75 California opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13 .) Here, the court did not make factual findings regarding any of the stated reasons, and denied the motion with minimal comment, which indicates that it was not making a stage 12 In People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 , our Supreme Court explained, “Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 2016(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13 .) Here, the court did not make factual findings regarding any of the stated reasons, and denied the motion with minimal comment, which indicates that it was not making a stage 12 In People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 , our Supreme Court explained, “Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2021Because Mixon did not present a prima facie case of gender-based exclusion, the prosecutor was not obligated to 31 explain his reasons for dismissing these prospective jurors.18 (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 [“a party exercising a strike thus has no obligation to articulate a reason until an inference of discrimination has been raised”].) F. Conclusion Our Supreme Court has recognized “‘that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge’; that ‘the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks 2021Because Mixon did not present a prima facie case of gender-based exclusion, the prosecutor was not obligated to 31 explain his reasons for dismissing these prospective jurors.18 (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 [“a party exercising a strike thus has no obligation to articulate a reason until an inference of discrimination has been raised”].) F. Conclusion Our Supreme Court has recognized “‘that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge’; that ‘the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks | 2 | 2 |
Pizarro v. Lamb's Players Theatregreen2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Starkman v. Mann Theaters Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1491, 1499 (Starkman); Pizarro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176; Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1402-1403 (Javorsky); see also Sargoy, supra, 4 Candelore rightly points out that the complaint alleges only that Tinder has publicly stated the budget constraints of its younger users were one among “ ‘a combination of factors’ ” that led it to adopt the chosen price points for “ ‘certain age demographics.’ ” We agree with his contention that the allegation concerning Tinder’s public statement 2018(See, e.g., Starkman v. Mann Theaters Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1491, 1499 (Starkman); Pizarro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176; Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1402-1403 (Javorsky); see also Sargoy, supra, 4 Candelore rightly points out that the complaint alleges only that Tinder has publicly stated the budget constraints of its younger users were one among “ ‘a combination of factors’ ” that led it to adopt the chosen price points for “ ‘certain age demographics.’ ” We agree with his contention that the allegation concerning Tinder’s public statement | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bonillagreen2 sentences2016(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13 .) Here, the court did not make factual findings regarding any of the stated reasons, and denied the motion with minimal comment, which indicates that it was not making a stage 12 In People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 , our Supreme Court explained, “Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 2016(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13 .) Here, the court did not make factual findings regarding any of the stated reasons, and denied the motion with minimal comment, which indicates that it was not making a stage 12 In People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220 , our Supreme Court explained, “Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jimenezred2 sentences1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi 1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Arandagreen2 sentences2024We believe that, for practical purposes, the instruction lowered the standard of proof for the determination of guilt.” (Id. at p. 1186.) Although the Cruz court acknowledged that the trial court had also given a proper jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard, and that 37 “[o]ther instructions reiterated that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to the ultimate question of guilt” (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184 ), it nevertheless found that “the combination of that instruction with the preponderance instruction for charged offenses produced a hopeless muddle.” (Id. at p. 1186 2016As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 365 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 283 P.3d 632 ], an instructional error that has the effect of lowering the reasonable doubt standard for guilt is one of the few errors deemed “structural” and therefore reversible per se. | 1 | 3 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2014Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact. ‘Even an inflection in the voice can make a difference in the meaning.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, we have recognized “that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge”; that “the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box”; and that “the same factors used in evaluating a juror may be given different we 2003In Wheeler , we said that we will ‘rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.’ (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) Similarly, the high court stated in Batson v. Kentucky, supra, that ‘the trial judge’s findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,’ and for that reason ‘a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.’ ( 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 .)” (Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal. | 1 | 3 |
Minton v. Cavaneygreen2 sentences2024(Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 576, 581 .)” (NEC Electronics, supra, at p. 781 .) It is not enough that a chief executive officer and sole shareholder of a corporation is “aware” of the litigation. 1989(Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 576, 581 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 364 P.2d 473 ].) In this case, Hurt delegated responsibility for the claim to Finelli. | 1 | 2 |
