combination factors in District of Columbia

1998Based upon A.H.B.'s history of neglect, caused by a combination of factors, and the showing that her progress and improvement have been, at best, slight, we sustain the court's holding that she is in no position to care for F.N.B. [4] The trial court in T.J. stressed the deep attachment that had developed between the child and the proposed adoptive mother, with whom he had resided for several years. 666 A.2d at 9 . [5] We observed that the mother "had not been adjudicated as a mother who failed, voluntarily, to provide proper parental care." In re T.J., supra, 666 A.2d at 10 . [6] In T.J., the

1998Based upon A.H.B.'s history of neglect, caused by a combination of factors, and the showing that her progress and improvement have been, at best, slight, we sustain the court's holding that she is in no position to care for F.N.B. [4] The trial court in T.J. stressed the deep attachment that had developed between the child and the proposed adoptive mother, with whom he had resided for several years. 666 A.2d at 9 . [5] We observed that the mother "had not been adjudicated as a mother who failed, voluntarily, to provide proper parental care." In re T.J., supra, 666 A.2d at 10 . [6] In T.J., the

2002Grand jury testimony is admissible as substantive evidence under D.C.Code § 14-102, 5 see Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1195 , and the trial court has broad discretion to determine the propriety of impeachment under section 14-102.

2001District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C.1987) (citing Lacy, 424 A.2d at 323 ). “[T]his heightened showing does not require previous occurrences of the particular type of harm, but can be met instead by a combination of factors which give defendants an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act.” Doe, 524 A.2d at 33 .

1997Id. at 928 .

1996The combination of these factors caused the court to conclude that the trial judge “should have sought alternative means to protect both parties or forced the Government to choose between its proof and the joint trial.” Id.

1996This prima facie showing is a question of law, whether the combination of factors from empaneling and selecting the jury raises the “necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.” Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 885 (D.C.1992) (quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ).

1996This prima facie showing is a question of law, whether the combination of factors from empaneling and selecting the jury raises the “necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.” Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 885 (D.C.1992) (quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ).

1992Likewise, in Gayden, supra, 492 A.2d at 874 , the court concluded that, despite repeated advice that he could leave at any time, the defendant could reasonably conclude that he needed police permission to leave as a result of a combination of factors, including the length of time that he spent in the police department (over five hours) giving rise to a growing sense of isolation from family and friends, the layout of the interrogation room, the constant company of armed police, and the skepticism of the police about the defendant’s first statement, as re-fleeted in accusatory questions about h

1992Likewise, in Gayden, supra, 492 A.2d at 874 , the court concluded that, despite repeated advice that he could leave at any time, the defendant could reasonably conclude that he needed police permission to leave as a result of a combination of factors, including the length of time that he spent in the police department (over five hours) giving rise to a growing sense of isolation from family and friends, the layout of the interrogation room, the constant company of armed police, and the skepticism of the police about the defendant’s first statement, as re-fleeted in accusatory questions about h

1986The court suppressed a gun found in the paper bag, finding that the combination of factors, each “capable of innocent interpretation,” do not “build to form the requisite objective basis for the particularized suspicion required to justify a Terry stop.” 424 Mich. at 64 , 378 N.W.2d at 461 .

1986The court suppressed a gun found in the paper bag, finding that the combination of factors, each “capable of innocent interpretation,” do not “build to form the requisite objective basis for the particularized suspicion required to justify a Terry stop.” 424 Mich. at 64 , 378 N.W.2d at 461 .

1979A. Whalem and Later Cases In Whalem , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held that when there is sufficient question as to a defendant’s mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. . . . [I]n the pursuit of justice, a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant . . . [Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 337-38 , 346 F.2d at 818-19 .] [ 11 ] The court declined to establish specific standards to guide trial judges in exercising their discretion. 12 The court stated, ambig

1979A. Whalem and Later Cases In Whalem , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held that when there is sufficient question as to a defendant’s mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. . . . [I]n the pursuit of justice, a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant . . . [Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 337-38 , 346 F.2d at 818-19 .] [ 11 ] The court declined to establish specific standards to guide trial judges in exercising their discretion. 12 The court stated, ambig

1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself.

1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant's right to represent himself.

1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself.

1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself.