extensive inquiry in District of Columbia

2007In some cases, for example, it may be adequate to provide an opportunity for “a mere written response”; in other circumstances, “a personal appearance by the adversely affected individual and a more extensive hearing [may be] required.” Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.3d 267, 279 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 572 P.2d 32, 39 (1977).

2007In some cases, for example, it may be adequate to provide an opportunity for “a mere written response”; in other circumstances, “a personal appearance by the adversely affected individual and a more extensive hearing [may be] required.” Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.3d 267, 279 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 572 P.2d 32, 39 (1977).

2006E.g., Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 355 (D.C.2000); Littlejohn v. United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C.1997); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C.1989).

2006E.g., Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 355 (D.C.2000); Littlejohn v. United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C.1997); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C.1989).

2006We conducted an extensive analysis of the history of section 13-423(a)(l) and (b) in Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 324-330 (D.C.2000) (en banc), which we need not reiterate here.

2006E.g., Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 355 (D.C.2000); Littlejohn v. United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C.1997); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C.1989).

2002On December 23, 1998 petitioner filed his sixth petition for reinstatement. 2 After an extensive hearing, a unanimous Hearing Committee in a twenty-nine page report rejected the petition on the grounds that petitioner had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he satisfied the five criteria for reinstatement outlined in In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985).

1999See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 , 113 S.Ct. 509 , 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (“points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal”) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70 , 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). 10 In order to prevail on this claim, Nixon must therefore demonstrate plain error.

1999See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 , 113 S.Ct. 509 , 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (“points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal”) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70 , 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). 10 In order to prevail on this claim, Nixon must therefore demonstrate plain error.

1999See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 , 113 S.Ct. 509 , 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (“points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal”) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70 , 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). 10 In order to prevail on this claim, Nixon must therefore demonstrate plain error.

1999See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 , 113 S.Ct. 509 , 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (“points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal”) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70 , 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). 10 In order to prevail on this claim, Nixon must therefore demonstrate plain error.

1999See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 , 113 S.Ct. 509 , 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (“points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal”) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70 , 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). 10 In order to prevail on this claim, Nixon must therefore demonstrate plain error.

1995That is my only concern." This statement starkly conveyed the message that appellant had no further concerns which he had not aired as yet. [22] Cf. Pursifell, supra note 11 , 746 P.2d at 272-74 (Utah App.1987) (where court mainly inquired into issue that was focus of defendant's complaint, no reversible error, even though defendant suggests on appeal that "had the trial court conducted a more extensive inquiry into the reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a myriad of complaints about the quality of defendant's representation.") [23] To prevail on a claim of ineffec

1995That is my only concern." This statement starkly conveyed the message that appellant had no further concerns which he had not aired as yet. [22] Cf. Pursifell, supra note 11 , 746 P.2d at 272-74 (Utah App.1987) (where court mainly inquired into issue that was focus of defendant's complaint, no reversible error, even though defendant suggests on appeal that "had the trial court conducted a more extensive inquiry into the reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a myriad of complaints about the quality of defendant's representation.") [23] To prevail on a claim of ineffec

1995Although some prejudice is unavoidable given the nature of this evidence, see Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C.1986), the prejudicial impact of this tape is far less than the prejudice created by an extensive inquiry into a rape victim’s sexual history.

1995Although some prejudice is unavoidable given the nature of this evidence, see Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C. 1986), the prejudicial impact of this tape is far less than the prejudice created by an extensive inquiry into a rape victim's sexual history.

1995The extensive analysis in Part III, however, is not so much an application of law to facts as was called for in Thompson 1, 570 A.2d at 285-86 (concerning whether mental injuries were disabling within meaning of CMPA); see Thompson II, 593 A.2d at 635 (reaffirming Part II of Thompson I ruling on CMPA disability provisions).

1995The extensive analysis in Part III, however, is not so much an application of law to facts as was called for in Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 285-86 (concerning whether mental injuries were disabling within meaning of CMPA); see Thompson II, 593 A.2d at 635 (reaffirming Part II of Thompson I ruling on CMPA disability provisions).

1995See Kinard v. United States, 635 A.2d 1297, 1303 (D.C.1993).

1995The extensive analysis in Part III, however, is not so much an application of law to facts as was called for in Thompson 1, 570 A.2d at 285-86 (concerning whether mental injuries were disabling within meaning of CMPA); see Thompson II, 593 A.2d at 635 (reaffirming Part II of Thompson I ruling on CMPA disability provisions).

1995The extensive analysis in Part III, however, is not so much an application of law to facts as was called for in Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 285-86 (concerning whether mental injuries were disabling within meaning of CMPA); see Thompson II, 593 A.2d at 635 (reaffirming Part II of Thompson I ruling on CMPA disability provisions).

1995Cf. Pursifell, supra note 11 , 746 P.2d at 272-74 (Utah App.1987) (where court mainly inquired into issue that was focus of defendant's complaint, no reversible error, even though defendant suggests on appeal that “had the trial court conducted a more extensive inquiry into the reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a myriad of complaints about the quality of defendant's representation.”) .

1995Cf. Pursifell, supra note 11 , 746 P.2d at 272-74 (Utah App.1987) (where court mainly inquired into issue that was focus of defendant's complaint, no reversible error, even though defendant suggests on appeal that “had the trial court conducted a more extensive inquiry into the reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a myriad of complaints about the quality of defendant's representation.”) .

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1983Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1243-44 (D.C.1979); see also Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 529-30 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 , 102 S.Ct. 635 , 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820-21 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 , 99 S.Ct. 621 , 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978).

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N

1979We must decide, however, whether the husband’s motion to withhold entry of the order was effective to withdraw his consent from the judgment. 5 In Conrad v. Medina, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 562 (1946), this court’s predecessor stated that, “A duly rendered judgment is binding and enforceable between the parties, even though through neglect it has not been entered.” Id. at 564 ; accord Krasner *965 v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga.App. 892, 894 , 204 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1974); Jones v. Galbasini, 134 Colo. 64, 67 , 299 P.2d 503, 506 (1956) (en banc); In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 529 , 112 N