Wolf Metals Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales Inc.green2 sentences2022“Under the alter ego doctrine, ... when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons ... actually controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners. [Citations.] The alter ego doctrine prevents individuals ... from misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham corporate entity formed for the purpose of committing fraud or other misdeeds.’ ” (Wolf Metals, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 703 2021As a result, we do not believe that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that [the shareholder] controlled the action between [the plaintiff] and Ph.” (Id. at p. 781.) More recently, in Wolf Metals Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales, Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 698, 708 (Wolf Metals), the court reversed an order amending a judgment under circumstances “materially identical” to Motores. | 1 | 2 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2015Our finding that Elias’s statements were involuntary is based on a combination of factors: (1) Elias’s youth, which rendered him “ ‘most susceptible to influence,’ Eddings [v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]], and *587 ‘outside pressures,’ Roper [v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ]].” (J. 2015Our finding that Elias’s statements were involuntary is based on a combination of factors: (1) Elias’s youth, which rendered him “ ‘most susceptible to influence,’ Eddings [v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]], and *587 ‘outside pressures,’ Roper [v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ]].” (J. | 1 | 2 |
Mixon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2015(Mixon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 [“a dangerous condition of public property may be based on a combination of factors”].) Considering each factor in isolation led the trial court to apply disconnected rules of law pertaining to the marking of crosswalks and the conduct of third party motorists and overlook the panorama of conditions present. 2015(Id. at p. 1183.) To reach a contrary conclusion, the majority agrees with plaintiffs, based on their expert’s declaration, that “triable issues of material fact exist based on the frequency of use by children, the presence of three schools, shopping centers that are frequented by the school children in this residential neighborhood, insufficient traffic gaps, combined with inadequate crosswalk painting at the intersection, lack of traffic controls at this intersection when conditions require them, as well as a prior history of accidents and studies of the intersection.” (Maj. opn., at pp. 12- | 1 | 2 |
Eddings v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2015Our finding that Elias’s statements were involuntary is based on a combination of factors: (1) Elias’s youth, which rendered him “ ‘most susceptible to influence,’ Eddings [v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]], and *587 ‘outside pressures,’ Roper [v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ]].” (J. 2015Our finding that Elias’s statements were involuntary is based on a combination of factors: (1) Elias’s youth, which rendered him “ ‘most susceptible to influence,’ Eddings [v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 1 , 102 S.Ct. 869 ]], and *587 ‘outside pressures,’ Roper [v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ]].” (J. | 1 | 2 |
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Districtgreen2 sentences2013Such lesser weakness need not be longlasting nor wholly incapacitating, but 14 may be merely a lack of full vigor due to age [citation], physical condition [citation], emotional anguish [citation], or a combination of such factors." (Odorizzi, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at p. 131 .) "In some of its aspects this lesser weakness could perhaps be called weakness of spirit. 1968Code, § 1575; see Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at p. 131 .) The last mentioned statute, in subdivision 2 thereof, provides that undue influence consits “In taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind. ...” In, Odorizzi it is noted that the lesser weakness of mind referred to in *835 section 1575 need not be long lasting or wholly incapacitating, but may consist of such factors as lack of full vigor due to age, physical condition, emotional anguish, or a combination of such factors. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2003In Wheeler , we said that we will ‘rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.’ (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) Similarly, the high court stated in Batson v. Kentucky, supra, that ‘the trial judge’s findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,’ and for that reason ‘a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.’ ( 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 .)” (Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal. 1990(See generally, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, fn. 26.) However, defendant did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination or systematic exclusion solely by his observation that one prospective juror peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor was Black. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Zavalagreen1 sentence2026(People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 6 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742-1743 ; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 45, 48 ; People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 405-406 .) Moreover, his repeated refusal to take a drug test is “reasonably interpreted as a consciousness of guilt” given his intoxicated state, and it provided further “probable cause.” (Marvin v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720 ; see also People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 740 .) Officer Lopez’s Credibility Appellant contends Lopez’s credibility was impeached by the bodycam video evidence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sanchezgreen1 sentence2026(People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 6 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742-1743 ; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 45, 48 ; People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 405-406 .) Moreover, his repeated refusal to take a drug test is “reasonably interpreted as a consciousness of guilt” given his intoxicated state, and it provided further “probable cause.” (Marvin v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720 ; see also People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 740 .) Officer Lopez’s Credibility Appellant contends Lopez’s credibility was impeached by the bodycam video evidence. | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Department of Justicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oyakawa v. Gillettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Denham v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Motores De Mexicali v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sargoy v. Resolution Trust Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Koire v. Metro Car Washgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Carl R.green | 1 | 1 |
| J. D. B. v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Antenor v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sabi v. Sterlinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Freemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeHoyosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Church v. Capital Freight Linesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salas v. Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Statengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Santascoygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffin v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guitongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ordonez
green
2 sentences2023The duration of the interaction between victims and perpetrators is therefore one consideration in assessing whether a defendant was recklessly indifferent to human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 .) We held in Ordonez’s initial appeal that “aggravated kidnapping for ransom, extortion or reward (§ 209, subd. (a)) is 17 an offense carrying ‘a high probability’ that death will result,” and is “an offense inherently dangerous to human life.” (Ordonez, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1228 .) We observed, “‘[K]idnapping for ransom inherently presents a combination of factors creating a subst 2010Section 209(a)’s severe penalties of life imprisonment with or without parole are sensible only because kidnapping for ransom is “an offense inherently dangerous to human life.” (People v. Ordonez, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1228 .) Although kidnapping for ransom does not require asportation (which carries innate risk of harm), it “has other features that heighten the danger to the victim.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[K]idnapping for ransom inherently presents a combination of factors creating a substantial risk of bodily harm. | 3 | 2010–2023 |
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2026As has been recognized: ‘[C]ertain institutions and enterprises are viewed by the courts as quasi-public in nature: The important products or services which these enterprises provide, their express or implied representations to the public concerning their products or services, their superior bargaining power, legislative recognition 16 of their public aspect, or a combination of these factors, lead courts to impose on these enterprises obligations to the public and the individuals with whom they deal, reflecting the role which they have assumed, apart from and in some cases despite the existen 2008As has been recognized: ‘[Cjertain institutions and enterprises are viewed by the courts as quasi-public in nature: The important products or services which these enterprises provide, their express or implied representations to the public concerning their products or services, their superior bargaining power, legislative recognition of their public aspect, or a combination of these factors, lead courts to impose on these enterprises obligations to the public and the individuals with whom they deal, reflecting the role which they have assumed, apart from and in some cases despite the existence | 2 | 2008–2026 |
NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt
green
2 sentences2024(NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772 , 778–779 (NEC Electronics).) “ ‘Control of the litigation sufficient to overcome due process objections may consist of a combination of factors, usually including the financing of the litigation, the hiring of the attorneys, and control over the course of the litigation.’ [Citation.] Clearly, some active defense of the underlying claim is contemplated. 2022A party may be added as a judgment debtor only if she controlled the underlying litigation and was virtually represented in the underlying litigation because due process “guarantees that any person against whom a claim is asserted in a judicial proceeding shall have the opportunity to be heard and to present his defenses.” (Motores de Mexicali, S.A. v. Superior Court (1958) 51 Cal.2d 172, 176 (Motores).) “ ‘Control of the litigation sufficient to overcome due process objections may consist of a combination of factors, usually including the 7 financing of the litigation, the hiring of attorneys | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Cruz
green
2 sentences2024We believe that, for practical purposes, the instruction lowered the standard of proof for the determination of guilt.” (Id. at p. 1186.) Although the Cruz court acknowledged that the trial court had also given a proper jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard, and that 37 “[o]ther instructions reiterated that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to the ultimate question of guilt” (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184 ), it nevertheless found that “the combination of that instruction with the preponderance instruction for charged offenses produced a hopeless muddle.” (Id. at p. 1186 2018In our *328 view, a jury instruction explaining the use of currently charged offenses to show propensity under Evidence Code section 1108 must resemble the instruction used in Villatoro in specifying that a currently charged offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before it can be used as propensity evidence in support of another currently charged offense." ( Cruz , supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 .) Even though the jury in Cruz was also instructed that the charged offenses had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found "the combination of that inst | 2 | 2018–2024 |
People v. Saldana
green
2 sentences2024Although there were some differences, on balance Garza’s questioning of Mendoza was comparable to the interview in Saldana where a combination of factors created “the sort of police–dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 460 .) Deputy Garza employed varied interrogation techniques specifically highlighted in Miranda as being psychologically coercive, along with the factors that Mendoza was alone at the station in the deputy’s choice of location for questioning, and Mendoza being the single suspect of the molestation. 2022This technique is also significant because it hearkens back to another specifically mentioned by the Miranda court: “point[ing] out the incriminating significance of the suspect’s refusal to talk.” The interview here was like the one in Saldana where the combination of factors created “the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 460 .) We conclude the culmination of this persistent and methodical accusatory questioning wherein Chavez employed varied interrogation techniques specifically highlighted in Miranda | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Chism
green
