimately infer that [the defendant] was a participant in the crime." Id.

1994This instruction appears to be a combination of the standard instruction on "attempt," [1] the statutory definition of felony murder, [2] and the case law interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, which requires an enhanced penalty for a person convicted of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." Isaac v. State, 626 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1994); Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1992).

1994Although the lower court did the best it could to fashion an adequate jury instruction on attempted felony murder (an effort in which defense counsel appears on this record to have been utterly uninterested), the instruction given was so defective that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. [3] The problem is that the instruction, as given, cannot be understood and cannot be applied by a jury in a manner consistent with Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1984).

1994This instruction appears to be a combination of the standard instruction on "attempt," [1] the statutory definition of felony murder, [2] and the case law interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, which requires an enhanced penalty for a person convicted of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." Isaac v. State, 626 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1994); Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1992).

1993Central Blood Bank, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (Common Pleas 1987); the physician-patient privilege, see Krygier v. Airweld, 137 Misc.2d 306 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1987); or a combination of these factors, see Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen.

1993Central Blood Bank, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (Common Pleas 1987); the physician-patient privilege, see Krygier v. Airweld, 137 Misc.2d 306 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1987); or a combination of these factors, see Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen.

1993Central Blood Bank, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (Common Pleas 1987); the physician-patient privilege, see Krygier v. Airweld, 137 Misc.2d 306 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1987); or a combination of these factors, see Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen.

1993Hosp., 555 So.2d 1381 (La. 1990).

1993Central Blood Bank, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (Common Pleas 1987); the physician-patient privilege, see Krygier v. Airweld, 137 Misc.2d 306 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1987); or a combination of these factors, see Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen.

1993Central Blood Bank, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (Common Pleas 1987); the physician-patient privilege, see Krygier v. Airweld, 137 Misc.2d 306 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1987); or a combination of these factors, see Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen.

1992Cf. Pan American Bank v. Glinski, 584 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (award of permanent total disability benefits appropriate, even in the absence of medical evidence that claimant is totally unable to work, when evidence establishes that physical restrictions placed upon claimant effectively eliminate all types of employment within claimant’s capacity and qualifications).

1991Glosson, 462 So.2d at 1085 .

1989Bell v. State, 522 So.2d 989, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Guzie v. State, 512 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Hadley v. State, 488 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Von Carter v. State, 468 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).