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11 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steward v. Goodgreen2 sentences2010Compare Steward, 51 Wash.App. at 513 , 754 P.2d 150 (noting that the bona fide purchasers had little real estate investing experience at the time of the sale) and Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash.2d 170, 176 , 685 P.2d 1074 (1984) (holding that the purchaser with 23 years of investment experience was not a bona fide purchaser). 2010Compare Steward, 51 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Miebach v. Colasurdogreen2 sentences2010Compare Steward, 51 Wash.App. at 513 , 754 P.2d 150 (noting that the bona fide purchasers had little real estate investing experience at the time of the sale) and Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash.2d 170, 176 , 685 P.2d 1074 (1984) (holding that the purchaser with 23 years of investment experience was not a bona fide purchaser). 2010Compare Steward, 51 Wash.App. at 513 , 754 P.2d 150 (noting that the bona fide purchasers had little real estate investing experience at the time of the sale) and Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash.2d 170, 176 , 685 P.2d 1074 (1984) (holding that the purchaser with 23 years of investment experience was not a bona fide purchaser). | 1 | 1 |
Marcia R. LIEBERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward v. GANT Et Al., Defendants-Appelleesgreen1 sentence1985Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir.1980)." The court listed the following factors: (1) Tenure contracts entail unusual commitments as to length of time and collegial relationships; (2) academic tenure decisions are often noncompetitive; (3) university tenure decisions are usually highly decentralized, although authority to overrule departmental decisions may exist since "the downside risk of affirmative decisions is greater than that of negative ones, but the deference given to departmental decisions grows as a case travels up the chain of authority"; (4) the number of factors consider | 1 | 1 |
Donna Zahorik, Judith Long Laws, Antonia Glasse and Charlotte Farris v. Cornell Universitygreen1 sentence1985See generally Special Comm, on *678 Educ. & Law of the Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, Due Process in Decisions Relating to Tenure in Higher Education, 11 J.C. & U. L. 323, 330 & n.33 (1984) (hereafter "Due Process in Tenure") (governing board of institution has ultimate authority to grant tenure). 5 In Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1984), the court noted that "tenure decisions in an academic setting involve a combination of factors which tend to set them apart from employment decisions generally. | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen2 sentences1984See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 , 54 L. 1984See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 , 54 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas A. Warren, John L. Warren, Jr., Des. E. Schick and David Definagreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); LaPoint v. State, 650 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Short v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); LaPoint v. State, 650 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Grewe
green
2 sentences2002Although, as noted above, the list of mitigating factors is not exclusive, any reasons that are relied on for deviating from the standard range must “distinguish the defendant’s crime from others in the same category.” State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993) (citing State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 216 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). 2002Although, as noted above, the list of mitigating factors is not exclusive, any reasons that are relied on for deviating from the standard range must “distinguish the defendant’s crime from others in the same category.” State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993) (citing State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 216 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2002Although, as noted above, the list of mitigating factors is not exclusive, any reasons that are relied on for deviating from the standard range must “distinguish the defendant’s crime from others in the same category.” State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993) (citing State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 216 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). 2002Although, as noted above, the list of mitigating factors is not exclusive, any reasons that are relied on for deviating from the standard range must “distinguish the defendant’s crime from others in the same category.” State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993) (citing State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 216 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1998But the combination of these factors makes this intrusion unreasonable, especially in light of our decision in State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. 1998App. 692 , 879 P.2d 984 (1994). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1989This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. [ 476 U.S. at 96 .] Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. . . . [W]e emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. 1989But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption—or his intuitive judgment—that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. [ 476 U.S. at 97 .] (Citations omitted.) Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-97 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Welch v. Railroad Crossing, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Because Welch v. Railroad Crossing, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), ignores this consideration, I find that analysis unpersuasive. 1989Because Welch v. Railroad Crossing, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), ignores this consideration, I find that analysis unpersuasive. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
LaPoint v. State
green
1 sentence1984See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); LaPoint v. State, 650 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking MacHine Co.
green
1 sentence1932J. 233, is: “Every element included in a combination claim must be regarded as material, and therefore the claim covers nothing less than the entire combination.” In Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301 , the court said: *320 “A combination is a union of elements, which, may be partly old and partly new, or wholly old or wholly new. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.