2 sentences2021Because Mixon did not present a prima facie case of gender-based exclusion, the prosecutor was not obligated to 31 explain his reasons for dismissing these prospective jurors.18 (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 [“a party exercising a strike thus has no obligation to articulate a reason until an inference of discrimination has been raised”].) F. Conclusion Our Supreme Court has recognized “‘that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge’; that ‘the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks 2021Because Mixon did not present a prima facie case of gender-based exclusion, the prosecutor was not obligated to 31 explain his reasons for dismissing these prospective jurors.18 (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387 [“a party exercising a strike thus has no obligation to articulate a reason until an inference of discrimination has been raised”].) F. Conclusion Our Supreme Court has recognized “‘that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge’; that ‘the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Duren
green
2 sentences1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi 1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi | 2 | 1981–1983 |
People v. McCowan
green
2 sentences1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi 1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi | 2 | 1981–1983 |
People v. Booker
green
2 sentences1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi 1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi | 2 | 1981–1983 |
People v. Chen
green
2 sentences1983The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 172 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; *18 People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ].” (In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 291 ].) In the instant case, albeit not involving interrogation, the offenses were related; all counts charged robbery in vi 1981The principal cases are People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 654 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; People v. McCowan (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 611 ]; People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 894 ], overruled on another point in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ]; People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 507 P.2d 1365 ]. 1 *796 In Chen , defendant was questioned on homicides in San Francisco after appointment of counsel on Oakland burglary charges; the court said the officer had no information counsel was appoin | 2 | 1981–1983 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 6 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742-1743 ; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 45, 48 ; People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 405-406 .) Moreover, his repeated refusal to take a drug test is “reasonably interpreted as a consciousness of guilt” given his intoxicated state, and it provided further “probable cause.” (Marvin v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720 ; see also People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 740 .) Officer Lopez’s Credibility Appellant contends Lopez’s credibility was impeached by the bodycam video evidence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Marvin v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 6 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742-1743 ; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 45, 48 ; People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 405-406 .) Moreover, his repeated refusal to take a drug test is “reasonably interpreted as a consciousness of guilt” given his intoxicated state, and it provided further “probable cause.” (Marvin v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720 ; see also People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 740 .) Officer Lopez’s Credibility Appellant contends Lopez’s credibility was impeached by the bodycam video evidence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| United States v. Donato Garcia Maldonado green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Mendoza
green
1 sentence2025The search was justified by the deputies’ reasonable fear for their safety based on a combination of factors including: (1) the time of day (4:00 a.m.) (see People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1082 ); (2) the poorly lit location where the driver stopped the vehicle; (3) the first deputy’s observations that the backseat passengers appeared to be passing something (and perhaps secreting it) just prior to the stop; (4) the nervousness of the male backseat passenger (see United States v. Maldonado (5th Cir. 1995) 42 F.3d 906, 908 ; United States v. Little (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 945 F.Supp. 79, 83 , | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Little
green
1 sentence2025The search was justified by the deputies’ reasonable fear for their safety based on a combination of factors including: (1) the time of day (4:00 a.m.) (see People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1082 ); (2) the poorly lit location where the driver stopped the vehicle; (3) the first deputy’s observations that the backseat passengers appeared to be passing something (and perhaps secreting it) just prior to the stop; (4) the nervousness of the male backseat passenger (see United States v. Maldonado (5th Cir. 1995) 42 F.3d 906, 908 ; United States v. Little (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 945 F.Supp. 79, 83 , | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Hammer green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Nicolas green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Clark green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Chan v. Curran green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dolan v. Buena Engineers, Inc. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Aguimatang v. California State Lottery green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School District green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Cunningham green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified School District green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re GM green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Daniels v. Robbins green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Cole v. Town of Los Gatos green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Smalley v. Baker green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mattos v. Kirby green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Capistran green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Fuentes green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Troxel v. Granville green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Celotex Corp. v. Copeland green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.